

**INDEX OF EXHIBITS TO DECLARATION OF CINDY PÁNUCO IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER**

Puente et al. v. City of Phoenix, et al.,
CV 18-2778-PHX-JJT

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Decl. Panuco ISO Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

Ex. 1

7:19 PM



ACU

Decl. Panuco ISO Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

Ex. 2

*Motion for leave to file non-electronic exhibits to be filed

Decl. Panuco ISO Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

Ex. 3



City of Phoenix

To: Ed Zuercher
City Manager

Date: January 29, 2018

From: Jeri L. Williams *JLW*
Police Chief

Subject: PRESIDENTIAL VISIT AFTER ACTION REPORT

On August 22, 2017, a presidential visit to Phoenix put our community on the worldwide stage. While the City of Phoenix is experienced and well respected in hosting large scale events of this nature, this particular event brought with it dynamics that created an environment that would eventually challenge our city, our residents and our police department.

For perspective, hosting a Super Bowl takes 18-months of planning and preparation. The scheduling of this event required a similar level of planning and security but with only six days' notice. In addition, the itinerary kept evolving and with just a couple days' notice, we learned that this presidential visit would be unique as it also included the U.S. vice president, the president's chief of staff and the U.S. secretary of housing and urban development. It was a rare scheduling of so many dignitaries for one event, which required extra layers of logistics with local, state and federal partners.

In the weeks' prior, cities throughout the country were experiencing free speech rallies with tragic consequences. Boston and Berkeley had increasing levels of violence and destruction. We know the Charlottesville rally ended in a death. National media stories on the issues in other cities put a heightened spotlight on Phoenix as hundreds of local and national media were assigned to cover the rally in our city.

For the Phoenix event, we had enough pre-information to expect multiple, diverse groups of the public with differing, and in many cases, conflicting views. The list of groups planning to attend the event, in both protest and support, grew by the hour indicating we should expect thousands of people. It is important to recognize that the vast majority of participants were peaceful, organized and respectful. Free speech and expression were celebrated. Community groups did extensive planning to be prepared for the hot weather where temperatures reached more than 100 degrees.

Good policing, especially in high-profile situations, requires information, communication and objective leadership to serve all members of the community. It is a graceful balance to maintain peace where there is discord. As your Police Chief, I am dedicated to doing everything possible to preserve life, prevent injury and protect property – for everyone.

As we developed and implemented our Operations Plan, our goal was to provide for a safe event with preservation of life and property at the top of our list. My instructions to our officers

Ed Zuercher
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were clear: be professional, decisive, and immediately responsive. We would not allow criminal conduct to endanger our residents and visitors.

As with any critical incident, it is our responsibility to objectively review our actions to determine what is working and what needs improvement. Supervisors from the Professional Standards Bureau worked tirelessly to review our Operations Plan and official actions taken during the event to determine if our actions were just and necessary. As expected, some areas for improvement were identified and we are making adjustments to our response model to better serve our community. My high-level summary of the After Action Report includes:

What Went Well

Before: The use of an Incident Management Team to staff our planning and preparations was well orchestrated. This model, used during large scale events, allows us to combine resources from a variety of partners including law enforcement agencies, fire departments, and other city, county, state and federal services. Over 100 public and private partners contributed to this event with thousands of dedicated sworn and non-sworn individuals providing support.

During: The Police Department maintained operational consistency. Regular police services continued throughout the City while nearly 1,000 public safety professionals staffed this event. The President, the Vice President, and the other high level dignitaries remained safe throughout their visit. Officers working the event operated as a singular component under the direction of the Incident Commander.

After: There was no loss of life related to this event. There were minimal reports of injury related to this event. There was no significant property damage related to this event.

Areas for Improvement

Before: We must increase our use of communication platforms to educate and inform the community on acceptable and unacceptable conduct with repetitive messages carried out as often as possible before an event. Expand our use of social media and improve real time communications with leaders of community groups to ensure current information is available and shared with those in attendance at large scale events.

During: Increase the use of on-site communications with real time observations and information through social media and amplified technologies as often as possible during an event. Increase the number and use of bullhorns / megaphones and related means to direct the crowd when necessary. Include messaging that relays the need for immediate dispersal and directions to do so safely and in a manner that can reach as many people as possible.

After: Improve reporting of tools that were used during the operation, particularly those used only during critical crowd control efforts, such as smoke, gas and impact projectiles. During post event media coverage, I should make clear to the public that information is still

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unfolding. To promote transparency and full investigation, the public should be directed where and how to report injuries, property damage or related concerns.

Conclusion:

Every major event is unique. The August 22 presidential visit to Phoenix included extraordinary circumstances with recent profound national events; a larger than normal dignitary presence; thousands of residents and visitors standing outside in high temperatures; and multiple diverse members of the public in attendance. We communicated to the community before the event and we listened and received both positive and negative feedback afterwards.

Some of the criticism about the Police Department's response was focused on differences in communication, particularly providing clear, audible and consistent directions to the crowd. Some of that criticism came from people who were attempting to peacefully express their views. And at the same time, our officers received praise for their professionalism and collaboration in managing a clearly tense situation.

I take responsibility with respect to listening to both sides, clearly self-examining our work, and leading the department. I still believe the actions of our officers reflected the direction I gave them: be professional, decisive and immediately reactive. The tragedies that happened in other cities did not happen in Phoenix.

Having said that, we must take the input of our community members seriously and I strive to live up to our community's trust. As we reviewed the operation, we worked to identify areas of improvement to better serve our community during future events. We will build upon what worked well and adjust those areas that need improvement. We will continue to reinforce dialogue and trust between all members of the community and our police officers who proudly serve this City.

2017 Presidential Visit



**2017 Presidential Visit
Public Safety After-Action Report
Professional Standards Bureau
NAR17-0037
January, 2018**

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Background

On August 22, 2017, the President of the United States and other federal dignitaries arrived in Arizona and departed on August 23, 2017. During the visit, the President attended and spoke at a rally at the Phoenix Convention Center. This event brought thousands of community members and groups with conflicting views to the downtown Phoenix area. Phoenix Police and Fire Departments along with several other federal, state, county, and local law enforcement agencies coordinated all public safety activities associated with this event. There were numerous meetings scheduled to establish each agency's role regarding overall goals and timelines. The Phoenix Police and Fire Departments had a significant role in planning and providing support for this event, and initiated the National Incident Management System (NIMS) model to coordinate the efforts of the involved agencies.

The NIMS model is a systematic, proactive approach to guide departments and agencies at all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to work together seamlessly and manage incidents involving all threats and hazards—regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity—in order to reduce loss of life, property, and harm to the environment.

The purpose of the NIMS is to provide a common approach for managing incidents. The concepts provide for a flexible but standardized set of incident management practices with emphasis on common principles, a consistent approach to operational structures and supporting mechanisms, and an integrated approach to resource management.

There are instances where success depends on the involvement of multiple jurisdictions, levels of government, functional agencies, and/or emergency-responder disciplines. These instances necessitate effective and efficient coordination across this broad spectrum of organizations and activities. NIMS provides a comprehensive national approach that improves the effectiveness of emergency management and response personnel across the full spectrum of potential threats and hazards (including natural hazards, terrorist activities, and other human-caused disasters) regardless of size or complexity.

Under this model, the Phoenix Police and Fire Departments provided significant sworn and non-sworn public safety personnel to staff the City of Phoenix Incident Management Team (IMT). The IMT, a part of the overall Emergency Operations Center (EOC), initiated unified planning five days prior to the President's visit after confirming the event at the Phoenix Convention Center was under contract.

The Phoenix Police Professional Standards Bureau Inspections Unit was tasked with tracking Phoenix Public Safety activities and compiling information obtained to complete an After-Action Report. The assigned Phoenix public safety personnel that primarily staffed this event and contributed information to this After-Action Report are:

- Homeland Defense Bureau (HDB) - IMT
- Tactical Response Unit (TRU)
- Community Relations Bureau (CRB)
- Public Affairs Bureau (PAB)
- Professional Standards Bureau (PSB)
- Employee Assistance Unit (EAU)
- Fire Department

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At the conclusion of the event, IMT section leaders and staff from the aforementioned bureaus or units, were tasked with developing and providing an After-Action Summary report to the Professional Standards Bureau Inspections Unit documenting the following related to the event:

- Assigned duties and functions
- Summary of activities
- Opportunities for improvement

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After-Action Summary Reports

Homeland Defense Bureau / Incident Management Team (IMT)

Assigned Duties & Functions

Incident Commanders

The Incident Management Team (IMT) personnel initiated unified planning five days prior to the President's visit, which was immediately implemented upon being advised the event space in the Convention Center was under contract. Incident Commanders are responsible for the overall planning and utilization of resources regarding operations for Phoenix public safety personnel. In addition, they direct coordination efforts with regional partners to ensure the successful completion of assigned operations.

The IMT is managed by two Incident Commanders, one from both the police and fire departments. The primary sections of the IMT are:

- Planning
- Operations
- Intelligence
- Logistics
- Finance

Planning Section

The Planning Section is responsible for organizing the event and documenting the manpower and work assignments of all assigned personnel. Planning also organizes and manages all meetings and provides situation updates throughout the event as directed by the Incident Commander.

Operations Section

The Operations Section is responsible for the overall coordination of public safety assets and keeping the Incident Commander updated on the operation and situational awareness activities for informed decision making. Operations was responsible for two significant branches which included the majority of the police and fire personnel assigned to this event. The first was the Dignitary Protection Branch, which included airport and motorcade operations. The second was the Public Safety Branch, which consisted of personnel assigned to the Convention Center, Tactical Response Unit (TRU), Air Support, Margaret T. Hance Park, Transit, Hazmat, and Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) Groups.

Intelligence Section

The Intelligence Section is responsible for preventing, detecting, and mitigating potential unlawful activity through the collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of information to appropriate law enforcement personnel.

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Logistics Section

The Logistics Section is responsible for establishing the IMT facility and providing appropriate resources, to include communications and technical equipment, ground support, and any needed supplies.

Finance Section

The Finance Section is responsible for financial tracking of all Phoenix public safety expenditures relating to the Presidential visit. In addition, the section comprised of Police Professional Standards Bureau Inspections and Fire Budget personnel was tasked with developing a City of Phoenix Public Safety After-Action Report.

Summary of Activities

Prior to the event, Planning personnel coordinated multiple group meetings with Phoenix Command Team members, Secret Service staff, and a strategic partner meeting with non-public safety entities. During the event, there were multiple situational updates provided to the public safety executive staff, city management staff, and elected officials.

Operations personnel managed four separate motorcades and ensured proper response and handling of suspicious packages and persons. EOD conducted canine sweeps along routes and primary locations prior to arrival and departure of Air Force One. In addition, Operations coordinated the Tactical Response Unit activities regarding the mitigation of conflicts (see the TRU section). The Dignitary Protection Branch of Operations managed the President, Vice President, President's Chief of Staff, along with the Secretary of US Housing and Urban Development movements and security during the visit. This was done in partnership with federal and local law enforcement agencies.

Prior to and during the event, Intelligence personnel monitored information being posted on open source platforms from community groups stating the desire to support or disrupt event activities. This information was provided to Incident Commanders and IMT personnel so appropriate operational procedures could be implemented.

Finance personnel collected staffing rosters and entered hours worked into an electronic financial tracking system. There were 882 police and 103 fire employees utilized during the event. Straight time costs could not be accurately determined since several additional employees were utilized in on-duty and overtime capacities as demonstration activities escalated into the evening hours on the day of the event. Overtime costs for police (\$477,226) and fire (\$83,157) totaled \$560,383. In addition, equipment and barricade combined costs were \$12,177.

Additional information gathered at the IMT:

- A total of 985 Phoenix public safety employees were utilized for this event
- Approximately 11,000 people were able to attend the event inside the Phoenix Convention Center
- Approximately 4,500 people were still in line to enter the Phoenix Convention Center when the doors were closed to the event
- Approximately 6,000 people gathered outside the Convention Center with groups showing up as early as 10:00 AM

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- There were no arrests made inside the Phoenix Convention Center
- There was one person removed from the Convention Center during the event
- All dignitary movements were completed without issue
- Individuals deployed chemical agents toward police during and after the event
- At approximately 8:33 PM, police deployed chemical agents and crowd control tactics in response to unlawful activities (see the timeline in the TRU section).
 - From approximately 8:33 PM – 10:45 PM, there were 7 calls dispatched to the Fire Department for the following:
 - Three officers were treated related to extreme heat conditions
 - One officer was treated for difficulty breathing
 - One person was treated for illness
 - Five to six news reporters were treated for “tear gas” exposure, none were transported
 - One person treated for a laceration to the face, police and fire responded, not transported
- There were eight Incident Reports documenting five arrests, see the table below.

IR #	Type	Arrest
2017-001475165	Criminal Damage	Yes
2017-001475176	Disorderly Conduct – Refuse to Disperse	Yes
2017-001475182	Aggravated Assault on Police	Yes
2017-001475214	Aggravated Assault on Police	Yes
2017-001478672	Aggravated Assault on Police	Yes
2017-001484734	Aggravated Assault on Police	No Subject Identified
2017-001491560	Unlawful Assembly	No Subject Identified
2017-001516522	Aggravated Assault on Police	No Subject Identified

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Tactical Response Unit (TRU)

Assigned Duties & Functions

The Tactical Response Unit (TRU) was assigned under the Operations Section of the Phoenix Public Safety Incident Management Team (IMT). An action plan was developed through collaboration with the United States Secret Service, Phoenix public safety agencies, Phoenix Convention Center staff, and City leadership. The goal was to manage public safety, mitigate incidents that could result in property damage, and protect the rights of those attending the event at the Phoenix Convention Center, along with those gathered in the downtown Phoenix area. The action plan documented:

- The establishment of the police command post in the downtown Phoenix area
- Rehabilitation location staffed with fire personnel at the Convention Center
- Briefing locations and times for deployment of personnel
- Assigned radio channels for the staff assigned to the event
- Dedicated air support resources
- Assignment of police supervisors and officers
- Mutual aid law enforcement agencies and resources
- Arrest procedures
- Unlawful assembly statement and warning

Summary of Activities

Note: Police efforts to deescalate or significant turning points are documented in bold print

On the day of the event, TRU implemented the action plan which included:

- Traffic closures and vehicle incursion hardening security procedures
- Monitoring attendees and lines at the Convention Center and the overflow area
- Operations zone and a large overflow area containing:
 - Pedestrian fencing lined with messaging tape stating "Do Not Cross"
 - This encompassed Monroe Street from 2nd to 5th Streets
 - Fixed and mobile officer positions

The operations zone was critical in maintaining public safety as it provided a staging area for fire, paramedic, and police mobile field force resources. A field force is comprised of police officers and supervisors specifically trained and equipped to manage demonstration activities. In addition, the operations zone facilitated the rapid response to emergencies, which enhanced security for the President, federal officials, and citizens.

TRU anticipated and prepared for large crowds from both attendees of the event and community groups. The groups began to arrive in downtown as early as 3:00 AM during the closure set up and the number of individuals increased rapidly throughout the day. By 11:00 AM, large crowds were lining up on 2nd Street between Van Buren and Washington Streets. Police motor units were deployed to control both vehicular and pedestrian traffic in the area. By 2:00 PM, the size of the crowd dictated a full closure of 2nd Street from Van Buren to Washington Streets, including the side streets of Adams and Monroe. Police Field Force squads that were in staging locations were deployed for crowd control to keep groups separated. These deployments increased throughout

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the day as the crowds continued to increase. **The Field Force squads were primarily used to keep access points open, intersections cleared, and opposing groups separated to prevent violence while still allowing free movement and the ability to exercise the right to free speech.** The deployment of the police personnel to fixed positions was critical, as thousands of people arrived in the downtown area after marching in large groups from various locations throughout the city. As the crowds increased and continued to move within downtown, a large area was designated as an overflow to avoid overcrowding, group conflicts and to enhance public safety.

At approximately 5:30 PM, TRU initiated messaging directed at individuals in line at the time when the United States Secret Service (USSS) closed the doors and no longer allowed access to the event at the Convention Center. The line was extensive and without messaging, the crowd of several thousand exiting into downtown without proper information and direction could have been problematic. It was decided to maintain separation of opposing groups. An exit strategy was implemented to move the large group south and west or east from the Convention Center and away from the conflicting community groups in the overflow area. In conjunction with Community Response Squads (CRS), **TRU personnel effectively handled several minor altercations and worked diligently to prevent additional physical confrontations by utilizing strategic exit patterns.**

At approximately 7:00 PM, TRU officers observed water bottles being thrown at event attendees from the overflow area southbound across Monroe Street. TRU officers who were also in danger of being struck, were deployed along the south side of Monroe Street along the exit route to position themselves between the two opposing groups. Officers were deployed from the south side to the middle of Monroe, between 1st and 5th Streets to discourage any further projectiles from being thrown. The Air Unit (police helicopter) also responded as a deterrent. Plainclothes CRS Officers were utilized throughout the event to contact and warn the groups, in an effort to cease illegal activity.

At approximately 7:20 PM, the LRAD (Long Range Acoustic Device), a high-volume communication system designed to give clear instructions to large crowds in amplified noise conditions was utilized. Instructions encouraged community members and groups to demonstrate peacefully, not to cross the fence and police lines, and not to throw objects. Two TRU officers issued these warnings on Monroe Street between 1st and 5th Streets.

At approximately 8:15 PM, TRU officers report water bottles being thrown down at them from the 2nd and Monroe Street parking garage. There were officers already in the garage dealing with another issue one level below from where subjects were throwing water bottles. Additional officers were dispatched to the garage and the entire structure was secured to prevent any further incidents.

Throughout the afternoon and evening, CRS Officers maintained communication with community groups and organizers, providing uniformed TRU personnel with regular intelligence updates. CRS attempted to contact and communicate with individuals that identified themselves as ANTIFA (for readability and clarification purposes, this group will be referred to as ANTIFA throughout the remainder of this report). Information reviewed by Phoenix Police Department Intelligence personnel found ANTIFA tends to be anti-government and have engaged in protest activities that include property damage and physical violence. ANTIFA has been associated with property damage and violence at demonstrations in Berkeley California and Charlottesville Virginia earlier this year. Based on this intelligence regarding ANTIFA, their past practices has demonstrated a

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propensity for violence across the country. **As ANTIFA members were contacted throughout the night, they were given warnings to demonstrate peacefully.** The group would not respond to police communications. By approximately 8:20 PM, a group of 15 to 20 ANTIFA representatives became situated near the south end of the overflow area, against the pedestrian fencing. Once there, they raised two large signs and began to conceal themselves behind the signs. Although hidden from the officers on Monroe Street, it was apparent that their movements were suspicious and required further investigation. TRU requested the Air Unit fly over and provide intelligence on ANTIFA activities. By 8:30 PM, the ANTIFA group began gathering behind the large signs and it appeared bags were being opened and items were being distributed. At this time, the type of items being distributed could not be determined.

TRU personnel, which included three grenadiers (specialty trained officers on deployment of chemical munitions), were positioned in the area where ANTIFA was gathering. TRU supervisors advised that if the ANTIFA group, or any others, tried to breach the fencing, the deployment of pepper ball rounds into the ground in front of them was authorized to stop that activity. It was essential to maintain the secure operations along Monroe Street for several reasons:

- Monroe Street was a critical public safety thoroughway, as it was the only way for emergency services to access the north, northwest, and northeast side of the Convention Center
- The overflow area was filled with community members and groups clustered up against the north Monroe Street pedestrian fencing. Due to the volume of individuals along the fence line, the integrity of the fence had to be maintained to avoid interaction and possible confrontation with other crowd members
- At that moment, (8:33 PM) the President, and other federal officials were departing the venue, requiring police to secure the area and maintain separation between the Convention Center, 5th Street, and the crowd in the overflow area
- During this time, attendees were exiting the event at 2nd and Adams Streets. A significant number of individuals from the event began walking north bound on 2nd Street toward Monroe Street. Had an incursion along Monroe Street occurred, there would be little to no buffer between the opposing groups
- Monroe Street borders the north section of the Convention Center. A loss of separation between opposing groups and the building could have led to incidents of property damage

At approximately 8:32 PM, the ANTIFA group began pushing the fence and attempted to use the wood supports attached to the signs as levers in an effort to topple the pedestrian fencing. Pepper ball munitions were strategically deployed into the ground in front of ANTIFA. The munitions operated as expected and moved the group of approximately 15 to 20 away from the fence which created distance between ANTIFA and police to avoid any potential physical confrontation. After the initial incursion and TRU response, the fence integrity was maintained. No further action was required as the offenders moved north away from the fence line. **The ANTIFA group began to circulate into the surrounding crowd and the frequency of items being thrown at officers rapidly increased. Items thrown were rocks, frozen water bottles, and regular filled water bottles. Officers without shields dodged the objects as they continued to maintain assigned positions and observe the crowd.**

At approximately 8:34 PM, an unknown object was thrown from the crowd directly at the TRU line. It was quickly identified as a small gas grenade, and as it hit the ground an unknown gas began exhausting from it. TRU personnel along Monroe Street were directed to don gas masks by the Field Force Commander. As the gas spread, it was identified by

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the grenadiers as possibly CS gas, commonly known as “Tear Gas.” Several officers were affected and treated through an on-site decontamination process.

TRU Officers then deployed smoke grenades to the area along Monroe Street where the ANTIFA group attempted to breach the fence. The wind direction was directly north by northwest and was taken into account during the deployment to disperse the smoke strategically toward the ANTIFA group. At this time, there were no active tear gas agents deployed. Smoke was utilized as a visual attempt to stop illegal activities and encourage the group to leave without deploying active chemical agents into the crowd. However, the individuals believed to be tied to the ANTIFA group reached over and through the fence and began kicking and throwing police deployed smoke munitions from Monroe Street back at the TRU Officers. Several ANTIFA group members donned gas masks and/or other face coverings indicating a preplanned effort to disrupt the event. As TRU munitions deployed, some were tossed back toward officers. The intent was for the smoke to defuse the situation, create distance, and to avoid escalating tactics. However, the frequency of items being thrown at officers significantly increased.

At approximately 8:36 PM, another type of pyrotechnical munition was thrown directly at TRU Officers. In response, grenadiers were ordered to deploy CS gas canisters in the same focused location; in the street along the north gutter. Once again, ANTIFA group members began throwing and kicking the canisters toward the TRU Officers. The grenadiers had permission to engage anyone attempting to assault officers by throwing or kicking gas canisters toward them. Pepper ball, 40mm foam impact rounds and sting balls (less lethal munitions used to dispense CS powder and cayenne pepper), were authorized for deployment by TRU supervisors if needed.

After the initial deployment of the CS Canisters, TRU Officers paused to assess if the agent had the desired effect to disperse unlawful individuals from the area. As a result of the deployment of CS Gas, several individuals from the targeted area vacated, however a core group of aggressive individuals remained and continued to throw projectiles at officers. At this time, it was decided to deploy TRU personnel north through the fence line to the targeted area, past the deployed munitions, to prevent any further misuse, and extend a police line from Monroe Street to the north against the south side of the Herberger Theater. This movement was conducted in an effort to stop the deployment of TRU munitions back toward officers and prevent property damage to the Convention Center. The movement was also designed to set up a formation which would allow TRU to make additional announcements and place officers in a position to prevent property damage to the Catholic Diocese on 3rd Street and the Herberger Theater. At 8:34 PM, the Air Unit was requested to illuminate the area, provide intelligence, and to provide an amplified notification as the LRAD was no longer effective due to the gas and munitions present in the air and personnel donning gas masks. During TRU’s initial movement past the north fencing and toward the Herberger Theater, aggressive individuals continued to assault officers by throwing objects, while the grenadiers continued to support operations by deploying chemical munitions.

At 8:52 PM, two police lines were formed, one facing east and one west. The Air Unit was overhead advising remaining people to leave the area. Announcements were made continuously while officers provided an opportunity for people to leave the area. At this time, it was determined that the aggressive individuals were positioned to the west of the police line. Officers were deployed and formed a line expanding from 2nd just north of Monroe Street. Also at this time, the crowd was determined to be unlawfully assembled due to their actions and the official unlawful assembly announcement was broadcast via a police public address system from a marked Patrol Tahoe. After the unlawful assembly advisement, grenadiers continued to confront aggressive individuals as the police line marched slowly northward toward Van Buren Street. Upon arrival at

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the intersection of Van Buren and 2nd Streets, the intersection was cleared of all people as they had stopped traffic and blocked the public right of way. The east side police line which had been held in place and assisted with clearing the area along 3rd and Monroe Streets secured the Catholic Diocese building. Officers then moved north to Van Buren Street to prevent groups from compromising the police line to the west. **These areas were secured by members of the police line without having to initiate physical force contact with any individuals.**

At approximately 9:10 PM, TRU personnel were deployed to the intersection of Central Avenue and Van Buren Street to assist with dispersing the last remaining individuals that gathered in that area. **All individuals were dispersed from the area without incident.** Once completed, demobilization of police personnel commenced.

During the TRU deployment of active tactics on Monroe Street, additional police personnel were used for the following:

- Staging was implemented at 333 W. Jefferson Street where non-TRU officers were deployed and mobilized to support fixed positions around the Convention Center
- Standby officers were used to relieve fixed posts, and secure 2nd Street locations as teams progressed
- Additional officers cleared and secured the 2nd Street Parking Garage during crowd control efforts and maintained a high-profile presence in the neighborhoods north of Van Buren Street during the crowd engagement to limit property damage in the neighborhood and business area
- Transit personnel remained at the light rail platforms and ensured peaceful transition from the street to train was maintained

Timeline of Significant Activities & Events

Below is a general timeline of the events that occurred on August 22, 2017, in downtown Phoenix as a result of the Presidential visit. The items listed here are approximate times and provide a general description of activities in chronological order.

As listed in the key below, no color represents general information regarding the events. Green highlights indicate announcements or warnings given by the Phoenix Police Department to stop throwing items or unlawful assembly announcements. Yellow highlights indicate actions taken by groups that were aggressive in nature, and in some instances unlawful. Finally, blue highlights are the actions initiated by the Phoenix Police Department to respond to aggressive and/or illegal actions.

- No Color: General information
- Green : Announcements/warnings by police
- Yellow : Aggressive action by individuals and groups
- Blue : Actions initiated by police to disperse aggressive individuals and groups

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All times are approximate (in PM)

• 2:30	Aggressive individuals confront attendees along 2 nd Street, south of Monroe Street
• 2:31	CRS is called in to mediate disputes and pedestrian fencing established along the east curb of 2 nd Street
• 2:35	Items were thrown between opposing groups on 2 nd Street, south of Monroe Street
• 2:38	CRS funnels additional personnel to 2 nd Street to maintain separation between opposing groups
• 2:44	A police bicycle unit is deployed along 2 nd Street, south of Monroe Street, to assist with crowd separation
• 2:57	Officers coordinating water drop-offs on Van Buren, at 2 nd and 3 rd Streets for individuals and community groups
• 3:44	Additional officers were deployed to provide security for attendees and individuals along established lines
• 4:00	Doors to the event are open at the Convention Center
• 4:00-5:00	Continue to coordinate demonstration marchers from various groups into the overflow area
• 4:04	Police contacted four individuals with rifles at 2 nd Avenue and Monroe Street to maintain public safety
• 5:07	Police removed an individual who was armed with a weapon, attempting to gain access into the Convention Center
• 5:21	Police examined a suspicious package and rendered it safe at 3 rd & Monroe Streets
• 5:30	Convention Center doors closed due to capacity and safety concerns. At that time, there were approximately 15,000 individuals inside and 4,000 to 5,000 individuals outside the Convention Center
• 5:57	Police monitored four armed male subjects reported in the area of the Herberger Theater to maintain public safety
• 6:00	Individuals burned an American Flag near the Herberger Theater
• 6:18	Crowd attempted to break through barriers at 3 rd Street
• 6:20	Police monitored a dozen more armed subjects leaving the Convention Center area
• 6:22	Police responded to seven male subjects armed with rifles at 5 th Street, just north of Van Buren, to maintain public safety
• 6:32	The President arrives at the Convention Center

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• 6:36	Police responded to multiple armed male subjects in downtown area to maintain public safety
• 6:39	Police responded to opposing groups fighting at 3 rd & Washington Streets
• 6:50	Police separate opposing groups with police tape at 3 rd & Washington Streets
• 7:01	Additional units needed to separate crowd at 3 rd & Washington Streets
• 7:03	Water bottles being thrown at officers from the crowd at 2 nd & Monroe Streets
• 7:13	Additional police units arrive to prevent items from being thrown from 2 nd – 3 rd on Monroe Street
• 7:15	Announcements by police not to throw objects from 2 nd – 3 rd on Monroe Street
• 7:23	All police response will be wearing helmets for protection
• 7:28	Announcement by police not to throw items, 5 th & Adams Streets
• 7:33	Vehicles being damaged by protesters at 2 nd & McKinley Streets
• 7:42	Groups began directing chants towards officers
• 8:00-8:25	The LRAD was used to make continuous announcement in an effort to stop individuals from throwing objects between 2 nd and 5 th , along Monroe Street
• 8:15	Water bottles thrown at officers from 2 nd & Monroe Street parking garage
• 8:23	ANTIFA used large flags to conceal their activities at 2 nd & 3 rd Streets, Near the Herberger Theater
• 8:33	President starting to leave the Convention Center
• 8:33	Attempted barrier breach by ANTIFA group
• 8:33	Police deployed pepper balls at the ground in front of ANTIFA in an effort to prevent a barrier breach and maintain public safety
• 8:33	Police reported being hit by rocks and bottles
• 8:34	Field Force Commander (FFC) gave an order to stop the deployment of pepper balls, to ascertain its effectiveness in deterring unlawful activities

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• 8:34	Air Unit requested to illuminate the area and make announcements, but delayed because of the need to get FAA clearance
• 8:34	CS gas being thrown at the police from the crowd
• 8:34-9:31	Crowd continues to throw and/or kick items at police, to include police deployed munitions
• 8:34	Police don gas masks
• 8:35	Police deployed smoke only
• 8:36	Police use pepper balls to drive back aggressive individuals
• 8:36	Police deployed OC grenades
• 8:36-8:45	Police used pepper balls to drive individuals back so that a police line could be formed in the overflow area in an effort to eventually disperse the aggressive crowd out of the area – this occurred near the Herberger Theater
• 8:40	Air Unit arrives overhead in downtown area
• 8:47	FFC requested the Air Unit make announcements after FAA clearance
• 8:52-9:10	Air Unit was used to continually make announcements to disperse
• 8:56	Police line begins marching to move crowd
• 8:56-9:31	Police deployed OC, pepper balls and tactics to disperse crowd
• 9:02	Used Police Tahoe to make unlawful assembly announcements
• 9:14	Grenadiers target anyone who aggressively approaches the police line with pepper balls
• 9:20	Police gave press the announcement to leave area
• 9:31	Police rear guard kept in place while breaking down Field Force Units
• 9:47	Used police Tahoe to make unlawful assembly announcement
• 9:56	Last Tahoe cleared out and started patrolling streets
• 10:00	All the fixed positions near 3 rd & Jefferson Streets were released

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Training

Tactical Response Unit personnel participate in a two-day training and certification which consists of:

- Introduction to riot and crowd control
- Familiarization of shield capabilities
- Movement drills and practical implementation of techniques in a controlled environment
- Scenario based training
- Exposure to CS gas – and successfully show proficiency in performing tasks
- Additional various tasks in order to be a certified TRU officer

Each officer must show proficiency in these areas, recertify annually, and are then designated as a Level 1 Public Order Officer.

Tactical Response Unit Grenadiers participate in a three-day training and certification which consists of:

- Introduction and familiarization of each non-lethal weapon system
- Advanced crowd control and crowd dispersal techniques
- Each grenadier is required to deploy munitions from these systems to within standards specified by the manufacturer and department deployment policies
- Each grenadier has to successfully maneuver in a CS filled environment and perform basic tasks, including mask manipulation and decontamination

Each Grenadier must show proficiency for each munition, recertify annually, and are then considered a Level 2 Public Order Officer.

The Tactical Response Unit is comprised of personnel from a variety of units and details within the department. Testing and selection procedures are designed to identify mature, experienced, senior officers that will professionally interact with antagonistic and in some instances aggressive individuals and crowds during demonstrations and other related activities.

Chemical Munitions

Chemical munitions are best described as less lethal products which are under pressure, pyrotechnic, incendiary, emit projectiles, generate smoke, or are explosive in nature. When used in accordance with training guidelines and the law enforcement agency's policy, they are intended to cause varying degrees of pain and injury, which are temporary. These products are restricted to law enforcement, corrections, and military personnel and are used to gain compliance, disperse crowds, restore order, or temporarily incapacitate dangerous persons. In rare circumstances, less-lethal products may cause damage to property, serious bodily injury, or death. These chemical munitions are not utilized for police day to day operations, but are used specifically for crowd control.

During the event, seven teams of two grenadiers were deployed in the downtown area. The information below, provided by Sergeant Douglas McBride, summarizes the munitions used throughout the incident. Further information is documented in Incident Reports 2017-1478672 (see attachment).

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Field Force Commander (FFC):

Lieutenant Benjamin Moore #6803

Grenadier Team Leader (GTL)

Sergeant Douglas McBride #6187

Sergeant Douglas McBride #6187 – Grenadier Team leader – Pepper ball launcher Serial# 1626535, equipped with red dot optic and laser site

At the direction of the Field Force Commander (FFC), the Grenadier Team Leader (GTL) deployed a tube of pepper ball at individuals who were participating in civil unrest and acts of active aggression towards police officers.

Officer Glenn Neville #5774 – Stun Bag shotgun (orange) Serial# B871758M – Throw Bag

At the direction of the FFC, deployed two smoke canisters and one CS canister during the civil unrest.

Officer Robert Scott #6158 – Pepper ball launcher Serial# 1873910, equipped with red dot optic and laser site

At the direction of the GTL, deployed ¾ of a tube of pepper ball at various individuals trying to breach the fence line or who were throwing objects at the police.

Officer Rikki Woolgar #7510 – 40mm launcher Serial# GS0524/Throw Bag

During the course of civil unrest, and at the direction of the FFC, threw three CS canisters and directed three OC muzzle blasts at an aggressive crowd.

Officer James Ray #5835 – Pepper ball launcher Serial# 230002217

At the direction of the FFC, conducted a onetime dispersal of five to seven rounds of pepper ball at the feet of an individual attempting to kick a CS canister back at the skirmish line.

Officer George Herr #7737 – Pepper ball launcher Serial# 230006117

At the direction of the GTL, deployed ¾ of a tube of pepper ball until the launcher malfunctioned. He then obtained a less lethal shotgun and utilized a Bore Thunder round to disperse the individuals who were conducting various acts of active aggression towards officers, to include throwing a wooden flag pole. After seeing the flag pole, he observed a male with a water bottle in his hand and he loaded a stun bag round. As the male reared back to throw it at police he fired one round which impacted the upper torso preventing him from throwing the water bottle. Officer Herr was approximately 45 feet away.

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Officer John Sticca #7765 – Less lethal shotgun (orange) Serial# B888121M / Throw Bag

After a small incendiary device thrown from the crowd hit him in the hand while he was standing behind the police line, the FFC had given the order for gas, he threw (2) smoke canisters and (1) CS canister at the crowd. When his partner Officer Herr's pepper ball launcher went down, Officer Sticca gave him a less lethal shotgun with munitions.

Sergeant Brian Bachorski #7403 - Bravo Team leader – Throw Bag – No Deployment

Officer William Gates #6831 – Pepper ball launcher Serial# 230001917 – No Deployment

Officer Christopher Turiano #6424 – 40mm launcher Serial# GS0525 / Throw Bag

At the direction of the FFC, fired (8) 40mm CTS warning munitions over the heads of the crowd in order to move them back. In addition, he targeted individuals either advancing on the line or trying to kick police munitions back at officers. He had one confirmed hit with a Frangible Impact OC Powder round from a distance of 60 feet which targeted the lower torso. That suspect was later arrested for his actions. During the course of the civil unrest, he fired an additional (8) 40mm Frangible Impact OC powder rounds, (10) 40mm CTS Sponge Spin Stabilized Impact Rounds, (8) 40mm OC muzzle blast, (4) smoke canisters and (3) CS canisters.

Officer Jeffrey Howell #5823 – Pepper ball launcher Serial# 1873912, equipped with red dot optic and laser site

At the direction of the FFC, deployed approximately one tube of pepper ball at various individuals participating in civil unrest.

Officer Lane White #6356 – Less lethal shotgun (orange) Serial# B878329M / Throw Bag

At the direction of the FFC, deployed (3) smoke canisters and (3) CS canisters during the civil unrest.

Officer J.D. Kurtis Merena #7117 – Pepper ball launcher Serial# 230016917 / Throw Bag

At the direction of the FFC, he delivered approximately 1.25 tubes of pepper ball, (4) canisters of smoke and (3) canisters of CS gas.

Officer Brandy Thwing #7686 – Less lethal shotgun Serial# B760509M / Throw Bag – No Deployment

Officer John Stewart #8215 – Less lethal shotgun Serial# AB758554M / Throw Bag

Obtained a Throw Bag from Officer Turiano sometime during the civil unrest. Delivered (1) smoke and (2) CS grenades.

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Field Force Extraction Team:

Officer Arnulfo Cuellar #5547 – Stun Bag Shotgun – No Deployment

Officer Lamar Rushing #5641 – Grenadier support – No Deployment

Officer Esteban Navarrette #5948 – Stun Bag Shotgun – No Deployment

Officer Adam Applegate #6847 – Grenadier support – No Deployment

Officer Mathew Tate #7559 – Stun Bag Shotgun – No Deployment

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Total Munitions Deployed:

4.75 tubes of pepper ball (approximately 100-110 pepper balls per tube)

Concentrated version of CS/PAVA projectiles for use in high-intensity/MFF/Crowd Control operations. Used for direct impact and area saturation:

- Caliber: .68
- Weight: 3 grams
- Payload: 2.5 gram
- Shelf Life: 3 years
- Velocity: 285-325 FPS
- Kinetic: 12-15 J
- Temperature: -30° to 150°F
- Shell Seam: Ultrasonically welded
- Formula: 1.25% CS 1.25% PAVA

(16) CTS Outdoor Smoke Grenades CS Model 6230

(16) CTS Outdoor Smoke Grenades Model 6210

The 62-Series Grenades are a pyrotechnic grenade discharging smoke and irritant agents through multiple emission ports. The grenade is a military type configuration with the same dimensions weight and performance of M-18 type grenades. CSI manufactures a variety of CTS less lethal products which are under pressure, pyrotechnic, incendiary, emit projectiles, generate smoke, or are explosive in nature. When used in accordance with CTS training guidelines and the individual agency's policy, they are intended to cause varying degrees of pain and injury, which are temporary. These products are restricted to law enforcement, corrections, and military personnel and are used to gain compliance, disperse crowds, restore order, or temporarily incapacitate dangerous persons. In rare circumstances, CTS less-lethal products may cause damage to property, serious bodily injury or death. Therefore, any person using the force option depicted on this page should receive proper training to ensure the safest and most effective use.

(1) ALS 1208 Bore Thunder 12-gauge round

The ALS1208 Bore Thunder is a 12-gauge muzzle bang that produces approximately 174 dB at 5 feet. A low cost, highly effective munition, the 1208 produces a diversionary device effect with flash and overpressure from a 12-gauge platform.

(1) Less-Lethal Super-Sock Bean Bag Round

Cotton Kevlar woven bag filled with 40 grams #9 shot, intended to be a direct fire impact munition.

- Projectile Weight 40 gm
- Cartridge Material Plastic
- Projectile Material Shot filled Ballistic Fiber Reinforced
- flexible sock

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- Overall Height 2.40" (61mm)
- Overall Weight 56 gm.

(11) 40mm OC muzzle blast Model 4640

Type	Point Control Impact Munitions
Caliber	40MM
Weapon Compatibility	All 40MM Launchers, M203, M79 and Multi-Launcher Type
Cartridge Length	3.9" (99.0 mm)
Effective Range*	50 YD (45 M)
Projectile Weight	60 gm
Projectile Material	Closed Cell Neoprene
Overall Weight	105 gm
Velocity	240-260 ft./sec
Warranty	5 Years from Shipment Date

(8) 40mm CTS Aerial Flashbangs Model 4090-50

Type	Aerial Flash-Bangs
Caliber	40MM
Weapon Compatibility	All 40MM Launchers, M203, M79
Cartridge Length	4.1" (104 mm)
Effective Range*	100 Meters
Sound Output	165-175 dB Average
Light Output	6 Million Candela Minimum
Terminal Effects	Explosion and Bright Flash
Warranty	5 Years from Shipment Date

(8) 40mm CTS Frangible Impact OC Powder Model 4556

Type	Point Control Impact Munitions
Caliber	40MM
Weapon Compatibility	All 40MM Launchers, M203, M79 and Multi-Launcher Type
Cartridge Length	4.0" (101.6 mm)
Effective Range*	50 YD (45 M)
Projectile Weight	39 gm
Projectile Material	Polyurethane Foam
Overall Weight	85 gm
Velocity	290-320 ft./sec
Warranty	5 Years from Shipment Date

The frangible Impact and munitions are spin-stabilized projectile and deliver a dispersal of irritant powder on and around target. Although it is extremely accurate and consistent, accuracy is dependent on the launcher, using open sights vs. an improved sight, environmental conditions,

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and the operator. Effectiveness depends on many variable, such as distance, clothing, stature, and the point where the projectile impacts.

(10) 40mm CTS Sponge Spin Stabilized Impact Round Model 4557

Type	Point Control Impact Munitions
Caliber	40MM
Weapon Compatibility	All 40MM Launchers, M203, M79 and Multi-Launcher Type
Cartridge Length	3.9" (99.0 mm)
Effective Range*	50 YD (45 M)
Projectile Weight	60 gm
Projectile Material	Closed Cell Neoprene
Overall Weight	105 gm
Velocity	240-260 ft./sec
Warranty	5 Years from Shipment Date

The Model 4557 Sponge Baton is a spin-stabilized projectile. Although it is extremely accurate and consistent, accuracy is dependent on the launcher, using open sights vs. an improved sight, environmental conditions, and the operator. Effectiveness depends on many variable, such as distance, clothing, stature, and the point where the projectile impacts.

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Community Relations Bureau

Assigned Duties & Functions

The Community Relations Bureau, Community Response Squads (CRS) have the primary responsibility of maintaining an ongoing, working relationship with the diverse community stakeholders in the City of Phoenix. The squads also facilitate the department's 12 Phoenix Police Advisory Boards, a forum where the Phoenix Police Department can actively listen to community members concerns and have open dialogue to create solutions to challenges. The squads actively engage community members and form partnerships that create a climate of trust and legitimacy between the Phoenix Police Department and the community.

Summary of Activities

Throughout the week prior to and up to the start of the event, CRS personnel were in communication with a point of contact from the following:

- Barb Lubin - AZ Democratic Party
- Petra Falcon - Promise AZ (PAZ)
- Carlos Garcia - Puente
- Sal Reza, Sylvia Herrera, Rob McElwain, Tupak Huehucoyoti - Tonatierra & Comites de Defense del Barrio
- Cristian Avila - Mi Familia Vota
- Deedra Abboud - Love Activists: Healing Hearts and Minds
- Zulema Rodriguez - Political Activist and Community Leader
- Jose Patino – AZ Dream Act Coalition
- Tami Updegraff – Director of Herberger Theater Security
- Antonio Velasquez – Maya Chapin
- Jose Guzman – Victims and Relatives of Victims of Crimes
- Lydia Guzman – Chicanos Por La Causa
- Muslim, Refugee & Sikh Advisory Board Chairs
- Carlos Galindo – Elvira - ADL
- Tonya Arroyo – No Hate on Our Streets
- Redeem Robinson, Ken Hienzelman, James Pennington, Jerry Heikens – First Church UCC
- Preacher Dean – Solo Street Preacher

During the days leading up to the event, communication focused on verifying marching routes, sharing information regarding the number of people and planned activity once arriving in the downtown Phoenix area. CRS assisted groups wanting to drop off water at designated locations and explained that the police will protect the right of peaceful assembly but unlawful acts would require a decisive response. On the day of the event, CRS personnel assisted with five planned marches from various locations throughout the city. Each march was completed without interruption of vehicular or pedestrian traffic.

During the event, CRS personnel in plain clothes attire, interacted with community members and group organizers to ensure First Amendment Rights were protected and to diffuse any potential violence between groups. However, based on the size of the crowds, at times this proved to be a difficult task. Numerous groups arrived in downtown Phoenix near the Convention Center.

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Additionally, thousands of community members came into downtown from various directions. Once downtown, community members and organizers were dispersed and intermingled into larger groups. CRS personnel were then assigned to monitor the larger groups making it difficult to maintain communication with a point of contact from each organization.

Throughout the day, a CRS Supervisor and five assigned detectives responded to locations around the Convention Center to contact individuals or groups that were creating disturbances. At one point this team was directed to 300 E. Washington Street to assist at that location. There were hundreds of people formed into two large opposing groups arguing and on the verge of a physical altercation. There were individuals being pushed into the curb lane of westbound traffic on Washington Street creating a public safety issue. The CRS supervisor made several requests and phone calls for additional units and TRU personnel. TRU responded and assisted with crowd and traffic control and eventually were able to separate the two groups.

At events where there is the potential for police to engage in enforcement activities, CRS protocol is to warn of possible police action or if any level of force is going to be initiated prior to deployment. As disturbance activity escalated, CRS personnel had difficulty implementing this protocol based on the significant number of people within the downtown area.

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Public Affairs Bureau

Assigned Duties & Functions

Phoenix Police Public Information (PIO) Sergeant Mercedes Fortune was assigned to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), which coordinated efforts with personnel from the Phoenix IMT. Phoenix Sergeants Jonathan Howard and Vince Lewis were assigned to the downtown area to monitor the events and report real time information to the Communications Group at the EOC. Following the event, the Sergeants coordinated with the Mayor, the Police Chief, and the City of Phoenix Communications Director to provide initial information to the media.

Summary of Activities

Following a large demonstration in downtown Phoenix on the day of the event, the Phoenix Police Department Public Affairs Bureau was tasked with reviewing the public communications plan to determine if changes would enhance public safety messaging. Based on citizen feedback following the event, there were some consistent areas that were identified as needing improvement:

- Some people within the crowd reported that they did not hear warnings or orders to leave the area
- Some people within the crowd reported that they were unaware that criminal conduct was occurring in the area
- Some people were unaware that presence at an unlawful assembly is dangerous and unlawful and subjects them to arrest and reasonable force necessary to preserve life and property
- Some people reported that nonverbal indicators such as officers donning gas masks, helmets, and shields were not indicators that the threat level was increasing and continued criminal conduct by some in the crowd might lead to enforcement action

The PIO's review determined messaging can be enhanced internally among public safety personnel, and externally by utilizing social media to provide real time information to community members and media outlets.

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Professional Standards Bureau

Assigned Duties and Functions

The Professional Standards Bureau (PSB) is comprised of the Administrative, Investigations, and Inspections Units. Each unit contributed significant resources regarding the review and documentation of law enforcement activities and the dissemination of information associated with the event.

The PSB Administrative Unit is staffed by a Police Commander, along with sworn and non-sworn personnel. The unit is responsible for supporting operations by providing electronic tracking of all bureau activities and disseminating PSB records to various public and government entities.

The PSB Inspections Unit consists of a Lieutenant, five Sergeants, four Detectives and a non-sworn Research Analyst. Inspections is responsible for conducting evaluations of all police activities to appraise the utility of existing policies, procedures, and programs. In addition, the unit conducts compliance inspections and internal performance audits to establish the effectiveness of current operational controls and/or programs.

The Investigations Unit is staffed by three Lieutenants and fifteen Sergeants. The unit is responsible for investigating a variety of administrative issues including: alleged misconduct and service complaints against department employees, officer-involved shootings, in-custody deaths, and serious incidents involving a pursuit or police equipment collision.

Summary of Activities

The PSB Administrative and Inspections Unit personnel assisted the Police Code Enforcement Unit with the collection and redaction of information pertaining to several public records requests associated with the event. Inspections was also tasked with providing staff to the IMT Finance section and completing the Phoenix Public Safety After-Action Report. Investigations personnel gathered commendations and investigated all citizen complaints related to the event.

Administrative and Inspections staff gathered, reviewed, and released several hours of recorded video from body worn cameras and the police Air Unit for public records requests. Video was also reviewed to determine if police conduct was appropriate and in compliance with department policy. No misconduct was found.

Investigations personnel documented 81 commendations, 10 citizen complaints, and one Administrative Inquiry documented in the PSB electronic tracking system related to the event (see details below). The commendations primarily expressed support for the police officers regarding the professionalism and restraint utilized in dealing with opposing groups and unlawful activities. Although some community members primarily expressed dissatisfaction with police actions, no misconduct was found. The following is a synopsis of the 10 citizen complaints:

- Seven of the complaints were citizens expressing their dissatisfaction with the overall handling of unlawful activities, primarily focusing on not receiving or being able to hear an appropriate warning prior to the deployment of crowd dispersing non-lethal use of force tactics

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- Three complaints focused on either being struck with a non-lethal projectile or exposure to a chemical munition, these incidents were found to be in compliance with policy
- One Administrative Inquiry (INQ17-0885) reference failure to obey a direct order by a supervisor and providing untruthful statements was unfounded

All citizen commentary received, positive or negative, have been and will continue to be thoroughly examined for any training opportunities that may improve police procedures in regard to preparing, responding, and ensuring public and officer safety for future events.

Community and Police Trust Initiative

A series of 13 listening sessions had already been scheduled by Phoenix Police Chief Jeri Williams to provide a platform for public commentary. As part of the Community and Police Trust Initiative (CPTI), the Community Listening Sessions were advertised and open to the public. Additionally, the sessions served to promote transparency, legitimacy and to present Chief Williams' vision, values, and goals for the Phoenix Police Department. These sessions were scheduled between Tuesday, September 6, 2017, and Thursday, September 28, 2017, at various times and locations to accommodate as many citizens as possible. Each CPTI Community Listening Session was attended by Chief Williams (or another member of the executive staff delegated to represent her) as well as Director Marchelle Franklin, Community Affairs Division, Phoenix Police Department. Many other ranking and front-line city and police employees were also in attendance.

After a brief presentation by Chief Williams, attending members of the community were presented with the opportunity to address the Chief and speak on any matter of their choosing. Questions and concerns were immediately addressed by the Chief and her team. In the event a concern could not be immediately resolved, the presenting member of the community was directed to available personnel and resources. In each case, the individual's name and contact information was recorded and assigned to a member of the Chief's staff for follow-up. Notes from each citizen's presentation were recorded (copies of notes from each session can be provided).

During the listening sessions, a broad range of concerns were presented before the Chief. On several occasions, these concerns were related to the Presidential visit. The commentary related to the event were both critical and commendatory with respect to the actions and response of the police department. The complimentary reports commended the Chief and the Phoenix Police Department for their discipline, professionalism, and dedication to duty. Those expressing concern and criticism echoed those reports made to the Professional Standards Bureau Investigations personnel, citing excessive force, insufficient warning prior to the deploying of chemical munitions, and targeting those assembled peacefully.

In addition to the CPTI Community Listening Sessions, the staff of St. Mary's Basilica, located at 231 North 3rd Street which is in the downtown Phoenix area, requested an opportunity to have their concerns heard. Members of the Professional Standards Bureau responded in person on Friday, September 1, 2017, to meet with the staff. The Basilica's primary concern was a lack of communication and warning from the city and police department prior to the President's visit. They stated in the past, members of the police department typically met with and discussed upcoming events that might affect the staff, some of which are full-time residents of the facility. One unintended consequence was the movement of the airborne chemical munitions that permeated the grounds of the Basilica. In response to the complaint by Basilica personnel, members of the police executive team met with the Basilica staff to ensure more effective and open communication.

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Phoenix Police Employee Assistance Unit

Assigned Duties & Functions

The Phoenix Police Department Employee Assistance Unit (EAU) is comprised of four detectives, one sergeant and one lieutenant. There are two detectives on call 24 hours a day, seven days a week and the EAU phone line is transferred to the primary detective on call after normal business hours. EAU detectives regularly get phone calls from employees for themselves or their families reference a variety of topics including but not limited to: medical insurance and coverage, retiree deaths, funeral preparation, industrial injuries, long-term disability, medical retirements, and divorce. EAU personnel are not counselors or psychologists, but they are listeners who connect employees with resources to meet their immediate needs. The Employee Assistance Program (EAP) offers employees and their families twelve visits with a mental health professional per issue, with three of the visits allowed while on duty.

Another resource available to employees from home or at work is a website created and maintained by the 100 Club, bulletproof.org. Bulletproof is a confidential and anonymous resource that provides law enforcement professionals and their families with mental health and wellness initiatives, addiction awareness tools, assessments, and direction towards treatment and care. The bulletproof website can be accessed from any computer or smartphone and can be accessed by the employee or their families at any time.

The department also has a Police Chaplain Program and currently there are three chaplains available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The main purpose of the Police Chaplain Program is to serve the employees of the department and intercede relative to ministerial concerns.

Summary of Activities

During the event, the Employee Assistance Unit personnel were available during business hours and on-call to respond in the evening hours if needed. The Employee Assistance Unit did not receive any contact from department employees via email, telephone, or in person, reference the Presidential visit during or after the event.

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Phoenix Fire Department

Assigned Duties & Functions

Phoenix Fire personnel established a special event incident number and utilized the “Geo Fence” system to determine boarders for dispatching units. This was implemented in the early afternoon hours (approximately 2:00 PM) on August 22, 2017. Geographical boarders used to track emergency medical calls related to the event were 7th Avenue to 7th Street (east and west) and Van Buren to Madison Streets (north and south).

Summary of Activities

Fire department personnel responded to 53 emergency medical calls in which 11 patients were transported to local hospitals for various reasons. The breakdown of calls is as follows:

Call Type	Numbers of Calls	Number of Transports
Ill Person/Heat	38	8 (1 officer transported)
Alert Level of Consciousness	4	1
Difficulty Breathing	4	1
Unconsciousness Person	2	1
Injured Person	1	
Unknown Medical	1	
Person Down	2	
Diabetic Problem	1	

Additional information related to emergency medical calls:

- The majority of the calls were related to **heat exposure**, temperatures reached a high of 106 degrees in the late afternoon hours
 - Two pallets (156 cases at 24 bottles per case) totaling 1,872 bottles of water were distributed to people in the downtown area by public safety personnel in an effort to prevent heat related illness
- Difficulty breathing calls
 - One was possibly related to the extreme heat
 - Two were patient refusals and were both at approximately 6:00 PM
 - One officer was treated after the deployment of chemical munitions at 8:00 PM
- There were **10 calls dispatched from approximately 8:00 PM – 10:45 PM**. They were related to:
 - Three officers treated for extreme heat conditions
 - One officer was treated for difficulty breathing
 - One officer was treated for illness
 - Five to six news reporters treated for “tear gas” exposure, none were transported
 - One person treated for a laceration to the face, police and fire responded; individual not transported
 - Two people were treated for illness, not transported

Presidential Visit After-Action Report
Page 29 of 30
January 2018

Opportunities for Improvement

Homeland Defense Bureau

The Incident Management Team (IMT) began operations on the day of the event. For future events, ensure the IMT is operational at least one day prior to verify all personnel have information needed to complete assigned tasks.

There was a shortage of seating and electrical outlets for the Strategic Partners in the Emergency Operations center (EOC), due to a large turnout of partners for this event. Ensure additional space and resources are considered for future events.

Some Tactical Response Unit (TRU) Officers required gas mask repairs or replacements during the engagement. Ensure TRU personnel inspect, repair, or replace equipment and verify proper working condition prior to the start of an event.

One police supervisor developed and coordinated motorcade and downtown traffic plans which was a daunting task. Ensure appropriate supervisory staff is considered and utilized for planning all aspects of future large-scale events.

Large opposing groups were gathered in the downtown area, and activities were monitored by plain clothes officers. Ensure sufficient plain clothes personnel are utilized for future events.

Tactical Response Unit

Ensure a proactive notification process is utilized when communicating with groups believed to be intent on causing public disorder.

Ensure TRU grenadiers develop and implement a munitions accountability process. The process should require the signing out of all munitions before deployment and a munitions count by a supervisor at the conclusion of an event.

Ensure TRU supervisors review all police reports and use of force documentation generated by grenadiers following deployment.

Establish a protocol to account for munitions deployed prior to the incident, and if possible regarding the type of munitions allowable and identify circumstances they may be deployed.

Community Relations Bureau

Identified areas for opposing groups to conduct activities can quickly change based on the size of crowds. Planning of future events should ensure additional resources are available to react to sudden changes in movement by crowds to avert possible public safety issues.

As disturbance activity began to rapidly develop, Tactical Response Units (TRU) had limited time to make announcements before engaging the crowd. This also provided little to no time for CRS personnel to inform the crowd as to the impending actions of TRU Officers. TRU personnel made announcements that the assembly was unlawful and groups would have to disperse. However, additional police personnel were needed to effectively inform the crowd of TRU engagement activities. TRU personnel should ensure that CRS personnel are notified as quickly as possible

Presidential Visit After-Action Report
Page 30 of 30
January 2018

of engagement plans so both TRU and CRS can assist with immediate notifications to gathered crowds and provide a greater opportunity to disperse.

Public Affairs Bureau

Use social media (Twitter, Instagram, etc.) to communicate, when practical, real-time observations from the scene. Ensure information pertaining to safety tips and recommendations that support free speech activities and discourage disruptive behaviors that threaten lawful activities is communicated.

Ensure scene Incident Commanders and officers utilize amplified notifications in conjunction with police action. Handheld megaphones or similar low-tech options are preferable to voice or no warnings for clear dispersal directions.

Use social media to notify the public each time warnings are given including the location and intended message. Amplified warnings should be given in all but the most extreme incidents before enforcement or dispersal actions are taken against the larger assembly.

Ensure Community Response Squad (CRS) personnel have updated information to text or otherwise notify event coordinators of event status, so they can share current information with attendees. This would also include encouraging people to distance themselves from criminal conduct and report unlawful behaviors.

Ensure warnings and amplified messages are provided in both English and Spanish and consideration should be given to following a specific pre-approved script or be pre-recorded.

Ensure scene interviews are conducted by appropriate city and department personnel with media officials during the event to update status and observations.

Police Chief

Ensure that during initial press briefings, state what is currently known and what is subject to change after appropriate review.

Ensure a follow-up strategy is developed to address media and public inquiries the day following any significant incident or event.

Ensure an After-Action Report is prepared to document any significant incident or event.

Decl. Panuco ISO Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

Ex. 4

*Motion for leave to file non-electronic exhibits to be filed

Decl. Panuco ISO Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

Ex. 5

Home

account? Log in



AZPLEA

@azplea

Follow

By all accounts, the City of Phoenix Police Department's actions during this incident were textbook, however, radical, leftist and anarchist groups who don't believe in the rule of law would like to convince you otherwise.



ACLU files class-action against Phoenix, police chief over 2017 Trump rally r...

The lawsuit claims Phoenix police used excessive force while dispersing crowds outside a Trump rally at the Phoenix Convention Center in August 2017.

azcentral.com

7:15 AM - 5 Sep 2018

1 Like



Decl. Panuco ISO Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

Ex. 6



Decl. Panuco ISO Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

Ex. 7

8:32 PM

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Arizona

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Decl. Panuco ISO Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

Ex. 8



City of Phoenix

Agenda
Public Safety and Veterans
Subcommittee

Meeting Location:
Phoenix City Hall
200 W. Washington St.
Phoenix, AZ 85003

Wednesday, June 13, 2018

9:00 AM

First Floor Assembly Rooms A, B

CALL TO ORDER

CALL TO THE PUBLIC

MINUTES OF MEETINGS

- 1 **For Approval or Correction, the Minutes of the Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee Meeting on May 9, 2018.** **Page 8**

CONSENT ACTION (ITEMS 2-8)

- 2 **Authorization to Enter into an Agreement with the Arizona Peace Officer Standards and Training Board** **Page 15**

This report requests the Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee recommend City Council approval for the Police Department to enter into an agreement with the Arizona Peace Officer Standards and Training Board (AZPOST) for the reimbursement of basic training costs at the Phoenix Regional Police Academy.

THIS ITEM IS FOR CONSENT ACTION.

Responsible Department

This item is submitted by Assistant City Manager Milton Dohoney, Jr. and the Police Department.

3 2018 Homeland Security Grant Program Funds**Page 16**

This report requests the Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee recommend City Council approval to apply for, accept, disperse funds, and enter into an agreement for Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grant funds that include the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) and the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) through the Arizona Department of Homeland Security (AZDOHS).

THIS ITEM IS FOR CONSENT ACTION.

Responsible Department

This item is submitted by Assistant City Manager Milton Dohoney, Jr., the Office of Homeland Security & Emergency Management, Police and Fire Departments.

4 Authorization to Purchase a LRAD-500X Mass Communications System for the Police Department**Page 18**

This report requests the Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee recommend City Council approval for the Police Department to purchase a Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) 500X Mass Communications System from the LRAD Corporation.

THIS ITEM IS FOR CONSENT ACTION.

Responsible Department

This item is submitted by Assistant City Manager Milton Dohoney, Jr. and the Police Department.

5 Emergency Request to Enter into an Agreement with the National Police Foundation for an Officer-Involved Shooting Study**Page 19**

This report requests the Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee recommend City Council approval for the Phoenix Police Department to enter into an agreement with the National Police Foundation to conduct an Officer-Involved Shooting (OIS) study.

THIS ITEM IS FOR CONSENT ACTION.

Responsible Department

This item is submitted by Assistant City Manager Milton Dohoney, Jr. and the Police Department.

6 Request to Enter into an Agreement with the National Training Institute on Race and Equity to Provide Implicit Bias and Cultural Competence Training

Page 21

This report requests the Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee recommend approval to City Council for the Police Department to enter into an agreement with the National Training Institute on Race and Equity (NTIRE) to conduct implicit bias and cultural competence training.

THIS ITEM IS FOR CONSENT ACTION.

Responsible Department

This item is submitted by Assistant City Manager Milton Dohoney, Jr. and the Police Department.

7 Authorization to Apply for, Accept and Enter into an Agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice, via the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, for the 2018 Community Policing Development Grant Program

Page 23

This report requests the Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee recommend approval to City Council for the Police Department to apply for, accept and enter into an agreement to receive federal grant funds through the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2018 Community Policing Development grant program.

THIS ITEM IS FOR CONSENT ACTION

Responsible Department

This item is submitted by Assistant City Manager Milton Dohoney, Jr. and the Police Department.

Page 25

8 Authorization to Enter into an Agreement with the Arizona Coliseum and Exposition Center for Increased Police Services during the Arizona State Fair 2018

This report requests the Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee recommend City Council approval for the Police Department to enter into an agreement with the Arizona Coliseum and Exposition Center to provide increased traffic enforcement, perimeter security, proactive police patrol and vending enforcement in the area surrounding the State Fairgrounds during the State Fair.

THIS ITEM IS FOR CONSENT ACTION.

Responsible Department

This item is submitted by Assistant City Manager Milton Dohoney, Jr. and the Police Department.

INFORMATION ONLY (ITEM 9)

9 Police Department Public Records Requests - Process Improvement Update

Page 26

This report provides the Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee with an update of the improvements to the Police Department's public records request process. Changes already implemented have helped to significantly reduce the backlog, decrease turnaround times and substantially improve customer service.

THIS ITEM IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY

Responsible Department

This item is submitted by Assistant City Manager Milton Dohoney, Jr. and the Police Department.

INFORMATION AND DISCUSSION (ITEMS 10-11)

10 Mine Blasting Levels

Page 28

This report provides the Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee an update on the City Council-adopted Phoenix Fire Code which includes provisions for allowable levels of blasting in residential areas.

THIS ITEM IS FOR INFORMATION AND DISCUSSION.

Responsible Department

This item is submitted by Assistant City Manager Milton Dohoney, Jr. and the Fire Department.

**11 California Aluminum Can Recycling Laws & Scrap Metal Dealer
Licensing**

Page 30

This report provides the Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee with a review of California's recycling laws related to aluminum cans and

responds to the question of whether Phoenix may regulate businesses that deal in aluminum cans through a Scrap Metal Dealer licensing program.

THIS ITEM IS FOR INFORMATION AND DISCUSSION

Responsible Department

This item is submitted by Assistant City Manager Milton Dohoney, Jr. and the Law Department.

DISCUSSION AND POSSIBLE ACTION (ITEMS 12)

Page 32

The Subcommittee may vote to discuss item 12 in Executive Session pursuant to A.R.S. Section 38-431.03 (A)(1).

12 Reappointment of Phoenix Municipal Court Judges and Chief Presiding Judge and Salary Consideration for the Chief Presiding Judge

This item is for discussion and consideration of reappointment of Phoenix Municipal Court Judges for a four year term and Chief Presiding Judge for four year term and an annual presiding term.

THIS ITEM IS FOR DISCUSSION AND POSSIBLE ACTION.

Summary

The Judicial Selection Advisory Board is recommending reappointment of Judge Robert Doyle as a Judge of the Phoenix Municipal Court for a four year term that would end on Jan. 1, 2022. The Judicial Selection Advisory Board is also recommending reappointment of Judge Laura Lowery as a Judge of the Phoenix Municipal Court for a four year term that would end on Sep. 30, 2022. The Judicial Selection Advisory Board also recommends reappointment of Chief Presiding Judge B. Don Taylor III as a judge of the Phoenix Municipal Court for a four year term that would end Feb. 9, 2021 and an annual term as Chief Presiding Judge that will end on June 30, 2019.

Responsible Department

This item is submitted by Deputy City Manager Karen Peters and the Municipal Court.

CALL TO THE PUBLIC

FUTURE AGENDA ITEMS

ADJOURN

For further information or reasonable accommodations, please call Corey Williams, Management Assistant II, City Manager's Office at 602-261-8875. 7-11 Friendly.

Persons paid to lobby on behalf of persons or organizations other than themselves must register with the City Clerk prior to lobbying or within five business days thereafter, and must register annually to continue lobbying. If you have any questions about registration or whether or not you must register, please contact the City Clerk's Office at 602-262-6811.

Members:

Councilman Michael Nowakowski, Chair
Mayor Thelda Williams
Councilwoman Laura Pastor

Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee



City of Phoenix

City Council Report

Agenda Date: 6/13/2018, Item No. 1

For Approval or Correction, the Minutes of the Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee Meeting on May 9, 2018.

Summary

This item transmits the minutes of the Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee Meeting on May 9, 2018.

The minutes are attached.

**Phoenix City Council
Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee
Summary Minutes
Wednesday, May 9, 2018**

City Council Subcommittee Room
Phoenix City Hall, Assembly Rooms A, B and C
200 W. Washington St.
Phoenix, Ariz.

Subcommittee Members Present

Councilman Michael Nowakowski, Chair
Councilwoman Laura Pastor
Vice Mayor Thelda Williams

Subcommittee Members Absent

None

Call to Order

Vice Mayor Williams called the Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee meeting to order at 9:07 a.m. with Chairman Nowakowski present telephonically.

Call to the Public

None.

1. For Approval or Correction, the Minutes of the Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee Meeting on March 14, 2018.

Chairman Nowakowski made a motion to approve the minutes from the March 14, 2018 Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee meeting. Vice Mayor Williams seconded the motion which passed 2:0.

3. Authorization to Enter into an Agreement with the Arizona Humane Society

Chairman Nowakowski made a motion to approve items 3-7. Vice Mayor Williams seconded the motion which passed 2:0.

4. Authorization to Extend the Agreement with Maricopa County for Jail Services and Facilities

5. Authorization to Pay the Public Safety Personnel Retirement System for FY 2018-19 Police Sworn Cancer Insurance Coverage

6. Authorization to Purchase Attic Cameras for the Police Department

7. Authorization to Enter into an Unlimited License Agreement with Oracle America Inc. to Support the Police Department's Records Management System

2. Approval of the Neighborhood Block Watch Oversight Committee's Recommendations for the 2018 Grant Program Awards

Jennifer Rouse spoke in support of approving the nine wake-up club applications and pointed out changes to the grant guide. She spoke about the support of the clubs and the high scores they had received. She discussed the impact the wake-up clubs had on the community and the graduates of the program. She wanted the program to begin in the fall and stated the children would be future leaders.

Vice Mayor Williams asked for Police Executive Assistant Chief Michael Kurtenbach to explain the situation. Chief Kurtenbach introduced Carmen Arias, Chair of the Neighborhood Block Watch Oversight Committee and Stacy Osborne-Fry from the Police Department Grant Unit. He explained the evaluation process stating 12 applicants were not being recommended due to not meeting certain elements of the guide.

Ms. Arias spoke about the recent process changes and HOA involvement. She stated a committee had been formed to revise the guidelines based on questions that arose and would come to the Council later for approval.

Vice Mayor Williams asked about the process for a new club. Ms. Arias stated there were currently no exceptions to the rules for new clubs or organizations. Vice Mayor Williams asked if there was still money available. Ms. Arias responded yes.

Vice Mayor Williams asked if a recommendation could be made by the Subcommittee for the wake-up clubs to be funded. Assistant City Manager Milton stated yes.

Chairman Nowakowski made a motion to approve funding for the wake-up clubs. Vice mayor Williams seconded the motion which passed 2:0.

Vice Mayor Pastor arrived at 9:15 a.m.

8. Transitioning the Reporting of Crime Statistics to the FBI's National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS)

Vice Mayor Williams asked if changing to the new FBI reporting system would change codes for officers and have any impact on the public's access to information.

Police Executive Assistant Chief Michael Kurtenbach stated the number of crimes that are tracked would change. He discussed how crimes were currently tracked and explained how in one incident there could be multiple crimes but only one would be counted. He stated with the new system every crime at an incident would be tracked. He explained how it would appear as though crime rates were increasing but the crime counts would be what increased.

Vice Mayor Williams asked if one person could have all the charges and codes associated with the multiple crimes in one incident. Chief Kurtenbach confirmed.

Chairman Nowakowski arrived at 9:17 a.m.

9. Update on the Phoenix Regional Police Academy Training

Information only. No Councilmember requested additional information.

10. Update on the Arizona Angel Initiative Program

Information only. No Councilmember requested additional information.

11. Prosecutor's Office Criminal Case Management System Replacement

Information only. No Councilmember requested additional information.

12. Phoenix Public Safety Facilities and Fleet Update

Director of Budget and Research Jeff Barton introduced the item and fellow presenters: Director of Public Works Ginger Spencer, Assistant Fire Chief Scott Walker, Police Chief Jeri Williams, and Special Project Administrator Art Fairbanks. He gave some background pointing out the negative impact of the recession and the general aging of the public safety facilities and fleet. He spoke about the maintenance and repair costs as well as the potential financing options which included a bond program. He discussed bond programs including the history and purpose of using bonds within the City of Phoenix.

Ms. Spencer spoke about the responsibility of the Public Works department to maintain the buildings and vehicles on behalf of the City. She discussed asset management which included funding, design, efficiency and maintenance. She outlined the stages of a building which were broken down by age and required varying levels of routine maintenance, capital renewals, adaptations and upgrades. She stated at year 50, or stage five, the options were to either rehabilitate or replace the building. She gave an example of old City Hall which was built in 1928, and the construction of the current City Hall which was built in 1994 and had reached its half-life. She explained how most buildings required major investments in the major building components such as plumbing, electrical, cooling, heating, safety systems and mechanical systems such as elevators. She discussed the life cycle and stages of vehicles. She went over the five stages which were broken down by age and had varying levels of preventative maintenance, warrant repairs, normal wear and tear, non-warranty failures, and major component failure. She stated the average life cycle was ten years, but between the different vehicle types there were some slight variations.

Chief Walker discussed the current state of the Fire department facilities and fleet. He stated the department had 78 buildings, 58 of which were fire stations. He discussed the breakdown of buildings by age stating 54% of the buildings were 30 years or older and many needed significant capital improvements. He discussed the maintenance budget for FY 17/18, went over the identified capital improvement projects, and stated the Fire department worked closely with the Public Works and Street Transportation departments on all facility projects. He discussed the Fire department vehicle fleet pointing out the FY 17-18 maintenance and replacement budgets. He broke down the fleet by age highlighting the high percentage of vehicles over ten years old. He discussed the overall fleet condition, and stated the overall replacement cost of the fleet would be \$59.8 million.

Chief Williams discussed the Police department fleet, hangers and facilities. She stated the fleet included 2,338 vehicles of which 1,155 were marked patrol vehicles. She went over the FY 2017-18 maintenance and replacement budget and stated the fleet was funded through general funds and public safety specialty funds. She stated the average fleet vehicle age was nine years and the average patrol vehicle age was 7.8 years. She discussed the condition of the fleet stating 58% of vehicles were in fair or poor condition and the estimated fleet replacement cost for those vehicles was \$50.4 million. She discussed the aircraft fleet and cost as well as lease-purchase options and spoke about the important role the air fleet served in keeping officers and residents safe. She discussed the aircraft hangar which was aged at 39 years. She spoke about the building and fire code issues with the hangar and immediate actions taken to mitigate risks. She stated they were currently exploring long-term solutions with the Aviation department. She discussed Police facilities stating the department had 30 buildings citywide with the average age being 24 years. She discussed the maintenance budget for FY 17/18 and the identified capital improvement projects and stated coordination was done closely with the Public Works and Street Transportation departments on all facility projects. She reviewed the breakdown of buildings by age and pointed out specific buildings and issues. She spoke about the Police Headquarters building and the various issues it had as the building continued to age including dated technology. She discussed the changes in the Police Headquarters over time including sworn totals, population served, city size, building occupants, and internal growth.

Mr. Fairbanks discussed maintaining existing facilities in the short-term using a risk evaluation exercise. He stated the exercise examined building systems by rating each building by likelihood and impact of failure. He stated the goal was to identify projects that would have the most impact and would best utilize city funds. He pointed out the City Manager's trial budget had set aside an additional \$7 million to fund ongoing repairs and listed some projects in the Police and Fire department that were identified through the process. He stated the evaluation exercise and building improvements were important for continued operation of buildings but did not address the need of building replacement. He explained the long-term approach of facility assessments which were typically conducted by third party engineers who provided objective input on the condition of the building, a recommended system replacement scheduled, and a facility condition index. He stated the goal would be to do assessments in all major buildings which would likely be a multiple year effort. He emphasized the importance of having good data in order to maximize the impact of dollars used for maintenance.

Vice Mayor Williams stated the list was long and the priorities were high, she asked how best to identify which projects to choose. Mr. Fairbanks stated the risk management exercise would help identify which items would have the greatest impact.

Vice Mayor Williams spoke about the library incident and asked if any new internal procedures had been created in response. Mr. Fairbanks stated the facility assessments as well as efforts by the Public Works department helped identify those issues. Ms. Spencer added that A.R.'s had been developed and regular meetings established once a quarter to review the issues, review information in detail, and deal with things on a priority

basis. Mr. Dohoney stated in addition, departments were asked to manage and rearrange their budget to cover unexpected costs for maintenance. Mr. Barton added the facility assessments would help determine the best allocation of dollars for maintenance stating some re-shifting of funds may need to be done after the assessments were completed.

Councilwoman Pastor asked what was being recommended given a bond program was mentioned. Mr. Barton responded a bond program was not currently recommended but options needed to be discussed which could include a bond program. Councilwoman Pastor asked for a timeline. Mr. Barton stated it would take at least 18 months to do the capital needs study. Mr. Dohoney added the important take away was to bring awareness of the current condition and to start thinking of how to begin addressing the issues.

Councilwoman Pastor stated every department was currently asking for maintenance upgrades and replacements. She stated she would like to see a broad high level approach done on all the maintenance costs at a Policy session so they could then determine how best to combat the overall maintenance issues. She asked what the plans were for the Police headquarters.

Chairman Nowakowski stated the City owned the property across the street which would allow them to build there and possibly do something with the old building. Vice Mayor Williams stated the old building would need to come down. Councilwoman Pastor stated with the number of aging buildings she wanted to know if the plan would be to bring down each one.

Ms. Spencer stated there were different options on the table and assessment had to be completed to determine whether to replace or rehabilitate the building. Chief Williams added there was an accident in the Police headquarters building that caused structural damage, she explained the building was technologically obsolete and although it would be ideal to remain downtown, a cost-risk analysis would need to be considered.

Councilwoman Pastor asked about the timeline for the analysis. Mr. Fairbanks stated some were complete and some still needed to be done. He spoke about being smart about the order the assessments were done and expected the entire process to be a multiyear project.

Councilwoman Pastor spoke about planning for the future and considering property values and space limitations, she asked what the plan would be. Mr. Dohoney stated the strategy would vary by department and gave the example of the Burton Barr building and the ability to use other facilities in the meantime. He stated the same could not be done for the Police headquarter as it would need to operate from the building while a new building was built. Mr. Barton spoke about being strategic and learning form the past and using a multifaceted approach. He stated it would not be wise to invest in one sole bond option having construction and aging of buildings occurring at the same time, leaving them in the same position in the future.

Chairman Nowakowski spoke about not wanting another Burton Barr incident. He asked if there was a way to get the information and options by the fall. He stated it was important to get the story out and bring awareness to the issue so if a bond program was needed, people would understand why it's necessary. Mr. Dohoney stated they would expedite as quickly as possible.

Councilwoman Pastor asked about the community's desire for more public safety officers and how that would impact the situation. Mr. Barton spoke about the 2006 bond program and the need to defer projects. He spoke about how they looked at projects that did not require additional operating expenses such as building a new facility and moving existing officers there. He stated if a new station were also to require a new compliment of officers the funding would be more complicated. Councilwoman Pastor stated a discussion needed to be had with the community.

Chairman Nowakowski stated perhaps the first public safety meeting in the fall could discuss the topic. Vice Mayor Williams suggested the Council have a work-study session to bring everyone up to date on the current conditions and needs. Mr. Dohoney stated they would be prepared to have the discussion by the fall. He mentioned needing to be prepared as once that occurred it would trigger the rest of the organization.

Vice Mayor Williams discussed the top priority being Public Safety. She spoke about the importance of the structures to maintain the people and ensure they are kept safe.

Call to the Public

None.

Future Agenda Items

Chairman Nowakowski mentioned the return of the Public Safety Facility and Fleet topic in the Fall.

Adjournment

Chairman Nowakowski adjourned the meeting at 10:09 a.m.

Respectfully submitted,
Sarah Moratto
Management Intern

Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee



City of Phoenix

City Council Report

Agenda Date: 6/13/2018, Item No. 2

Authorization to Enter into an Agreement with the Arizona Peace Officer Standards and Training Board

This report requests the Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee recommend City Council approval for the Police Department to enter into an agreement with the Arizona Peace Officer Standards and Training Board (AZPOST) for the reimbursement of basic training costs at the Phoenix Regional Police Academy.

THIS ITEM IS FOR CONSENT ACTION.

Summary

The Phoenix Regional Police Academy is managed by the Phoenix Police Department Training Bureau and trains recruits from multiple Arizona law enforcement agencies. The Phoenix Regional Academy holds approximately 12 classes per fiscal year. In FY 2018-2019, AZPOST shall pay \$2,500.00 per recruit who graduates and \$900.00 per recruit who completes at least 50% of the academy but does not graduate.

Contract Term

This agreement is effective when ratified by all signatories, and terminates June 30, 2023, with annual options to amend for the per recruit amount.

Financial Impact

Funds will be used for training supplies, equipment, vehicle maintenance, fuel, and capital improvements.

Responsible Department

This item is submitted by Assistant City Manager Milton Dohoney, Jr. and the Police Department.

Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee



City of Phoenix

City Council Report

Agenda Date: 6/13/2018, Item No. 3

2018 Homeland Security Grant Program Funds

This report requests the Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee recommend City Council approval to apply for, accept, disperse funds, and enter into an agreement for Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grant funds that include the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) and the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) through the Arizona Department of Homeland Security (AZDOHS).

THIS ITEM IS FOR CONSENT ACTION.

Summary

The responsibilities of Fire, Police, and the Office of Homeland Security & Emergency Management (OHSEM) are to enhance regional capabilities to detect and prevent terrorist attacks, reduce the vulnerability to all critical hazards, minimize damages and expedite recovery that affect the safety, well-being, and economic security of Phoenix residents and the surrounding area.

Grant awards for 2018 include: Urban Area Security Initiative \$4,000,000 and the State Homeland Security Grant Program \$1,000,000.

Grant funds are used to purchase equipment and vehicles, conduct training and exercises, perform assessments of critical infrastructure sites, and implement target-hardening measures to protect critical infrastructure. The following programs are also funded with HSGP: Terrorism Liaison Officer program, Community Emergency Response Teams, and the Metropolitan Medical Response System. The grant program focus on regionalization has forged jurisdictional and multi-discipline collaboration through strong partnerships.

Contract Term

The grant period of performance begins October 1, 2018 and ends June 30, 2021.

Financial Impact

No matching funds are required. Grand funds will be managed through the Office of Homeland Security & Emergency Management, Police, and Fire Departments.

Responsible Department

This item is submitted by Assistant City Manager Milton Dohoney, Jr., the Office of Homeland Security & Emergency Management, Police and Fire Departments.

Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee



City of Phoenix

City Council Report

Agenda Date: 6/13/2018, Item No. 4

Authorization to Purchase a LRAD-500X Mass Communications System for the Police Department

This report requests the Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee recommend City Council approval for the Police Department to purchase a Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) 500X Mass Communications System from the LRAD Corporation.

THIS ITEM IS FOR CONSENT ACTION.

Summary

Several large protests and demonstrations have confirmed the need to upgrade the Police Department's communication capabilities for safety and legal requirements. The current communication equipment, LRAD-100X, is a backpack system that was purchased in 2010. The system was completely inadequate for the recent Red for Ed March of over 50,000 participants. The upgraded system is a vehicle-mounted platform that is specifically designed to address large crowds. The LRAD-500X system meets and exceeds all upgrading needs.

Procurement Information

This procurement will be a non-competitive process. The equipment is purchased directly from the manufacturer. No other vendor makes this product. The department conducted tests with the manufacturer and had Chiefs, Commanders, and other Police personnel present. The product test was highly successful.

Financial Impact

The total cost of the system is \$43,134.17. Funds are available in the Police Department's budget.

Responsible Department

This item is submitted by Assistant City Manager Milton Dohoney, Jr. and the Police Department.

Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee



City of Phoenix

City Council Report

Agenda Date: 6/13/2018, Item No. 5

Emergency Request to Enter into an Agreement with the National Police Foundation for an Officer-Involved Shooting Study

This report requests the Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee recommend City Council approval for the Phoenix Police Department to enter into an agreement with the National Police Foundation to conduct an Officer-Involved Shooting (OIS) study.

THIS ITEM IS FOR CONSENT ACTION.

Summary

The Phoenix Police Department (PPD) has an immediate and critical operational need to address the number of OIS incidents that have occurred since the beginning of the year. Between Jan. 1 and May 29, 2018, there have been 23 OIS incidents in Phoenix. Historically, this is the number of OIS incidents that occur on an annual basis. To illustrate, the annual number of OIS incidents for the most recent three-year period totaled: 21 in 2017, 25 in 2016 and 17 in 2015. The PPD has already exceeded the annual OIS incident totals for 2015 and 2017 in the first five months of the current year.

The PPD's top priority is ensuring the safety of both the community and our officers. An in-depth analysis of OIS incidents in Phoenix will provide the Department with a deeper understanding of these events to gain a full picture of each incident to determine not only what occurred, but how, and why, from the point of initiation to conclusion. This insight, coupled with the study recommendations will improve the chances of reducing the frequency of these deadly force encounters.

Procurement Information

Due to the urgency of the issue, the department would like to conduct an emergency procurement with the National Police Foundation for the study. The National Police Foundation has been developing an extensive, multi-agency, OIS dataset as part of a groundbreaking collaborative with the Major Cities Chiefs Association. The dataset currently contains detailed information on more than 1,200 OIS encounters as reported by more than 50 of the largest law enforcement agencies across the United States and Canada. This will allow regional and national comparisons between OIS incidents in Phoenix to those in other agencies. Also, due to the urgency of the study, the National Police Foundation can complete the analysis and provide a final report with

recommendations in six months.

Contract Term

This agreement shall commence on or about July 5, 2018, the term shall be for six months.

Financial Impact

The cost of the study is \$149,000.00. Funds are available in the Police Department's budget.

Emergency Clause

The high number of officer-involved shootings are a threat to public safety and expose the City to serious liability.

Responsible Department

This item is submitted by Assistant City Manager Milton Dohoney, Jr. and the Police Department.

Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee



City of Phoenix

City Council Report

Agenda Date: 6/13/2018, Item No. 6

Request to Enter into an Agreement with the National Training Institute on Race and Equity to Provide Implicit Bias and Cultural Competence Training

This report requests the Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee recommend approval to City Council for the Police Department to enter into an agreement with the National Training Institute on Race and Equity (NTIRE) to conduct implicit bias and cultural competence training.

THIS ITEM IS FOR CONSENT ACTION.

Summary

The Phoenix Police Department (PPD) has an immediate and critical operational need to provide implicit bias and cultural competence training to police officers. Police officers have daily contact with the community. Being aware of implicit bias and having the tools will strengthen the relationship between the Police Department and the community. A vendor with experience in training law enforcement is preferred to provide an understanding of implicit bias, what causes this bias, how it impacts service to the community, how it can be managed and reduced in the workplace, and how one can self-recognize their implicit bias and use the training to overcome it.

Procurement Information

The PPD is requesting a non competitive procurement process to utilize the services of the NTIRE to begin training. The NTIRE is an experienced training institute that can meet the law enforcement training needs required by the PPD.

Contract Term

This agreement will begin on or about July 1, 2018, and the term shall be for two years with one option to extend to a third year.

Financial Impact

The annual cost of the agreement will not exceed \$150,000.00 per year, aggregate \$450,000.00. Funds are available in the Police Department's budget.

Responsible Department

This item is submitted by Assistant City Manager Milton Dohoney, Jr. and the Police

Department.

Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee



City of Phoenix

City Council Report

Agenda Date: 6/13/2018, **Item No.** 7

Authorization to Apply for, Accept and Enter into an Agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice, via the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, for the 2018 Community Policing Development Grant Program

This report requests the Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee recommend approval to City Council for the Police Department to apply for, accept and enter into an agreement to receive federal grant funds through the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2018 Community Policing Development grant program.

THIS ITEM IS FOR CONSENT ACTION**Summary**

The Police Department is seeking federal funding to implement the Virtual Community Crime Prevention program. This innovative new program would combine the Virtual Block Watch program with the Crime Free Multi-Housing program to enhance community safety through a projected reduction in calls for service and violent crimes. The program goals and objectives are to develop an innovative policing strategy to address and respond to gangs, violent crimes, and the opioid crisis. The Virtual Community program would identify 60 multi-housing properties within the City of Phoenix with the highest number of calls for service. These properties would be invited to participate in the program where they would purchase and install a surveillance camera system and signage promoting their participation in the Virtual Community program. The Police Department would inspect the cameras, ensure access to the video footage, and then reimburse the property management company for the purchase of the surveillance camera system. Access to this camera footage could then be accessed by Police Department personnel during an investigation of a crime. The program goal is to reduce calls for service and violent crimes, while enhancing the quality of life for residents and the community. If awarded, grant funding will be utilized to reimburse Crime Free Multi-Housing complexes for the purchase of a monitored camera security system. The grant application was due June 7, 2018. If this request is denied, the grant application will be rescinded.

Contract Term

The term is two years, with an anticipated start date of Oct. 1, 2018 through Sept. 30, 2020.

Financial Impact

The grant amount requested is \$300,000.00. No matching funds are required. Cost to the City would be in-kind resources only.

Responsible Department

This item is submitted by Assistant City Manager Milton Dohoney, Jr. and the Police Department.

Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee



City of Phoenix

City Council Report

Agenda Date: 6/13/2018, Item No. 8

Authorization to Enter into an Agreement with the Arizona Coliseum and Exposition Center for Increased Police Services during the Arizona State Fair 2018

This report requests the Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee recommend City Council approval for the Police Department to enter into an agreement with the Arizona Coliseum and Exposition Center to provide increased traffic enforcement, perimeter security, proactive police patrol and vending enforcement in the area surrounding the State Fairgrounds during the State Fair.

THIS ITEM IS FOR CONSENT ACTION.

Summary

The intent of this agreement is to recover costs associated with providing increased Police services.

Contract Term

Increased services will take place from Oct. 5, 2018 through Oct. 28, 2018.

Financial Impact

The amount to be recovered by the Police Department is \$31,500.00.

Location

The area surrounding the Arizona State Fairgrounds located at 1826 W. McDowell Road.

Council District: 4

Responsible Department

This item is submitted by Assistant City Manager Milton Dohoney, Jr. and the Police Department.

Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee



City of Phoenix

City Council Report

Agenda Date: 6/13/2018, Item No. 9

Police Department Public Records Requests - Process Improvement Update

This report provides the Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee with an update of the improvements to the Police Department's public records request process. Changes already implemented have helped to significantly reduce the backlog, decrease turnaround times and substantially improve customer service.

THIS ITEM IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY**Summary**

The Police Department's response to public records requests has been a lengthy and frustrating process for both customers and staff. The process improvement review, or "Kaizen," identified several improvement opportunities and methods to substantially improve customer service and streamline processes by implementing new technology, and adjusting/reorganizing staffing levels and responsibilities.

The peak of the Police public records processing backlog was January 2017, with a backlog to September 2015. Today, the backlog team is processing public records requests for April 2018. The Public-Traffic Records Detail has experienced staffing challenges considering the number of requests processed annually. For FY 2016-17, the total number of records requests was 72,700, handled by a staff of 22. The next closest comparable city is the Los Angeles Police Department, which receives about 60,000 annual requests with a staff of 60. The FY 2018-19 Trial Budget includes a proposal to utilize existing reallocated funds in the Police Department for 13 positions to assist with the immediate backlog, and to maintain acceptable turnaround times for ongoing public records requests.

In order to continue to improve turnaround times and customer service, the Police Department has secured funding to purchase forensic photo equipment that will allow a more efficient way to redact video and photographs and has finalized the Technology Project Charter to develop a web-based tracking system to create a central entry point for customers that will provide them with an on-line option to submit public records requests.

Effective June 4, 2018, the Public-Traffic Records Detail implemented a change in the

check-in procedures for all customers. Previously customers were served on a first come first served basis and were allowed a maximum of five requests per person. This resulted in customers with single requests waiting for hours. A triage method was implemented, assisting customers with more than one request at a designated window and four windows used to serve customers with single requests.

Responsible Department

This item is submitted by Assistant City Manager Milton Dohoney, Jr. and the Police Department.

Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee



City of Phoenix

City Council Report

Agenda Date: 6/13/2018, Item No. 10

Mine Blasting Levels

This report provides the Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee an update on the City Council-adopted Phoenix Fire Code which includes provisions for allowable levels of blasting in residential areas.

THIS ITEM IS FOR INFORMATION AND DISCUSSION.

Summary

Blasting, such as that which occurs in mining operations or during heavy construction, is governed by Chapter 56 of the International Fire Code adopted by the City of Phoenix on April 18, 2014 (Ordinance G-5898).

The principle Fire Code provisions for blasting levels are ground vibration (i.e., seismic) and air blast monitoring. When buildings or structures are located within a 500-foot radius of a blast site, monitoring of these levels is required by the Phoenix Fire Code. The maximum allowable value within the City of Phoenix for ground vibration is 1.0 inch per second peak particle velocity and 129 decibels for air blast. Of note, the adopted Phoenix Fire Code blasting regulations are twice as restrictive as the Federal Standard.

Phoenix Fire Code Blasting in the City of Phoenix

The following provides a summary of the Fire Code requirements for blasting within the City of Phoenix:

Permit Requirements

To obtain a permit for blasting, the applicant must have the following:

- Valid federal explosives user's permit or federal explosives license.
- Blasting contractor's license issued by the Arizona Registrar of Contractors.
- Knowledge of safety precautions related to storing, handling, and use of explosives.
- Certificate of Fitness Card (background check, verification of associated licensing, written test, insurance certificate).

Note: An insurance certificate is required for every blasting permit issued.

Pre-blast Survey Requirements

When a new blasting company is contracted to conduct blasting operations, a survey of all structures or buildings within a 500-ft radius of the blast site shall be conducted to document the existing conditions.

Monitoring Requirements

Seismic (ground vibration) and air blast monitoring is required when buildings or structures are located within a 500-ft radius of the blast site. Again, the maximum allowable values are 1.0 inch per second peak particle velocity (i.e. seismic) and 129 decibels (i.e. air blast). Further, anytime a complaint is received regarding blasting operations, the Fire Department offers to coordinate a maximum allowable values assessment at the specific location due to the possibility of complex geological variances. In other words, if a complaint is received, a blasting assessment will be conducted to determine Fire Code compliance at that specific location.

Notification Requirements

Prior to the commencement of any blasting operations, written notification by the blasting contractor is required to all occupied structures within a 500-ft radius of the blast site.

Post-Blast Survey Requirements

When a blasting company stops operating at a site, a post-blast survey is required of all structures within a 500-ft radius of the blast site to compare the conditions found in the pre-blast survey. Additionally, if complaints are received from any property within the 500-ft radius relating to allegations of structural or cosmetic damage, a post-blast survey is required.

Blasting in Residential Areas

There are two locations in the City of Phoenix that currently have a blasting permit and are conducting blasting operations within a 500-ft radius of a residential structure: the Cave Creek & Beardsley Quarry, and the 202 Expansion Project. Fire Department records indicate that the blasting operations at these locations have been conducted in compliance with the City Council-adopted Fire Code.

Responsible Department

This item is submitted by Assistant City Manager Milton Dohoney, Jr. and the Fire Department.

Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee



City of Phoenix

City Council Report

Agenda Date: 6/13/2018, Item No. 11

California Aluminum Can Recycling Laws & Scrap Metal Dealer Licensing

This report provides the Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee with a review of California's recycling laws related to aluminum cans and responds to the question of whether Phoenix may regulate businesses that deal in aluminum cans through a Scrap Metal Dealer licensing program.

THIS ITEM IS FOR INFORMATION AND DISCUSSION

Summary

California has a cash redemption program that provides payment to persons recycling aluminum cans. Arizona scrap metal businesses have reported that persons are collecting cans in Arizona and transporting them to California for payment under that program, negatively impacting the industry. Questions have been raised about whether the City of Phoenix can regulate the practice of aluminum cans being collected in Arizona and transported to California for payment under California's cash redemption program. California has, and can enforce, laws that make it unlawful to seek recycling redemption payments for recyclable beverage containers brought in from out-of-state (see CA Public Resources Code section 14591, 14595.5). Arizona does not have laws regulating the transport of aluminum cans out-of-state. Pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (ARS) section 9-500.38. regulating the sale, use, and disposition of "auxiliary containers" (which includes aluminum beverage cans) is a matter of "statewide concern." Therefore, only the State can regulate the transport of aluminum cans from Arizona to California.

ARS section 44 - 1648 (B) does allow cities to regulate businesses that deal in aluminum cans through scrap metal dealer licensing programs, if the programs include background checks. The City of Phoenix currently has a scrap metal dealer licensing program that includes background checks and regulates scrap metal dealers that deal in scrap metal (including aluminum), but it exempts businesses that exclusively deal in aluminum cans. Expansion of the City's current scrap metal dealer licensing to include business that exclusively deal in aluminum cans would require a change to the Phoenix City Code, stakeholder notification and input, and posting of any new fees on phoenix.gov as required by State Law.

Responsible Department

This item is submitted by Assistant City Manager Milton Dohoney, Jr. and the Law Department.

Public Safety and Veterans Subcommittee



City of Phoenix

City Council Report

Agenda Date: 6/13/2018, Item No. 12

Reappointment of Phoenix Municipal Court Judges and Chief Presiding Judge and Salary Consideration for the Chief Presiding Judge

This item is for discussion and consideration of reappointment of Phoenix Municipal Court Judges for a four year term and Chief Presiding Judge for four year term and an annual presiding term.

THIS ITEM IS FOR DISCUSSION AND POSSIBLE ACTION.

Summary

The Judicial Selection Advisory Board is recommending reappointment of Judge Robert Doyle as a Judge of the Phoenix Municipal Court for a four year term that would end on Jan. 1, 2022. The Judicial Selection Advisory Board is also recommending reappointment of Judge Laura Lowery as a Judge of the Phoenix Municipal Court for a four year term that would end on Sep. 30, 2022. The Judicial Selection Advisory Board also recommends reappointment of Chief Presiding Judge B. Don Taylor III as a judge of the Phoenix Municipal Court for a four year term that would end Feb. 9, 2021 and an annual term as Chief Presiding Judge that will end on June 30, 2019.

Responsible Department

This item is submitted by Deputy City Manager Karen Peters and the Municipal Court.

Decl. Panuco ISO Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

Ex. 9



PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT (0723)

Incident Report

Incident Number 20170001475176	CFS Incident # 201701475176
Report Type Incident Supplement	Page 1 of 2
Date / Time Occurred 08/22/2017 00:00 to	Date / Time Reported 08/22/2017 21:46

Arrested Suspects	Additional Suspects	Unknown Suspects	Victims	Other Persons	Vehicles	Items	Evidence Count	Leads Count	Related Report #
<input type="checkbox"/> Arson Related Arson Code					Damage Value		<input type="checkbox"/> Bias Crime <input type="checkbox"/> Gang Involved <input type="checkbox"/> Domestic Violence		
Incident Details									
Squad X83	Clearance Disposition CLEARED BY ADULT ARREST				Cleared by Exception			Exceptional Clearance Date	
Situation Found					Status CLOSED - CLEARED				
Location Given By Dispatcher E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST						Cargo Theft NO			
Incident Address									
Street Address E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST									
City PHOENIX			State ARIZONA		Zip 85004		Country Code UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA)		
Administrative Info									
Reporting Officer NEVILLE, GLENN			Serial # 05774						

Narrative Information

GRENADIER DEPLOYMENT

LESS LETHAL STUN BAG WITH ORANGE STOCK SERIAL# B871758M

ROUNDS DEPLOYED: 0

SMOKE/CS GRENADES:

2 SMOKE GRENADES AND 1 CS GRENADE DEPLOYED.

SUSPECT INFO

SEVERAL UNKNOWN SUSPECTS.

ON 8/22/17 I WAS ASSIGNED TO THE ALPHA TRU TEAM AS A GRENADIER FOR THE PRESIDENT TRUMP RALLY THAT WAS TAKING PLACE AT THE PHOENIX CONVENTION CENTER. ON THIS ASSIGNMENT I WAS TEAMED UP WITH OFFICER SCOTT #6158. I WAS ASSIGNED TO CARRY A LESS LETHAL STUN BAG WEAPON THAT CAN SHOOT SEVERAL LESS LETHAL 12 GAUGE MUNITIONS AND I ALSO HAD A THROW BAG, IT IS CALLED A THROW BAG BECAUSE EVERYTHING INSIDE IS A THROW ABLE MUNITIONS, FOR EXAMPLE SMOKE GRENADES, CS GAS GRENADES AND STING BALL GRENADES. THE MUNITIONS ARE PLACED IN THE SAME POCKETS IN EVERY THROW BAG.

AT APPROXIMATELY 2035 HOURS I WAS STANDING OUTSIDE ON THE STAIRWAY LEADING TO THE WEST BUILDING OF THE CONVENTION CENTER ON ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF MONROE STREET, MID BLOCK BETWEEN 2ND STREET AND 3RD STREET MONITORING THE CROWD WHICH WAS ON THE NORTH SIDE OF MONROE STREET. LT. MOORE, FIELD FORCE COMMANDER, HAD ALREADY AUTHORIZED FOR THE PEPPERBALL OPERATORS TO ENGAGE THE SUBJECTS WHO WERE HURLING OBJECTS AT THE OFFICERS ON THE TRU LINE. AS THE PEPPERBALL GRENADIERS WERE ENGAGING THE UNKNOWN SUSPECTS WHO CONTINUED TO THROW OBJECTS AT OFFICERS, LT. MOORE GAVE THE COMMAND TO "THROW SMOKE ". I OPENED MY THROW BAG AND REMOVED A SMOKE GRENADE, I PHYSICALLY LOOKED TO ENSURE IT WAS A SMOKE GRENADE, PULLED THE PIN AND TOSSED IT TOWARDS THE CROWD AS THEY WERE PUSHING ON THE PED FENCING AND STILL THROWING OBJECTS AT OFFICERS. I PULLED ANOTHER SMOKE GRENADE FROM MY THROW BAG, ENSURED IT WAS A SMOKE GRENADE, AND THREW IT AS WELL. APPROXIMATELY 1 MINUTE LATER LT. MOORE REQUESTED FOR THE GRENADIERS TO THROW CS GAS, I OPENED THE FRONT POUCH OF MY THROW BAG, WHERE THE CS GRENADES ARE STORED, REMOVED A CS GRENADE, LOOKED TO ENSURE IT WAS A CS GRENADE, AND PULLED THE PIN AND THREW IT TOWARDS THE CROWD. IT APPEARED THAT THE SMOKE AND CS GRENADES HAD THE DESIRED AFFECT ON THAT



PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT (0723)

Incident Report

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CROWD AS IT WAS CAUSING THEM TO DISPERSE FROM THAT IMMEDIATE AREA.

I HAVE BEEN A CERTIFIED GRENADIER FOR APPROXIMATELY 10 YEARS, AND HAVE BEEN ON NUMEROUS TRU DEPLOYMENTS AS A GRENADIER.

Public Narrative

Decl. Panuco ISO Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

Ex. 10



PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT (0723)

Incident Report

Incident Number 201700001475176	CFS Incident # 201701475176
Report Type Incident Supplement	Page 1 of 3
Date / Time Occurred 08/22/2017 21:46 to	Date / Time Reported 09/13/2017 14:27

Arrested Suspects	Additional Suspects	Unknown Suspects	Victims	Other Persons	Vehicles	Items	Evidence Count	Leoka Count	Related Report #
<input type="checkbox"/> Arson Related			Arson Code		Damage Value		<input type="checkbox"/> Bias Crime	<input type="checkbox"/> Gang Involved	<input type="checkbox"/> Domestic Violence
Incident Details									
Squad X81	Clearance Disposition			Cleared by Exception			Exceptional Clearance Date		
Situation Found					Status				
Location Given By Dispatcher E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST					Cargo Theft				
Incident Address									
Street Address E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST									
City PHOENIX			State ARIZONA		Zip 85004		Country Code UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA)		
Administrative Info									
Reporting Officer MCBRIDE, DOUGLAS		Serial # 06187							

Narrative Information

INVOLVED PERSONNEL:

LIEUTENANT BENJAMIN MOORE #6803 - FIELD FORCE COMMANDER

GRENADIER TEAM:

SERGEANT DOUGLAS MCBRIDE #6187 - GRENADIER / EXTRACTION TEAM LEADER - PEPPERBALL LAUNCHER SERIAL# 1626535
 ROUNDS DEPLOYED - APPROXIMATELY (1) TUBE
 IMPACT LOCATION - FEET, KNEES, ANKLES, LEGS, TORSO, ARMS, HANDS
 DISTANCE - VARIED 15 FEET TO 60 FEET

OFFICER GLENN NEVILLE #5774 - LESS LETHAL SHOTGUN SERIAL# B871758M / THROW BAG
 OFFICER ROBERT SCOTT #6158 - PEPPERBALL LAUNCHER SERIAL# 1873910
 OFFICER RIKKI WOOLGAR #7510 - 40MM LAUNCHER SERIAL# GS0524 / THROW BAG
 OFFICER JAMES RAY #5835 - PEPPERBALL LAUNCHER SERIAL# 23000221
 OFFICER GEORGE HERR #7737 - PEPPERBALL LAUNCHER SERIAL# 230006117
 OFFICER JOHN STICCA #7765 - LESS LETHAL SHOTGUN SERIAL# B888121M / THROW BAG
 SERGEANT BRIAN BACHORSKI #7403 - BRAVO TEAM LEADER - THROW BAG
 OFFICER WILLIAM GATES #6831 - PEPPERBALL LAUNCHER SERIAL# 230001917
 OFFICER CHRISTOPHER TURIANO #6424 - 40MM LAUNCHER SERIAL# GS0525 / THROW BAG
 OFFICER JEFFREY HOWELL #5823 - PEPPERBALL LAUNCHER SERIAL# 1873912
 OFFICER LANE WHITE #6356 - LESS LETHAL SHOTGUN SERIAL# B878329M / THROW BAG
 OFFICER J.D. KURTIS MERENA #7117 - PEPPERBALL LAUNCHER SERIAL# 230016917 / THROW BAG
 OFFICER BRANDY THWING #7686 - LESS LETHAL SHOTGUN SERIAL# B760509M/THROW BAG

FIELD FORCE EXTRACTION TEAM:

OFFICER ARNULFO CUELLAR #5547 - STUN BAG SHOTGUN SERIAL# V020069V - NO DEPLOYMENT
 OFFICER LAMAR RUSHING #5641 - GRENADIER SUPPORT - NO DEPLOYMENT
 OFFICER ESTEBAN NAVARRETTE #5948 - STUN BAG SHOTGUN - NO DEPLOYMENT
 OFFICER ADAM APPLGATE #6847 - GRENADIER SUPPORT - NO DEPLOYMENT
 OFFICER MATHEW TATE #7559 - STUN BAG SHOTGUN SERIAL# B675558M - NO DEPLOYMENT

 OFFICER JOHN STEWART #8215 SELF-DEPLOYED - A140 - CERTIFIED GRENADIER WITH THE PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT, HOWEVER, NOT ASSIGNED AS A DESIGNATED GRENADIER FOR THIS DEPLOYMENT. DEPLOYED WITH PATROL STUN BAG SHOTGUN SERIAL# AB758554M AND OBTAINED THROW BAG FROM OFFICER TURIANO SOMETIME DURING CIVIL UNREST.

*****ON TUESDAY, AUGUST 22, 2017, I WAS ASSIGNED AS THE GRENADIER TEAM LEADER FOR THE POTUS VISIT AT THE DOWNTOWN CONVENTION CENTER. AT 1300 HOURS, I PERSONALLY BRIEFED ALL OF THE GRENADIERS AND EXTRICATION TEAM MEMBERS ON INTELLIGENCE SURROUNDING THE VISIT AS WELL AS CURRENT TRENDS AND INCIDENTS OCCURRING AROUND THE



PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT (0723)

Incident Report

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WORLD DURING CIVIL UNREST. AT THIS MEETING EACH GRENADIER WAS ISSUED THE AFOREMENTIONED EQUIPMENT BASED ON THEIR ASSIGNMENT. THEY WERE ALSO PAIRED WITH ANOTHER GRENADIER. A PUBLIC SAFETY ZONE HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED ON MONROE STREET TO KEEP THE CROWDS SEPARATED AND ALLOW A WORK ZONE FOR OFFICERS. THE ENTIRE PERIMETER OF MONROE STREET FROM CURB TO CURB WAS LINED WITH PEDESTRIAN FENCING AND TO FURTHER COMMUNICATE TO THE CROWDS THAT THE AREA WAS OFF LIMITS, I HAD THE ENTIRE PERIMETER LINED WITH BRIGHT YELLOW CRIME SCENE TAPE WHICH READ "POLICE LINE DO NOT CROSS".

THROUGHOUT THE EVENT WE MONITORED THE CROWD IN SHIFTS. BY APPROXIMATELY 1900 HOURS WE HAD SEVERAL BOTTLES THROWN FROM THE PROTESTORS' SIDE OF THE FENCE LINE AT SEVERAL OF THE ATTENDEES. ONE ATTENDEE HAD BEEN STRUCK. SEVERAL FIGHTS HAD BROKEN OUT AND LIEUTENANT MOORE HAD DISPATCHED SEVERAL OF THE FIELD FORCE SQUADS TO SEVERAL AREAS OF CONCERN. ADDITIONALLY, WE HAD MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY RESPONSE TEAM CONTACT THE GROUPS FROM WHERE THE BOTTLES WERE BEING THROWN. IN ADDITION TO THAT WE SET UP THREE SQUADS OF FIELD FORCE OFFICERS INSIDE THE SAFE ZONE AND I HAD THE GRENADIERS' POSITION THEMSELVES BETWEEN THE PROTESTORS AND THE EVENT ATTENDEES. THE BOTTLES STOPPED BEING THROWN. AT 1923 HOURS, LIEUTENANT MOORE ORDERED ALL TRU OFFICERS TO HAVE THEIR HELMETS ON DURING ANY DEPLOYMENT FROM THIS TIME FORWARD. AT 1927 HOURS, I INSTRUCTED OFFICERS THWING AND NAVARRETTE TO DEPLOY WITH THE LRAD NOISE DIVERSIONARY DEVICE WHICH ALSO PERFORMS LIKE A LOUD SPEAKER AND GIVE WARNINGS TO THE CROWD THAT THIS IS TO REMAIN A PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND TO STOP THROWING ITEMS. WE WALKED THE ENTIRE CROWD OF PROTESTORS FROM 1ST STREET TO WHERE IT ENDED, APPROXIMATELY TO THE MIDDLE OF THE NORTH EAST BUILDING OF THE CONVENTION CENTER. THESE WARNINGS WERE COMPLETED AT 1934 HOURS.

AFTER THE ATTENDEE LINE WAS CUT OFF AT APPROXIMATELY 1940 HOURS, I NOTICED THE PROTESTORS BEGAN TARGETING THEIR CHANTS AND SHOUTS AT THE OFFICERS. AT 1945 HOURS, I DISPATCHED THE ALPHA GRENADIERS TO THE 2ND STREET AND MONROE STREET INTERSECTION TO CLEAR OUT THE ATTENDEES WHO HAD NOT BEEN ALLOWED INSIDE THE VENUE. BY THIS TIME THE ENTIRE ROADWAY ON 2ND STREET WAS OCCUPIED BY PEOPLE IN ALL DIRECTIONS. AT 2007 HOURS, I WAS DIRECTED BY LIEUTENANT MOORE TO A GROUP OF 10 - 15 INDIVIDUALS JUST EAST OF 2ND STREET ON THE NORTH SIDE OF MONROE. THEY WERE ALL DRESSED IN BLACK AND WERE POSSIBLY PART OF AN AGGRESSIVE PROTEST GROUP ANTIFA. THERE WAS A CITIZEN IN FRONT OF THEM TELLING THE GROUP TO STOP THROWING BOTTLES, ETC. THEY SHOVED HIM DOWN AND WHEN COMMUNITY RESPONSE MOVED IN TO REMOVE THE CITIZEN AND SPEAK TO THE INDIVIDUALS THEY BECAME AGGRESSIVE AND SHOUTED AT THE OFFICERS INCLUDING MYSELF. THEY WERE EXTREMELY AGITATED AND DID NOT REFRAIN FROM LETTING US KNOW. THEY SAID "FUCK YOU TO THE DETECTIVES AS THEY ESCORTED THE OTHER CITIZEN AWAY. I MADE ALL GRENADIERS AWARE OF THIS GROUP.

I WAS IN THE DOWN ROOM OF THE CONVENTION CENTER GETTING WATER AND REHABBING WHEN LIEUTENANT MOORE ADVISED THAT SAME GROUP HAD ERECTED A BANNER AND WERE HIDING BEHIND IT. IT WAS 2031 HOURS, WHEN I RESPONDED OUT THERE AND CALLED MY PEPPERBALL OPERATORS TO THE SCENE. LIEUTENANT MOORE ADVISED ME WE WERE AUTHORIZED TO USE PEPPERBALL IF THIS GROUP TRIED TO BREACH THE FENCE INTO THE PUBLIC SAFETY ZONE.

A SHORT TIME LATER SEVERAL PEOPLE FROM THIS GROUP GRABBED THE FENCE AND STARTED PICKING IT UP AND MOVING IT FORWARD. I BEGAN A COMPLETE SATURATION. IN UNISON WITH MY OTHER GRENADIERS OF THE AREA AROUND THE GROUPS' FEET AS THEY CONTINUED FORWARD I ROSE MY AIM TO THEIR LEGS AND KNEES WHICH IMMEDIATELY STOPPED THEIR ACTIONS. DURING THIS TIME I HAD TO DUCK OUT OF THE WAY OF SEVERAL MUNITIONS WHICH WERE THROWN AT ME INCLUDING A CS DEVICE OF SOME KIND THAT LANDED BEHIND ME. I HEARD LIEUTENANT MOORE ORDER SMOKE AND GAS GRENADES AND REALIZED I HAD NOT DONNED MY MASK. THAT IS WHEN THE CS CANISTER THEY HAD THROWN BEHIND ME OVERWHELMED MY RESPIRATORY SYSTEM AND I HAD TO RUN INSIDE THE CONVENTION CENTER TO DECONTAMINATE. WITH ME WERE LIEUTENANT MOORE, SERGEANT LOIS WEISS AND OFFICER NAVARRETTE, WE HAD ALL BEEN GASSED. THE PROTESTORS CONTINUED TO THROW SOME SORT OF INCENDIARY DEVICES. I SAW AT LEAST FIVE OTHER DEVICES THROWN IN ADDITION TO THE CS THROWN AT ME IN THE BEGINNING.

IT WAS LIEUTENANT MOORE'S DECISION TO CLEAR THE CROWD OFF OF THE HERITAGE PROPERTY BECAUSE THEY CONTINUED TO THROW OBJECTS AND WERE REFUSING TO LEAVE DESPITE THE NUMEROUS WARNINGS



PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT (0723)

Incident Report

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Incident Supplement		
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BROADCAST BY THE AIR UNIT. I INSTRUCTED THE GRENADIERS TO SUPPORT THE SKIRMISH LINE AS WE MOVED INTO THE CROWD. I CUT THE FENCE LINE AT ONE OF THE PREDETERMINED POINTS I HAD MARKED EARLIER IN THE DAY. ON LIEUTENANT MOORE'S ORDER WE MOVED INTO THE CROWD AND CLEARED THE AREA ALL THE WAY TO VAN BUREN WHERE THE CROWD EVENTUALLY DISSIPATED. ALL THROUGHOUT THE MOVEMENT MULTIPLE UNKNOWN PROTESTORS WERE STRUCK BY PEPPERBALL AND LESS LETHAL MUNITIONS BY VARIOUS GRENADIERS. THERE WOULD BE TOO MANY TO LIST. SEVERAL PEOPLE WERE ARRESTED.

Public Narrative

Decl. Panuco ISO Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

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PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT (0723)

Incident Report

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Arrested Suspects	Additional Suspects	Unknown Suspects	Victims	Other Persons	Vehicles	Items	Evidence Count	Leads Count	Related Report #
<input type="checkbox"/> Arson Related			Arson Code		Damage Value		<input type="checkbox"/> Bias Crime <input type="checkbox"/> Gang Involved <input type="checkbox"/> Domestic Violence		
Incident Details									
Squad 50X	Clearance Disposition CLEARED BY ADULT ARREST			Cleared by Exception			Exceptional Clearance Date		
Situation Found					Status CLOSED - CLEARED				
Location Given By Dispatcher E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST					Cargo Theft NO				
Incident Address									
Street Address E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST									
City PHOENIX		State ARIZONA		Zip 85004		Country Code UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA)			
Administrative Info									
Reporting Officer SCOTT, ROBERT		Serial # 06158							

Narrative Information

PEPPER BALL DEPLOYMENT INFO

PEPPER BALL LAUNCHER: SERIAL #1873910

ROUNDS DEPLOYED: APPROXIMATELY THREE QUARTERS OF A TUBE OF PEPPER BALL

IMPACT LOCATIONS: GROUND SATURATION TECHNIQUE TO DISPERSE CROWD. DIRECT IMPACT TO SUBJECTS REFUSING TO LEAVE AND ACTIVELY TRYING TO BREACH SAFE ZONE.

DEPLOYMENT DISTANCE: APPROXIMATELY 25-50 FEET

DEPLOYMENT TIME: APPROXIMATELY 2031 HOURS TO 2050 HOURS

CERTIFICATION

GRENADIER CERTIFICATION TRAINING ON DECEMBER 13-14, 2016.

PEPPER BALL OPERATOR TRAINING ON DECEMBER 15, 2016.

NARRATIVE

ON 8/22/17 I WAS ASSIGNED TO WORK THE PROTEST OF THE PRESIDENT TRUMP RALLY IN DOWNTOWN PHOENIX. I WAS ASSIGNED AS A MEMBER OF THE GRENADIER TEAM AND WAS ASSIGNED A PEPPER BALL LAUNCHER. PEPPER BALL LAUNCHERS ARE COMMONLY DEPLOYED AS A LESS LETHAL OPTION FOR CIVIL UNREST. THE PEPPER BALL IS COMMONLY USED TO DISPERSE CROWDS AND STOP ACTIVE AGGRESSION.

THE MAJORITY OF THE PROTEST GROUPS WERE POSITIONED ON THE NORTH SIDE OF MONROE STREET. MONROE STREET BETWEEN 2ND STREET AND 3RD STREET WAS DESIGNATED AS A SAFE ZONE AND CIVILIANS WERE NOT PERMITTED IN THAT AREA. THERE WAS PEDESTRIAN FENCING THAT ENCLOSED MONROE STREET AND THE PROTESTORS WERE POSITIONED ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THAT FENCING. THE LINE LEADING TO THE ENTRANCE FOR THE TRUMP RALLY RAN THROUGH THE SOUTH SIDEWALK OF MONROE STREET. THE PROTESTORS WERE SEPARATED FROM THE ATTENDEES OF THE TRUMP RALLY BY THE WIDTH OF MONROE STREET, APPROXIMATELY 30'.

I WAS POSITIONED HALF WAY BETWEEN 2ND AND 3RD STREET ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF MONROE STREET. I WAS INITIALLY POSITIONED SOUTH OF THE SAFE ZONE ON THE SIDE WALK(SOUTH SIDE OF MONROE ST). DURING THIS



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TIME I HAD OBSERVED MULTIPLE ITEMS, BELIEVED TO BE WATER BOTTLES BEING THROWN AS RALLY ATTENDEES WALK TOWARDS THE ENTRY. I DID NOT OBSERVE WHO ACTUALLY THREW THE WATER BOTTLES. THIS OCCURRED SPORADICALLY DURING THE PROTEST. AT ONE POINT I OBSERVED OFFICER THWING #7686 USE THE PORTABLE PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM TO WARN THE CROWD NOT TO THROW THINGS. NO POLICE ACTION OTHER THAN VERBAL WARNINGS WERE TAKEN AT THIS TIME.

AT SOME POINT DURING THE EVENT, I OBSERVED A GROUP THAT WAS DONNING MASKS CARRYING BANNERS THAT IDENTIFIED THEM AS BEING FROM THE GROUP KNOWN AS ANTIFA. I WATCHED AS THE GROUP MADE ITS WAY TO THE FRONT OF THE CROWD ATTEMPTING TO TAKE A POSITION AT THE PEDESTRIAN FENCE. I OBSERVED A MALE SUBJECT THAT HAD BEEN AT THE PEDESTRIAN FENCE THAT HAD HIS ARMS SPREAD ACROSS THE FENCING, APPEARING NOT TO ALLOW THE ANTIFA GROUP TO THE FRONT. THERE WAS A WATER BOTTLED THAT HAD BEEN THROWN FROM THE GROUP JUST PRIOR AND IT APPEARED AS IF THE SINGLE MALE SUBJECT WAS ATTEMPTING TO KEEP THE ANTIFA GROUP OFF OF THE FRONT LINE. A CONFRONTATION ENSUED AND I OBSERVED SOMEONE FROM THE ANTIFA GROUP TAKE A SWING AT THE SINGLE MALE THAT WAS TRYING TO PREVENT THE GROUP FROM TAKING POSITIONS IN THE FRONT. DETECTIVES FROM THE COMMUNITY RESPONSE BUREAU ASCENDED ON THE GROUP. A SHORT TIME LATER I OBSERVED THE SINGLE MALE THAT WAS PREVENTING THE ANTIFA GROUP FROM TAKING THE FRONT, WALK WEST AWAY FROM THE ANTIFA GROUP. I WATCHED AS THE BANNERS OF THE GROUP WERE BROUGHT FORWARD, ULTIMATELY BEING PLACED AT THE FRONT. THERE WERE AT LEAST TWO LARGE BANNERS THAT THE GROUP PLACED AT THE PEDESTRIAN FENCING. THERE WERE MULTIPLE SUBJECTS BEHIND THE BANNERS WEARING MOSTLY BLACK CLOTHING AND VARIOUS TYPES OF MASKS COVERING THERE FACE. IT WAS BELIEVED THAT THE GROUP WAS PREPARING TO TO BREACH THE PEDESTRIAN FENCING AND GOING TO ATTEMPT TO COME INTO THE SAFE AREA. A DIRECTION WAS GIVEN TO DEPLOY PEPPER BALL IF THE GROUP ATTEMPTED TO BREACH THE FENCE. A SHORT TIME LATER I OBSERVED THE ANTIFA GROUP BUNCHING UP BEHIND THEIR BANNERS. I OBSERVED THE GROUP SURGE FORWARD TRYING TO BREACH THE FENCE WHICH MOVED IN TOWARDS THE SAFE ZONE. THE PEDESTRIAN FENCING IS INTERLINKED AND REMAINED CONNECTED EVEN AFTER THE IMPACT OF THE GROUP. I IMMEDIATELY DEPLOYED PEPPER BALL, IMPACTING THE GROUND IN FRONT OF THE GROUP, DRIVING THE GROUP BACKWARDS, USING A TECHNIQUE KNOWN AS AREA SATURATION. THIS TECHNIQUE IS MEANT TO MAKE THE IMMEDIATE AREA UNPLEASANT TO BE IN BECAUSE OF IRRITANT IN THE PEPPER BALLS - MOST SUBJECTS RETREATED AT THIS POINT, BUT A COUPLE OF SUBJECTS REMAINED TRYING TO HIDE BEHIND THE BANNERS. I DELIVERED MORE PEPPER BALL TO THE GROUND AND THEN BEGAN ATTEMPTING TO DIRECTLY IMPACTING THE LEGS OF THE SUBJECTS THAT REMAINED. THE DEPLOYMENT SEEMED EFFECTIVE AS SUBJECTS RETREATED FROM THE IMMEDIATE AREA.

I THEN OBSERVED AN OLDER MALE, NOT DRESSED IN THE DARK CLOTHING AND NO MASK COVERING HIS FACE, CHARGE THE PEDESTRIAN FENCING. THE OLDER MALE GRABBED THE FENCING AND PUSHED IT IN TOWARDS THE SAFE ZONE, ACTIVELY TRYING TO BREACH THE FENCING. I IMMEDIATELY DELIVERED DIRECT IMPACTS TO THE SUBJECT, AIMING AT THE TORSO OF THE SUBJECT. THE SUBJECT ULTIMATELY RETREATED AND THE FENCING REMAINED IN TACT.

THE AREA IN WHICH THE DISTURBANCE WAS INITIATED WAS CLEARED AND THE ORDER FOR THE PEPPER BALL GRENADIER'S TO STAND DOWN WAS GIVEN.

I STOOD BY MONITORING THE AREA. A SHORT TIME LATER I OBSERVED A DEVICE THAT LANDED TO THE EAST OF MY POSITION. I WAS UNAWARE OF WHERE THE ITEM WAS THROWN FROM, BUT OBSERVED IT LAND IN THE SAFE ZONE IN FRONT OF OFFICERS STANDING TO MY RIGHT(EAST). A SHORT TIME LATER I WAS MADE AWARE THAT THE ORDER TO DON OUR GAS MASKS WAS GIVEN AND SMOKE WAS DEPLOYED. A GAS IRRITANT WAS DEPLOYED AFTER THE SMOKE. AT ONE POINT MY VISIBILITY WAS VERY LOW FOR A PERIOD TIME, EITHER BECAUSE OF SMOKE DEPLOYED BY POLICE WAS THROWN BACK OR SOMEONE FROM THE CROWD DEPLOYED THERE OWN SMOKE. AT SOME POINT DURING THIS TIME PERIOD I HEARD THE AIR UNIT OVER HEAD GIVING COMMANDS FOR THE CROWD TO DISPERSE.

AFTER THE SMOKE CLEARED I WAS DIRECTED TO DEPLOY PEPPER BALL TO CLEAR OUT THE REMAINING PEOPLE AT THE PEDESTRIAN FENCE TO PROVIDE A CLEAR PATH FOR A SKIRMISH LINE TO BE FORMED. I DEPLOYED MULTIPLE ROUNDS OF PEPPER BALL USING THE AREA SATURATION METHOD THAT RESULTED IN THE FENCE LINE BEING CLEARED. A SKIRMISH LINE WAS FORMED AND ULTIMATELY BROKE INTO TWO LINES - ONE FOR 2ND STREET AND ONE FOR 3RD STREET. I WAS PROVIDING GRENADIER COVERAGE FOR THE 3RD STREET SKIRMISH LINE. THE



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Incident Report

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SKIRMISH LINE I WAS COVERING CLEARED 3RD STREET NORTH TO VAN BUREN ST. WHILE AT 3RD STREET AND VAN BUREN ST I WAS ADVISED TO ASSIST THE OFFICERS AT 2ND STREET AND VAN BUREN.

I MADE MY WAY TO 2ND STREET AND VAN BUREN ST AND OBSERVED A CROWD NORTH OF VAN BUREN ON 2ND STREET. ULTIMATELY THAT CROWD WAS DISPERSED AND I DID NOT DEPLOY ANY FURTHER PEPPER BALLS.

Public Narrative

Decl. Panuco ISO Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

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Arrested Suspects	Additional Suspects	Unknown Suspects	Victims	Other Persons	Vehicles	Items	Evidence Count	Leads Count	Related Report #
<input type="checkbox"/> Arson Related Arson Code					Damage Value		<input type="checkbox"/> Bias Crime <input type="checkbox"/> Gang Involved <input type="checkbox"/> Domestic Violence		
Incident Details									
Squad X81	Clearance Disposition		Cleared by Exception			Exceptional Clearance Date			
Situation Found					Status				
Location Given By Dispatcher E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST						Cargo Theft NO			
Incident Address									
Street Address E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST									
City PHOENIX			State ARIZONA		Zip 85004		Country Code UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA)		
Administrative Info									
Reporting Officer TURIANO, CHRISTOPHER			Serial # 06424						

Narrative Information

GRENADIER SUPPLEMENT TURIANO 6424
 PENN ARMS 40MM LAUNCHER: SERIAL GS0525
 BAG OF HAND THROWN SMOKE AND CS GRENADES

MUNITIONS DEPLOYED:

- 4 SMOKE GRENADES
- 3 CS GRENADES
- 8 40MM AERIAL WARNING
- 8 40MM OC MUZZLE BLAST
- 10 40MM SPIN STABILIZED FOAM BATON IMPACT ROUNDS
- 8 40MM OC IMPACT ROUND

ON 082217, I WAS ASSIGNED AS GRENADIER AT AN EVENT AT THE PHOENIX CONVENTION CENTER. I WAS PARTNERED WITH OFC. GATES 6831, AND SUPERVISED BY SGT. MCBRIDE 6187. WE WERE ALL UNDER THE DIRECTION OF LT. MOORE 6803 FOR THIS EVENT. I WAS BRIEFED BY SGT. MCBRIDE AND LT. MOORE IN DAYS AND HOURS LEADING UP TO THE EVENT. THEY CONVEYED TO ME THAT THE EVENT WAS TO BE A SPEAKING ENGAGEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. THEY ADVISED ME THAT THERE WAS INFORMATION THAT VARIOUS PROTEST GROUPS WERE GOING TO PROTEST OUTSIDE THE CONVENTION CENTER. THEY ADVISED ME THAT, IN AN EFFORT TO KEEP THE OPPOSING FACTIONS OF PROTESTORS AND ATTENDEES SEPARATE FROM EACH OTHER, A SECTION OF MONROE STREET WOULD BE FENCED OFF WITH PEDESTRIAN BARRICADES AND THIS WOULD BE A PROTECTED BUFFER ZONE.

ON THAT DAY, I WAS ASSIGNED TO OPERATE AS A GRENADIER ARMED WITH BOTH HAND THROWN GRENADES AND A 40MM LAUNCHER. I AM A CERTIFIED GRENADIER. I AM ALSO A CERTIFIED GRENADIER INSTRUCTOR. I AM ALSO A CERTIFIED PEPPERBALL INSTRUCTOR. MY NORMAL ASSIGNMENT IS AS A DOU TRAINING OFFICER. ONE OF MY RESPONSIBILITIES IN THIS POSITION IS TO PURCHASE AND MAINTAIN AN INVENTORY OF CHEMICAL AND IMPACT MUNITIONS FOR USE AT THE DIRECTION OF THE FIELD FORCE COMMANDER, LT. MOORE. I ALSO PROVIDE INSTRUCTION AND TRAINING TO PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT FIELD FORCE GRENADIERS. THERE WERE SEVEN 2 OFFICER TEAMS ASSIGNED AS GRENADIERS THAT DAY. EACH TEAM HAD ONE PEPPERBALL LAUNCHER AND HAND THROWN GRENADES. SOME GRENADIERS HAD 12 GAUGE LESS LETHAL SHOTGUNS. OTHERS HAD 40MM LAUNCHERS.

AS TIME GREW CLOSER TO THE START OF THE SPEAKING EVENT, OFFICER GATES AND I WERE DIRECTED TO STAND WATCH OVER A SECTION OF MONROE STREET. AS PEOPLE WERE WALKING IN TO THE EVENT, WE STOOD WATCH OVER THE PROTEST CROWD ON THE NORTH SIDE OF MONROE STREET. AS WE STOOD ON THE SOUTH SIDEWALK, I SAW SOME FULL WATER BOTTLES BEING THROWN FROM THE PROTESTOR CROWD, TO THE SOUTH, LANDING NEAR OFFICERS AND CITIZENS WALKING TO THE EVENT. I COULD NOT SEE WHO WAS THROWING THESE BOTTLES. AT THIS POINT THE THROWING OF THINGS FROM THE CROWD WAS VERY SPORADIC AND DID NOT SEEM WELL AIMED.



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AN ADDITIONAL CROWD OF PROTESTORS FORMED ON WASHINGTON STREET TO THE SOUTH OF US. OFFICER GATES AND I, WITH SGT. BACHORSKI 7403, WENT TO THAT LOCATION TO WATCH OVER THE GROUPS THERE. WHILE WE WERE AT THAT LOCATION, I HEARD LT MOORE ON THE RADIO ADVISING THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME KIND OF SMOKING DEVICE, AND ROCKS, AND WATER BOTTLES THROWN AT OFFICERS. I MONITORED AS HE INDICATED THAT SUBJECTS HAD KNOCKED DOWN THE PED FENCING. AFTER HE HAD REQUESTED PEPPERBALLS DEPLOYED (2031HRS), I CONFERRED WITH SGT BACHORSKI AND THEN PROCEEDED TO ASSIST THE OFFICERS ON MONROE ST.

I DROPPED MY GAS MASK AND WENT TO A POSITION BETWEEN 3RD AND 2ND STREET. LT MOORE HAS ALREADY REQUESTED GRENADIERS TO DEPLOY SMOKE GRENADES, AND THEN CS GRENADES. I ASKED LT MOORE IF HE WOULD LIKE SOME AERIAL WARNING MUNITIONS DEPLOYED. I LAUNCHED FOUR OF THESE OVER THE PROTEST CROWD. THESE ARE MEANT TO ENCOURAGE THE CROWD TO EGRESS FROM THE AREA. THEY APPEARED TO BE EFFECTIVE AS I COULD SEE MANY OF THE REMAINING CROWD LEAVING THE AREA. LT MOORE DIRECTED A SKIRMISH LINE OF OFFICERS WITH SHIELDS TO BEGIN TO MOVE THE REMAINING CROWD OUT OF THE AREA. I DEPLOYED SMOKE GRENADES, AND THEN A CS GRENADES. I ALSO DEPLOYED 40MM OC MUZZLE BLAST ROUND ROUNDS AT PROTESTORS THAT STILL REFUSED TO DISPERSE AND THOSE THAT CAME FORWARD TO THE POLICE LINE.

I JOINED THE SKIRMISH LINE AT 2ND STREET AND MONROE. THE LINE WAS FACING NORTH. THERE WERE STILL PROTESTORS IN THE STREET THROWING FULL BOTTLES OF WATER AT THE SKIRMISH LINE OF OFFICERS. I MOVED TO A POSITION TO PROVIDE COVER FOR THE OFFICERS AND PROVIDE COVER FOR THE HAND THROWN MUNITIONS (THROWN BY THE OTHER GRENADIERS). ADDITIONAL ANNOUNCEMENTS WERE MADE FOR EVERYONE TO LEAVE THE AREA. AS THE LINE MOVED NORTH I DEPLOYED MUZZLE BLAST ROUNDS OF OC AT THOSE REFUSING TO DISPERSE.

I SAW ANOTHER GRENADIER HAD THROWN A CS GRENADE OUT IN FRONT OF THE LINE. I SAW A MALE SUBJECT RUN FROM THE NORTH AND KICK THE GRENADE BACK AT THE SKIRMISH LINE OF OFFICERS. THE MALE WAS WEARING A GAS MASK WITH A GREY FILTER IN THE CENTER PORT BY HIS CHIN. HE HAD A BLACK T-SHIRT ON AND BLUE SHORTS. I NOTED THE GREAT DANGER OF HIM DOING THIS. THIS TYPE OF GRENADE THAT WAS THROWN IS A PYROTECHNIC GRENADE. IT BURNS BETWEEN 750 AND 800 DEGREES F. THIS IS FAR ABOVE A TEMPERATURE THAT WOULD BURN SKIN OR CLOTHING.

I SWITCHED THE ROUND IN MY LAUNCHER FROM AN OC MUZZLE BLAST TO A DIFFERENT ROUND. SINCE THE MALE WAS WEARING A GAS MASK I DETERMINED AN IMPACT ROUND WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE. I FIRED ON OC IMPACT ROUND AT THE MALE'S LOWER TORSO. THIS IS A PRIMARY TARGET ZONE FOR THIS TYPE OF ROUND. FROM APPROXIMATELY 20 YARDS AWAY, IT HIT THE MALE, AND APPEARED TO HAVE GOOD EFFECT. THIS TYPE OF ROUND IS A SPIN STABILIZED ROUND, WITH A POLYURETHANE FOAM FRANGIBLE NOSE CONE THAT WEIGHS 39 GRAMS AND TRAVELS BETWEEN 290 AND 320 FEET PER SECOND. IT IS A DIRECT IMPACT MUNITION.

I LOST SIGHT OF THAT MALE AS HE WAS ASSISTED OFF THE STREET. I PROCEEDED NORTH WITH THE SKIRMISH LINE. I TARGETED ADDITIONAL PROTESTORS THAT WERE THROWING THINGS, KICKING OR THROWING OUR HAND THROWN MUNITIONS BACK AT US, OR RUSHING AT THE SKIRMISH LINE TO ENGAGE OFFICERS.

I LAUNCHED ADDITIONAL WARNING MUNITIONS AT 2ND STREET AND VAN BUREN. I THEN ASSISTED IN COVERING OFFICERS MOVING EAST TOWARDS 3RD STREET. I EVENTUALLY WENT TO CENTRAL AND MONROE AND PEPPER SPRAYED A GROUP THAT WAS FIGHTING ON THE CORNER. I ALSO FIRED IMPACT ROUNDS AT AN INDIVIDUAL THERE THAT WAS THROWING THINGS AT OFFICERS.

ONLY FEW INDIVIDUALS WERE LEFT IN THE AREA. I BEGAN EXPERIENCING SEVERE MUSCLE CRAMPS. I WAS TREATED BY FOR PHOENIX FIRE FOR DEHYDRATION SYMPTOMS AT THE SCENE.



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Arrested Suspects	Additional Suspects	Unknown Suspects	Victims	Other Persons	Vehicles	Items	Evidence Court	Looka Court	Related Report #
<input type="checkbox"/> Arson Related	Arson Code					Damage Value	<input type="checkbox"/> Bias Crime	<input type="checkbox"/> Gang Involved	<input type="checkbox"/> Domestic Violence
Incident Details									
Squad X84	Clearance Disposition	Cleared by Exception			Exceptional Clearance Date				
Situation Found					Status				
Location Given By Dispatcher E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST						Cargo Theft			
Incident Address									
Street Address E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST									
City PHOENIX			State ARIZONA		Zip 85004		Country Code UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA)		
Administrative Info									
Reporting Officer BACHORSKI, BRIAN			Serial # 07403						

Narrative Information

GRENADIER DEPLOYMENT INFO AND ASSIGNMENT:

SERGEANT BACHORSKI 7403
GRENADIER BRAVO TEAM LEADER
CERTIFIED-2017

OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO BRAVO TEAM:

1. OFFICER BRANDY THWING 7686
2. OFFICER J.D. MERENA 7117
3. OFFICER LANE WHITE 6356
4. OFFICER JEFF HOWELL 5823
5. OFFICER CHRIS TURIANO 6424
6. OFFICER WILLIAM GATES 6831

CHEMICAL MUNITIONS ASSIGNED TO ME AND IN MY POSSESSION AT TIME OF INCIDENT (THROW BAG):

1. SMOKE (WHITE AND YELLOW)
2. CS GAS
3. STINGER BALLS

MUNITIONS DEPLOYED:

NONE

DATE OF INCIDENT:

082217

ON 082217, I WAS ASSIGNED AS THE BRAVO GRENADIER TEAM LEADER FOR THE PRESIDENT TRUMP RALLY, WHICH WAS BEING HELD AT THE NORTH CONVENTION CENTER. AS THE BRAVO GRENADIER TEAM LEADER, I WAS ASSIGNED TO OVERSEE THE DEPLOYMENT AND ACTIONS OF MY OFFICERS ON SCENE. OUR PRIMARY GOAL WAS TO PROVIDE SECURITY AND SUPPORT FOR TACTICAL RESPONSE UNITS WORKING THE EVENT. WE ROTATED OUR DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES WITH THE ALPHA GRENADIER TEAM LEADER AND HIS ASSIGNED OFFICERS. FOR A MAJORITY OF THE EVENT, MY TEAM REMAINED ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE CONVENTION CENTER PROVIDING SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT.

AT APPROXIMATELY 1840 HOURS, BRAVO FIELD FORCE UNITS ASSIGNED TO THE AREA OF NORTH 3RD STREET AND EAST WASHINGTON STREET INDICATED THAT THEY HAD A LARGE GROUP OF UNRULY PRO AND ANTI TRUMP PROTESTORS CONGREGATING ON THE N/E AND S/E CORNERS. AS A RESULT, GRENADIER TEAM SUPPORT WAS REQUESTED AND I DEPLOYED WITH OFFICER GATES AND TURIANO TO THEIR LOCATION.



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OFFICER GATES AND I REMAINED AT THIS LOCATION (WITHOUT INCIDENT) UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 2200 HOURS, AT WHICH TIME WE RE-JOINED ALPHA AND BRAVO GROUND UNITS IN THE AREA OF CENTRAL AVENUE AND MONROE. OFFICER TURIANO WAS RE-ASSIGNED TO THE MAIN FIELD FORCE (BY ME) AT APPROXIMATELY 2035 HOURS, IN AN EFFORT TO ASSIST OFFICERS ENGAGING WITH PROTESTORS ON EAST MONROE.

I DID NOT DEPLOY ANY MUNITIONS DURING THIS INCIDENT.

Public Narrative

Decl. Panuco ISO Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

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Incident Report

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Arrested Suspects 1	Additional Suspects	Unknown Suspects	Victims	Other Persons	Vehicles	Items	Evidence Count	Locka Count	Related Report #
<input type="checkbox"/> Arson Related Arson Code					Damage Value		<input type="checkbox"/> Bias Crime <input type="checkbox"/> Gang Involved <input type="checkbox"/> Domestic Violence		

Squad	Clearance Disposition	Incident Details Cleared by Exception	Exceptional Clearance Date
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Situation Found	Status
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Location Given By Dispatcher E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST	Cargo Theft
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Incident Address			
Street Address E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST			
City PHOENIX	State ARIZONA	Zip 85004	Country Code UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA)

Administrative Info	
Reporting Officer HAMAS, MATTHEW	Serial # 06851

SUSPECT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Known	<input type="checkbox"/> Unknown	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Arrested
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Name (Last, First Middle) PACHECO, DERRICK GILBERT							Suffix		
Nickname	Race WHITE	Sex MALE	SSN	Date of Birth /1983	Age 34	Age Range to	Age At Time Of Incident		

Height 5'07"	Weight 180	Driver's License # B14S	DL State ARIZONA	DL Class	DL Restrictions
Primary Language	Place of Birth UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	Citizenship	Ethnicity HISPANIC	Marital Status	

SIB Check Result	ICE Contact Date	ICE Phone #	ICE Response
------------------	------------------	-------------	--------------

Preferred	Home Phone	Cell Phone	Email Address
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Additional Email or Social Media Handle	Social Media Types
---	--------------------

Suspect Home Address			
Street Address			

City	State ARIZONA	Zip	Country Code
------	------------------	-----	--------------

Mailing Address			
Street Address			

City	State	Zip	Country Code
------	-------	-----	--------------

Suspect Employment Information			
<input type="checkbox"/> Student	<input type="checkbox"/> Homeless	Employer / School	Occupation
			Work Phone

Street Address			
City			
State	Zip	Country Code	

Hours of Employment	Days Off
---------------------	----------

Details					
Hair Color BROWN	Hair Length	<input type="checkbox"/> Glasses	Eye Color BROWN	Build	Facial Hair
Facial Hair Color	Voice	Complexion	Teeth		

Clothing Description			
Misc 1			

Misc 2			
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Trademarks of Suspect			
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PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT (0723)
Incident Report

Incident Number 201700001475176	CFS Incident # 201701475176
Report Type Incident Supplement	Page 2 of 3
Date / Time Occurred to	Date / Time Reported 08/22/2017 21:46

Injury 1	Injury 2	Injury 3	Injury 4	Injury 5
<input type="checkbox"/> Hospitalized Hospital Facility		Resident U.S. RESIDENT		

MO Panel	Entry Area	Entry Method
Entry Type	Exit Point	Target Area
Entry Point	Property Target 2	Property Target 3
Property Target 1	Time of Day	Victim Activity
Victim Target	Action 2 on Victim	Action 3 on Victim
Action 1 on Victim	Action 2 to Premises	Action 3 to Premises
Action 1 to Premises	Other Action 2	Other Action 3
Other Action 1	Solicited Offered 2	Solicited Offered 3
Solicited Offered 1	Weapon 2	Weapon 3
Weapon 1	Weapon 2 Type	Weapon 3 Type
Weapon 1 Type	Weapon 2 Caliber	Weapon 3 Caliber
Weapon 1 Caliber	Weapon 2 Color	Weapon 3 Color
Weapon 1 Color	Precipitating Circumstance	Instrument Used
Arson	Comments	

Gang Information		
<input type="checkbox"/> Primary Gang	Primary Gang Name	Primary Gang Membership Info
Primary Gang Location Info		Rival Gang Name
Colors/Logos		
<input type="checkbox"/> Secondary Gang	Secondary Gang Name	Secondary Gang Membership Info
Secondary Gang Location		Rival Gang Name
Colors/Logos		
<input type="checkbox"/> Clothing or Colors	<input type="checkbox"/> Gang Tattoos	<input type="checkbox"/> Paraphernalia or Photographs
<input type="checkbox"/> Self Proclamation	<input type="checkbox"/> Witness Testimony/Statement	<input type="checkbox"/> Written/Electronic Correspondance
Other		

Guardian Information	
<input type="checkbox"/> Guardian Notified	Guardian Notified On
Guardian Of	Guardian Relationship

ARREST			
Arrested As <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Adult <input type="checkbox"/> Juvenile	Arrest Number PHX201708223951	Arrest Action ON-VIEW - TAKEN INTO CUSTODY W/O WARRANT	Disposition
Arrest Date/Time 08/22/2017 21:20	Booking Precinct	Consular Notified?	<input type="checkbox"/> Arrested on Scene
Miranda Date/Time	Subject Response	Mirandized By	



PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT (0723)
Incident Report

Incident Number 201700001475176	CFS Incident # 201701475176
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Street Address 200 E MONROE ST					
City PHOENIX		State ARIZONA		Zip 85004	Country Code
Arresting Officer HAMAS, MATTHEW S		Squad	Complaint Date	Transporting Officer	Transported Date/Time
Weapon 1		Automatic Weapon 1		Weapon 2	
Automatic Weapon 2		Multiple Clearance		Juvenile Disposition	
Warrant Number		Warrant Signed By		Gang Affiliation	
Card Number					

Associated Charges					
Charge DISORDERLY CONDUCT-NOISE					Charge Code CLASS 1 MISDEMEANOR
Counts	PCN #	Property Value	Incident #	Warrant #	Offense Date / Time
1			201700001475176		08/22/2017 00:00
Victim					

Statement of Probable Cause

SUBJECT WAS PART OF A LARGE GROUP THAT WAS OUTSIDE OF THE CONVENTION CENTER WHERE PRESIDENT TRUMP WAS SPEAKING. AS THE CROWD WAS WALKING DOWN THE STREET, THEY WERE BEING ORDERED TO LEAVE THE AREA BY OFFICERS AND THE POLICE HELICOPTER. SUBJECT WAS TOLD AT LEAST 10 TIMES TO LEAVE. AT ONE POINT HE PUSHED A UNIFORMED OFFICER TRYING TO GO PAST A POLICE LINE.

Narrative Information

THIS SUPPLEMENT IS BEING GENERATED TO LIST THE ARRESTED PERSON.

Public Narrative

Decl. Panuco ISO Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

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PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT (0723)

Incident Report

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Arrested Suspects	Additional Suspects	Unknown Suspects	Victims	Other Persons	Vehicles	Items	Evidence Count	Leads Count	Related Report #
<input type="checkbox"/> Arson Related Arson Code					Damage Value		<input type="checkbox"/> Bias Crime <input type="checkbox"/> Gang Involved <input type="checkbox"/> Domestic Violence		
Incident Details									
Squad X84	Clearance Disposition CLEARED BY ADULT ARREST			Cleared by Exception			Exceptional Clearance Date		
Situation Found					Status CLOSED - CLEARED				
Location Given By Dispatcher E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST						Cargo Theft NO			
Incident Address									
Street Address E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST									
City PHOENIX		State ARIZONA		Zip 85004		Country Code UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA)			
Administrative Info									
Reporting Officer RAY, JAMES		Serial # 05835							

Narrative Information

OFFICER JAMES RAY 5835
DOWNTOWN OPERATIONS UNIT
X82 SQUAD

GRENADIER DEPLOYMENT INFORMATION

PEPPERBALL LAUNCHER: SERIAL #230002217

PEPPERBALL OC ROUNDS DEPLOYED ON 082217 = 5-7 ROUNDS TOTAL

IMPACT LOCATION: GROUND SATURATION OF THE LISTED ROUNDS OF OC PEPPERBALL AT A W/M WEARING A WHITE T-SHIRT, SHORTS, DARK HAIR, AND BANDANA OVER HIS FACE AS HE MOVED TOWARDS A CANISTER STILL IN THE PROCESS OF DEPLOYING ITS CONTENTS ON THE NORTH SIDE OF E VAN BUREN ST AT N 2ND STREET.

DEPLOYMENT DISTANCE: APPROXIMATELY 30 - 40 FEET

CERTIFICATION

- PEPPERBALL OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE 12/11/2013
- LEVEL II GRENADIER TRAINING 12/16/2014
- PEPPERBALL OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE 10/13/2015
- LEVEL II GRENADIER TRAINING 12/13/2016
- PEPPERBALL OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE 12/15/2016

I HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN THE TACTICAL RESPONSE UNIT FOR 15+ YEARS, ASSIGNED TO THE DOWNTOWN OPERATIONS UNIT SINCE 08/2006. DURING THIS TIME PERIOD I HAVE DEPLOYED TO 30+ TRU EVENTS EITHER AS A MOUNTED POLICE OFFICER, A TRU LINE OFFICER, AN ARREST TEAM OFFICER, SHIELD VAN OFFICER, WAGON OFFICER, TOOL TEAM OFFICER AND GRENADIER/PEPPERBALL OPERATOR.

ON 082217, AT APPROXIMATELY 1300 HOURS, I ATTENDED A MANDATORY DOU/TRU GRENADIER BRIEFING BEING HELD AT THE 101 N 1ST AVE OFFICE IN REGARDS TO THE POTUS RALLY TO OCCUR LATER THIS DAY. INSTRUCTIONS, DIRECTIVES AND ASSIGNMENTS WERE GIVEN TO ALL OFFICERS PRESENT. I WAS ASSIGNED AS A ALPHA SQUAD PEPPERBALL OPERATOR AND ISSUED MY GEAR FROM THE DOU TRAINING SQUAD. MY SQUAD WAS



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THEN ASSIGNED TO THE WEST CONVENTION CENTER BUILDING AND BEGAN ALTERNATING DEPLOYMENTS ONTO EAST MONROE STREET BETWEEN 2ND STREET AND 5TH STREET TO SUPPORT FIELD FORCE OFFICERS AT FIXED POSITIONS, AS WELL AS, ALL CONFRONTATION SQUAD DETECTIVES PATROLLING THE "NO FLY ZONE".

THE RALLY PROCEEDED ON SCHEDULE WITH AN ENDING TIME WELL AFTER 2000 HOURS. THE CROWD SIZE OF PROTESTORS HAD GROWN INTO THE THOUSANDS UP TO THIS POINT WITH THE MAJORITY OF THE PROTESTING BODY BEING ALONG THE NORTH CURB LINE OF MONROE STREET. THE RALLY INSIDE THE CONVENTION CENTER ENDED AND INITIATED A MASS EXIT OF PERSONS OUT SEVERAL EXIT PORTALS. A CLASH OF ANTI TRUMP PROTESTORS AND PRO TRUMP SUPPORTERS BEGAN IN THE INTERSECTION OF 200 E ADAMS STREET REQUIRING FIELD FORCE OFFICERS TO MAINTAIN A LINE OF SEPARATION. SUPERVISION, LT JANHKE AND LT WHITE, REQUESTED GRENADIER SUPPORT FOR THEIR LOCATION VIA RADIO. OFFICER MERENA 7117 AND I RESPONDED THROUGH THE CONVENTION CENTER TO THAT INTERSECTION TO PROVIDE SUPPORT UNTIL THE MAJORITY OF ATTENDEES HAD EXITED THE BUILDING SOUTHBOUND.

I HEARD ALPHA FIELD FORCE LEADER, LT MOORE, BROADCAST OVER OUR RADIO FREQUENCY TO THE EFFECT OF "GAS, GAS, GAS" "OFFICERS MASK UP". IN A LOUD AND DISTINCTIVE TONE HE COMMANDED GRENADIERS TO DEPLOY GAS, THEN FOR PEPPERBALL OPERATORS TO DEPLOY AND BEGIN FORCING THE LARGE CROWD BACK. FINALLY, GAS WAS AUTHORIZED. AT THIS POINT, I AM STILL A BLOCK AWAY FROM WHERE THIS INCIDENT IS OCCURRING AND ONLY HEARING THE RADIO TRANSMISSIONS. OFFICER MERENA IMMEDIATELY BEGINS HEADING NORTHBOUND TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO ALPHA LEADER, BUT I REMAINED AT THE INTERSECTION WITH LT WHITE FOR APPROXIMATELY ANOTHER 5-7 MINUTES. WITH CONTINUED REQUESTS FOR MORE OFFICERS TO RESPOND THE INTERSECTION AT 200 E MONROE STREET WHERE THE LARGER INCIDENT IS DEVELOPING, I AND TWO OTHER SQUADS OF FIELD FORCE OFFICERS LEAVE OUR INTERSECTION AND MOVE TO JOIN UP WITH LT MOORE.

I APPROACHED THE INTERSECTION OF 200 E MONROE STREET COMING FROM SOUTH TO NORTH. OFFICER HOWELL WAS OBSERVED WITH HIS PEPPERBALL WEAPON IN THE READY POSITION POINTING INTO THE CROWD LOCATED ON THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF THE INTERSECTION UNDER THE OVERHANG OF THE CHASE PARKING GARAGE AND I MOVED TO SUPPORT HIM. HE POINTED OUT TWO W/M'S IN RED T-SHIRTS THAT WERE IN THE PROCESS OF MASKING AND GLOVING UP. THEY WERE HOLDING MULTIPLE WATER BOTTLES IN THEIR ARMS AND APPEARED TO BE POURING AN UNKNOWN SUBSTANCE INTO SEVERAL OF THE BOTTLES. WE MAINTAINED OUR POSITION AND OBSERVED THEM UNTIL ALPHA LEADER DIRECTED ALL GRENADIERS TO SUPPORT THE FIELD FORCE AS THEY BEGAN MOVING THE SKIRMISH LINE NORTHBOUND ON 2ND STREET TOWARDS VAN BUREN STREET. I FOCUSED MY ATTENTION ON THE CROWDS OCCUPYING THE DIFFERENTLY LEVELS OF THE CHASE GARAGE FOR THREATS AS THE FIELD FORCE MOVED NORTH. WHEN THE FIELD FORCE WAS ORDERED TO STOP UPON ARRIVAL AT E VAN BUREN STREET AND MAINTAIN THE SKIRMISH LINE ALONG THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE ROAD, I MOVED TO A POSITION BETWEEN TWO OFFICERS ON THE FRONT LINE. THERE WERE AGGRESSIVE PROTESTORS STILL IN THE INTERSECTION AND ALL ALONG THE NORTH SIDE OF VAN BUREN STREET. SMOKE AND GAS WERE DEPLOYED IN A FURTHER ATTEMPT TO DISPERSE THE CROWD AS THE AIR UNIT WAS GIVING VERBAL COMMANDS FOR THE CROWD TO LEAVE THE AREA. I OBSERVED A WHITE MALE WEARING A WHITE T-SHIRT, SHORTS, DARK HAIR AND A BANDANA OVER HIS FACE MOVE TOWARDS A CANISTER STILL DEPLOYING IT'S CONTENTS AND IT APPEARED TO ME HIS INTENTION WAS TO INTERFERE WITH IT'S DELIVERY. I IMMEDIATELY RAISED MY WEAPON AND SATURATED THE GROUND IN FRONT OF THE CANISTER WITH 5-7 OC PEPPERBALLS. HE WAS NOT STRUCK WITH ANY OF THE ROUNDS, BUT LOOKED DIRECTLY AT ME AND MOVED BACK. THIS WAS MY ONLY DEPLOYMENT WITH MY ASSIGNED WEAPON SYSTEM DURING THE INCIDENT OF 082217.

I ASSISTED THE FIELD FORCE AND ALPHA LEADER BY MAINTAINING A GRENADIER PRESENCE ON THE FRONT LINE UNTIL ORDERED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA.

NO FURTHER INFORMATION AT THIS TIME.

Decl. Panuco ISO Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

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PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT (0723)

Incident Report

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Arrested Suspects	Additional Suspects	Unknown Suspects	Victims	Other Persons	Vehicles	Items	Evidence Count	Lacka Count	Related Report #
<input type="checkbox"/> Arson Related	Arson Code					Damage Value	<input type="checkbox"/> Bias Crime	<input type="checkbox"/> Gang Involved	<input type="checkbox"/> Domestic Violence
Incident Details									
Squad X91	Clearance Disposition	Cleared by Exception			Exceptional Clearance Date				
Situation Found					Status				
Location Given By Dispatcher E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST					Cargo Theft				
Incident Address									
Street Address E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST									
City PHOENIX		State ARIZONA		Zip 85004		Country Code UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA)			
Administrative Info									
Reporting Officer STICCA, JOHN		Serial # 07765							

Narrative Information

LESS-LETHAL SHOTGUN (ORANGE) AND THROW BAG INFO
 LESS-LETHAL SHOTGUN (ORANGE): SERIAL #B888121M
 ROUNDS DEPLOYED: 0
 THROW BAG MUNITIONS: 1 CS CANISTER AND 2 SMOKE CANISTERS THROWN AT THE CROWD

TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE

PEPPERBALL INSTRUCTOR CERTIFICATION: 01/2017
 LEVEL II GRENADIER TRAINING: 12/13/16 - 12/14/16
 PEPPERBALL OPERATOR TRAINING: 12/15/16

SUSPECT INFO

WHITE MALE, LARGE BUILD, GAS MASK, BLACK SHIRT WITH UNKNOWN CENTER DESIGN, BRIGHT BLUE SHORTS,
 BACKPACK (SUSPECT LATER IDENTIFIED AS JOSHUA COBIN)
 MULTIPLE, UNKNOWN SUSPECTS

NARRATIVE

ON 08/22/17 I WAS ASSIGNED AS AN ALPHA TEAM GRENADIER FOR THE PRESIDENT TRUMP EVENT AT THE ARIZONA CONVENTION CENTER. I WAS ISSUED A THROW BAG OF MUNITIONS CONSISTING OF SMOKE GRENADES AND CS GAS GRENADES. I WAS ALSO ISSUED A LESS-LETHAL SHOTGUN (ORANGE) WITH BOTH SOUND AND IMPACT MUNITIONS, CONSISTING OF BORE THUNDER MUZZLE BANG AND STUN BAG SUPER SOCK ROUNDS. I WAS PARTNERED WITH OFR GEORGE HERR #7737, WHO WAS EQUIPPED WITH A PEPPERBALL SYSTEM. OFR HERR AND I WERE ASSIGNED A ROTATING PATROL ZONE ON E MONROE ST, BETWEEN N 2ND AND N 3RD ST. PER PHOENIX CITY CODE, THIS AREA WAS ESTABLISHED AS A DEDICATED WORKSPACE FOR POLICE TO OPERATE IN. THE OBJECTIVE WAS TO MONITOR THE CROWD OF PROTESTORS BEHIND THE PEDESTRIAN FENCING ON THE NORTH CURB AND TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF BOTH EVENT ATTENDEES AND PROTESTORS. ADDITIONALLY, WE WERE TO ENSURE THAT NO ONE BREACHED AND ENTERED THE WORKSPACE AREA ON E MONROE ST. THROUGHOUT THE DAY, SMALL UNKNOWN OBJECTS, WATER BOTTLES, AND OTHER ITEMS WERE RANDOMLY THROWN FROM THE CROWD E MONROE ST OR AT THE EVENT GOERS. AT 1923 HOURS, OFFICERS ISSUED WARNINGS VIA AN AMPLIFIED SPEAKER TO THE CROWD REGARDING THROWN OBJECTS. THAT WARNING CONTINUED UNTIL ROUGHLY 1934 HOURS. AT 2031 HOURS, I HEARD SGT MCBRIDE BROADCAST OVER THE POLICE RADIO FOR GRENADIER OFFICERS TO ENTER ONTO MONROE ST AND TAKE POSITIONS BEHIND THE OFFICER SKIRMISH LINE THAT WAS ESTABLISHED ON MONROE ST EARLIER. OFR HERR AND I TOOK A POSITION ON THE WESTERN END OF THE LINE, CLOSEST TO N 2ND ST. WATER BOTTLES WOULD INTERMITTENTLY BE THROWN FROM THE CROWD AND INTO THE STREET AND THE CROWD BEGAN DIRECTING THEIR CHANTS TOWARD POLICE, CHANTING "HANDS UP! DON'T SHOOT!" AND "FUCK ARPAIO!" LT. MOORE HAD BROADCAST EARLIER THAT A SMALL GROUP OF PROTESTORS WERE MOVING A LARGE BANNER THROUGH THE CROWD AND APPROACHING THE PEDESTRIAN FENCING. THE CROWD BEGAN MOVING CLOSER TO THE FENCE AND BEGAN ATTEMPTING TO BREACH THE FENCING ON THE NORTH CURB OF MONROE. AT 2033



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HOURS, LT. MOORE BROADCAST THAT PEPPERBALL GRENADIER OFFICERS WERE TO DEPLOY MUNITIONS IN THE DIRECTION OF THAT GROUP. I OBSERVED PEPPERBALL GRENADIER OFFICERS DEPLOY MUNITIONS AT THE GROUND IN FRONT OF THE FENCE TO DISCOURAGE THE PROTESTORS FROM TRYING TO ENTER THE STREET. AN INDIVIDUAL RAN UP AND BEGAN PULLING ON THE FENCE, SO PEPPERBALL GRENADIER OFFICERS DEPLOYED MUNITIONS WHICH EFFECTIVELY MOVED HIM OFF THE FENCE LINE. LT MOORE GAVE ORDERS TO HALT DEPLOYMENT OF MUNITIONS TO ALLOW THE PEPPERBALL AGENTS TO TAKE EFFECT ON THE CROWD. AT 2034 HOURS, I HEARD LT. MOORE ADVISE OVER THE POLICE RADIO THAT SOMEONE IN THE CROWD OF PROTESTORS HAD THROWN AN UNKNOWN GAS OR CHEMICAL AGENT TOWARD OFFICERS ON THE SKIRMISH LINE AND THAT ALL OFFICERS WERE TO DON GAS MASKS. AT ABOUT THE SAME MOMENT, AN UNKNOWN SUSPECT THREW AN UNKNOWN OBJECT WHICH STRUCK ME IN THE RIGHT HAND. INITIALLY, I BELIEVED THIS OBJECT TO BE A ROCK UNTIL I TURNED AND SAW THE OBJECT SMOKING AND FLAMING ON THE GROUND. AN UNKNOWN PHOENIX BOMB SQUAD OFFICER STEPPED FORWARD AND DEPLOYED A FIRE EXTINGUISHER ONTO THE OBJECT, PUTTING IT OUT.

AT 2035 LT. MOORE THEN ADVISED GRENADIER OFFICERS TO DEPLOY SMOKE CANISTERS TOWARD THE CROWD. I REMOVED A SMOKE CANISTER FROM MY BAG AND ENSURED IT WAS LABELED "SMOKE" AND DEPLOYED IT TOWARD THE CROWD. THE SMOKE CANISTER WAS PICKED UP BY A WHITE MALE PROTESTOR, WEARING A BLACK SHIRT WITH AN UNKNOWN CHEST DESIGN, A GAS MASK, AND BLUE SHORTS (THIS INDIVIDUAL WAS LATER IDENTIFIED AS JOSHUA COBIN), AND THROWN BACK AT THE DIRECTION OF MYSELF AND OTHER SKIRMISH LINE OFFICERS. I DIRECTED OFR HERR TO DEPLOY PEPPERBALL MUNITION IN THAT AREA AS I PREPARED TO DEPLOY A CS CANISTER TOWARD THE CROWD. AT 2036 HOURS, LT MOORE GAVE THE COMMAND TO DEPLOY CS CANISTERS AT THE CROWD. I DEPLOYED A CANISTER OF CS, FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER SMOKE CANISTER, TOWARD THE CROWD. OFR HERR PROVIDED PEPPERBALL COVERAGE FOR MY DEPLOYED MUNITIONS, TO PREVENT PROTESTORS FROM PICKING UP AND THROWING THEM BACK AT THE SKIRMISH LINE. AT NO TIME DID I EVER DEPLOY SMOKE OR CS CANISTERS BEHIND THE SKIRMISH LINE.

OFR HERR STATED HE WAS OUT OF AIR TO POWER HIS PEPPERBALL GUN AND NEEDED ME TO SWITCH ON HIS SUPPLEMENTAL AIR TANK LOCATED ON HIS BACK. I MADE TWO ATTEMPTS TO TURN ON THE AIR TANK BUT HAD NO LUCK. AT THAT POINT, I ADVISED OFR HERR OF THE MALFUNCTIONING AIR TANK AND HANDED HIM MY LESS-LETHAL SHOTGUN AND MUNITIONS FOR IT. OFR HERR UTILIZED THE LESS-LETHAL SHOTGUN UNTIL HE WAS ABLE TO REPAIR HIS AIR TANK AND GET HIS PEPPERBALL SYSTEM FUNCTIONING, AT WHICH POINT HE RETURNED THE LESS-LETHAL SHOTGUN AND MUNITIONS TO ME.

OFR HERR AND I JOINED UP WITH SKIRMISH LINE OFFICERS ON THE EAST FLANK AT 3RD ST AND MONROE AND HELD THAT POSITION UNTIL WE WERE ORDERED BY LT MOORE TO MOVE NORTH ON N 3RD ST TO E VAN BUREN ST. WE THEN MOVED WEST ON E. VAN BUREN ST. TO N 2ND ST. AND ASSISTED SKIRMISH LINE OFFICERS WITH MOVING THE CROWD OF PROTESTORS NORTH OF E VAN BUREN ST. NO ADDITIONAL MUNITIONS OR SMOKE CANISTERS WERE DEPLOYED. AFTER SUCCESSFULLY MOVING THE CROWD, LT. MOORE GAVE THE ORDER TO BREAK DOWN THE LINE AND LEAVE THE AREA. NO FURTHER INFORMATION.

Public Narrative

Decl. Panuco ISO Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

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Incident Report

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Report Type Incident Supplement	Page 1 of 1
Date / Time Occurred to	Date / Time Reported 08/22/017 21:46

Arrested Suspects	Additional Suspects	Unknown Suspects	Victims	Other Persons	Vehicles	Items	Evidence Count	Leoka Count	Related Report #
<input type="checkbox"/> Arson Related Arson Code					Damage Value		<input type="checkbox"/> Bias Crime <input type="checkbox"/> Gang Involved <input type="checkbox"/> Domestic Violence		
Incident Details									
Squad X84	Clearance Disposition			Cleared by Exception			Exceptional Clearance Date		
Situation Found					Status				
Location Given By Dispatcher E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST						Cargo Theft			
Incident Address									
Street Address E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST									
City PHOENIX			State ARIZONA		Zip 85004		Country Code UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA)		
Administrative Info									
Reporting Officer WHITE, LANE			Serial # 00356						

Narrative Information

OFFICER LANE WHITE #6356, DOWNTOWN OPERATIONS UNIT X84 SQUAD

DEPLOYMENT INFORMATION

ORANGE LESS-LETHAL REMINGTON 870 SHOTGUN: SERIAL # B878329M

NO SHOTGUN ROUNDS DEPLOYED

ONE THROW BAG CONTAINING THROWABLE MUNITIONS: 3 SMOKE GRENADES, 3 CS GRENADES AND 2 STINGBALL GRENADES.

LATER GIVEN BY LT MOORE 1 MORE SMOKE GRENADE AND 1 MORE CS GRENADE. I DEPLOYED 3 SMOKE GRENADES AND 3 CS GRENADES. NO STINGBALL GRENADES WERE DEPLOYED

TRAINING

TRU CERTIFIED FOR MORE THAN 10 YEARS AND HAVE DEPLOYED TO MANY TRU EVENTS.

GRENADIER CERTIFIED DECEMBER 2016. DEPLOYED AS GRENADIER SEVERAL TIMES.

I WAS ASSIGNED TO WORK WITH OFFICER HOWELL #5823. OFFICER HOWELL WAS ASSIGNED AS PEPPER BALL OPERATOR AND I WAS A LESS LETHAL SHOTGUN AND THROW MUNITIONS OPERATOR. OFFICER HOWELL AND I WERE ASSIGNED TO THE AREA OF MONROE STREET BETWEEN 2ND STREET AND 3RD STREET.

OFFICER HOWELL AND I STAYED TOGETHER THE ENTIRE NIGHT UNTIL THE ITEMS STARTED BEING THROWN BY THE PROTESTERS. WHEN LT MOORE GAVE THE ORDER TO DEPLOY SMOKE I BEGAN THROWING SMOKE MUNITIONS ALONG THE NORTH CURB OF MONROE STREET. I NOTICED THAT ALMOST EVERY SMOKE MUNITIONS THAT I THREW AT THE NORTH CURB WAS PICKED UP AND THROWN BACK AT THE OFFICER LINE. I DEPLOYED 3 SMOKE GRENADES.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WHILE I WAS STANDING BEHIND THE OFFICER LINE SEVERAL WATER BOTTLES NEARLY HIT ME. THE BOTTLES WERE IN SUCH A CLOSE PROXIMITY THAT I HAD TO DUCK TO AVOID BEING HIT. I COULD NOT SEE WHO THE SUSPECT WAS WHO THREW THE BOTTLES.

WHEN LT MOORE GAVE THE ORDER TO DEPLOY CS GAS I DEPLOYED 3 CS GRENADES. I THREW THE CS MUNITIONS AT THE NORTH CURB OF MONROE BETWEEN 2ND STREET AND 3RD STREET.

I DID NOT DEPLOY ANY STINGBALL MUNITIONS.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT AT SOME POINT LT MOORE GAVE ME 2 MORE GRENADES. 1 SMOKE GRENADE AND 1 CS GRENADE. I DID NOT DEPLOY THESE 2 GRENADES.

I DID HAVE A LESS LETHAL ORANGE SHOTGUN WITH ME BUT I DID NOT DEPLOY ANY LESS LETHAL SHOTGUN ROUNDS.

I AT NO TIME DROPPED OR DEPLOYED MUNITIONS BEHIND THE OFFICER LINE.

Decl. Panuco ISO Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

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Date / Time Occurred to	Date / Time Reported 08/22/2017 21:46

Arrested Suspects	Additional Suspects	Unknown Suspects	Victims	Other Persons	Vehicles	Items	Evidence Count	Leads Count	Related Report #
<input type="checkbox"/> Arson Related	Arson Code					Damage Value	<input type="checkbox"/> Bias Crime	<input type="checkbox"/> Gang Involved	<input type="checkbox"/> Domestic Violence
Incident Details									
Squad	Clearance Disposition	Cleared by Exception			Exceptional Clearance Date				
Situation Found					Status				
Location Given By Dispatcher E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST						Cargo Theft NO			
Incident Address									
Street Address E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST									
City PHOENIX		State ARIZONA		Zip 85004		Country Code UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA)			
Administrative Info									
Reporting Officer GATES, WILLIAM		Senat # 06831							

Narrative Information

GRENADIER DEPLOYMENT INFO

OPERATOR: OFFICER WILLIAM GATES #6831
 PEPPERBALL LAUNCHER: SERIAL # 230001917
 ROUNDS DEPLOYED: 0

GRENADIER TRAINING INFORMATION

ORIGINAL CERTIFICATION: LEVEL II GRENADIER TRAINING 12/2014
 LAST CERTIFICATION: LEVEL II GRENADIER TRAINING 12/2016

ON 08-22-2017 AT 1300 HRS, I WAS ASSIGNED AS A GRENADIER FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL VISITATION AT THE PHOENIX CONVENTION CENTER AS A MEMBER OF THE BRAVO TEAM GRENADIERS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF SERGEANT BACHORSKI #7403.

I WAS ASSIGNED AS A PEPPERBALL LAUNCHER OPERATOR AS A PART OF A TWO MAN GRENADIER TEAM ELEMENT WITH MY PARTNER OFFICER TURIANO #6424.

WHILE WORKING THE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT AT APPROXIMATELY 1840 HRS, THE MOBILE FIELD FORCE ELEMENTS THAT WERE AT THE INTERSECTION OF NORTH 3RD STREET AND EAST WASHINGTON STREET REQUESTED ADDITIONAL ASSETS TO ASSIST THEM WITH CROWD CONTROL CONCERNING SOME ALTERCATIONS THAT WERE OCCURRING BETWEEN PROTESTORS AND ATTENDEES OF THE PRESIDENT TRUMP RALLY.

SERGEANT BACHORSKI DIRECTED OFFICER TURIANO AND MYSELF TO ACCOMPANY HIM TO THAT LOCATION TO PROVIDE GRENADIER SUPPORT FOR THOSE FIELD FORCE ELEMENTS SHOULD THEY NEED US TO ASSIST IN CROWD DISPERSION.

SERGEANT BACHORSKI, OFFICER TURIANO AND I STOOD BY AS GRENADIER SUPPORT FOR THOSE FIELD FORCE ELEMENTS AND MONITORED THE CROWDS FOR ANY SIGNS OF VIOLENT PROTESTORS OR RALLY ATTENDEES.

AT APPROXIMATELY 1943 HRS, ALPHA FIELD FORCE LEADER LIEUTENANT BEN MOORE #6803 REQUESTED MORE GRENADIERS TO THE INTERSECTION OF NORTH 2ND STREET AND EAST MONROE STREET REFERENCE PROTESTORS AND ATTENDEES OVERTAKING THE INTERSECTION AND TO MONITOR ESCALATING TENSIONS BETWEEN THE GROUPS.

MY PARTNER OFFICER TURIANO BROKE AWAY FROM OUR LOCATION AT APPROXIMATELY 2035 HRS AND PROCEEDED TO NORTH 2ND STREET AND EAST MONROE STREET TO ASSIST LIEUTENANT MOORE'S ELEMENTS WITH PROTESTORS THAT WERE THROWING OBJECTS AT THE OFFICERS AND RALLY ATTENDEES. SERGEANT BACHORSKI AND I REMAINED AT THE INTERSECTION OF NORTH 3RD STREET AND EAST WASHINGTON STREET FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE EVENING UNTIL THE CROWD LEVELS DWINDLED AND THE MAJORITY OF THE PROTESTORS AND ATTENDEES HAD LEFT THE AREA.

AT APPROXIMATELY 2200 HRS, SERGEANT BACHORSKI AND I THEN LINKED UP WITH THE OTHER GRENADIER TEAMS MEMBERS AT NORTH CENTRAL AVENUE AND MONROE STREET AS THE LAST GROUPS OF PROTESTORS



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WERE DISPERSING AND LEAVING THE AREA.
I DID NOT DEPLOY ANY PEPPERBALL OR ANY OTHER GRENADIER MUNITIONS DURING THIS GRENADIER DEPLOYMENT. NFI.

Public Narrative

Decl. Panuco ISO Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

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PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT (0723)

Incident Report

Incident Number 201700001476176	CFS Incident # 201701476176
Report Type Incident Supplement	Page 1 of 3
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Arrested Suspects	Additional Suspects	Unknown Suspects	Victims	Other Persons	Vehicles	Items	Evidence Count	Leuka Count	Related Report #
<input type="checkbox"/> Arson Related Arson Code		Damage Value		<input type="checkbox"/> Bias Crime		<input type="checkbox"/> Gang Involved		<input type="checkbox"/> Domestic Violence	
Incident Details									
Squad	Clearance Disposition		Cleared by Exception		Exceptional Clearance Date				
Situation Found					Status				
Location Given By Dispatcher E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST						Cargo Theft			
Incident Address									
Street Address E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST									
City PHOENIX		State ARIZONA		Zip 85004		Country Code UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA)			
Administrative Info									
Reporting Officer THWING, BRANDY		Serial # 07686							

Narrative Information

OFFICER BRANDY THWING #7686; X81 SQUAD

GRENADIER DEPLOYMENT INFO

STUNBAG/LESS LETHAL & THROW BAG
-STORED WITH BORE THUNDER AND SUPER SOCK
-COLORED GAS/CS GAS/STING BALLS GRENADES

ROUNDS DEPLOYED: NONE

PARTNERED WITH: OFFICER K. MERENA #7117

TRAINING

TRU CERTIFICATION: 04/04/13
YEARLY RECERTIFICATION SINCE
GRENADIER TRAINING: 02/20/15
PEPPERBALL OPERATOR CERTIFICATION: 10/20/15
DURING MY TIME ASSIGNED TO THE DOWNTOWN OPERATIONS UNIT, I HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED TO AT LEAST 10 AND NO MORE THAN 30 TRU EVENTS. DURING THESE DEPLOYMENTS I HAVE HAD MULTIPLE POSITIONS RANGING FROM GRENADIER/PEPPER BALL OPERATOR, ARREST TEAM, SHIELD VAN, ALPHA SQUAD, AND WAGON.

I WAS PAIRED UP WITH OFFICER MERENA #7117 AND WE WERE BOTH ADVISED TO STAND ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE CONVENTION CENTER ON MONROE STREET IN BETWEEN 2ND STREET AND 3RD STREET; I WAS ASSIGNED THE STUNBAG AND THROW BAG FOR THIS EVENT. WE WERE ROTATED OUT SEVERAL TIMES FROM THIS POST WITH



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OTHER GRENADIERS UP UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 1900 HOURS. AT THIS TIME, OFFICERS WERE DISPATCHED TO STAND ON MONROE STREET IN THE WORKSPACE AREA FOR 1ST RESPONDERS. THIS AREA IS ON MONROE STREET IN BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH PEDESTRIAN FENCING SEPARATING THE PROTESTING GROUPS. THE PROTEST GROUP TO THE NORTH BECAME MORE AGITATED BY THROWING WATER BOTTLES AND BY CURSING AT THE PRO-TRUMP PEDESTRIANS WALKING TO THE CONVENTION CENTER ENTRANCE.

AT APPROXIMATELY 1927 HOURS, I WAS REQUESTED BY SERGEANT MCBRIDE #6187 TO MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT WHILE UTILIZING THE LRAD SPEAKER SYSTEM. OFFICER NAVARETTE #5948 CARRIED THE LRAD SPEAKER WHILE I MADE THE ANNOUNCEMENT FROM 2ND STREET TO NEARLY 3RD STREET WHILE WALKING ALONG MONROE STREET. THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS REPEATED AT LEAST 6-7 TIMES, "DO NOT THROW WATER BOTTLES, DO NOT THROW OBJECTS- THIS IS A PEACEFUL GATHERING." THE VOLUME WAS TURNED UP TO IT'S HIGHEST VOLUME SETTING.

I RETURNED BACK TO THE LINE AND AT APPROXIMATELY 2015 HOURS, I OBSERVED A ROWDY GROUP DRESSED IN ALL BLACK. THEY ALL HAVE THEIR FACES PARTIALLY COVERED WITH BLACK MATERIAL AND/OR THEY WERE WEARING BLACK MASKS. DUE TO THEIR SIZE AND SOME FACIAL FEATURES; THEY APPEARED TO BE YOUNG. THEY WERE HOLDING A BLACK BANNER, AND WERE STANDING BEHIND ANOTHER WHITE MALE WEARING A BLUE/GREY CAMELPACK OR SMALLER BACKPACK. I OBSERVED THE GROUP PUSH INTO THE WHITE MALE WITH SMALL BACKPACK TO WHERE HE ABRUPTLY TURNED AROUND AND VERBALLY CONFRONTED THE GROUP. HE HAD HIS HANDS UP AND WAS FACING THE GROUP WHILE YELLING SOMETHING TO THEM. I THEN SAW SOMEONE IN THE GROUP PUSH THE WHITE MALE IN THE RIGHT SHOULDER AND THEN I SAW A SINGLE CLOSED FIST STRIKE AT THE FACE OR SHOULDER AREA OF THE WHITE MALE. THE STRIKE WASN'T FORCEFULLY BECAUSE THE WHITE MALE NEVER STAGGERED OR STUMBLED FROM THE STRIKE. AT THIS TIME, COMMUNITY RESPONSE OFFICERS WERE ALREADY STANDING AT THE GROUP AND ESCORTED THE WHITE MALE OUT OF THE CROWD/PROTEST.

OFFICER MERENA #7117 THEN LEFT AND WENT TO 2ND STREET TO ASSIST IN CROWD CONTROL ON THAT SIDE OF THE INTERSECTION.

I CONTINUED TO WATCH THE GROUP AND OBSERVED THEY PLACE 2 BLACK BANNERS ON TOP OF EACH OTHER OVER THE PEDESTRIAN FENCING THAT BLOCKED MY VIEW FROM THEIR GROUP. FROM THE SIDE OF THE BANNERS AND IN BETWEEN THE GROUPS OF PEOPLE, I OBSERVED THEM OPENING THEIR BLACK BACKPACKS AND CLOSING THEIR BACKPACKS AND HANDING WATER BOTTLES TO EACH OTHER.

I CONTINUED TO WATCH THE GROUP AND OTHER SUBJECTS IN THE NORTH PROTEST GROUP. SEVERAL WATER BOTTLES WERE THROWN FROM THIS CROWD TOWARDS OFFICERS ON THE LINE. I DODGED SEVERAL BOTTLES OF WATER THAT WERE THROWN IN MY DIRECTION.

AT APPROXIMATELY 2030 HOURS, I WAS STANDING ON THE LINE WEARING MY TRU HELMET. I THEN TASTED AND SMELLED A CHEMICAL LIKE PEPPER TASTE AND MY FACE AND NECK HAD A MILD BURNING SENSATION. I THEN REALIZED THE CROWD MUST OF THROWN A CHEMICAL AGENT IN POLICE DIRECTION. I KNOW POLICE HAVE NOT DISPERSED ANYTHING AT THIS TIME BECAUSE I NEVER HEARD COMMANDS VIA RADIO AND OR SOUNDS OF WEAPON DEPLOYMENT. AT THIS TIME, LT. MOORE #6803 ADVISED OVER THE RADIO TO PUT GAS MASKS ON AND THE GROUP THREW A GASSING AGENT.

I THEN HEARD A COMMOTION IN THE DIRECTION OF THE GROUP THAT WAS WEARING ALL BLACK WITH 2 BLACK BANNERS BLOCKING THEIR VIEW. I LOOKED OVER AND OBSERVED THIS GROUP GRAB THE PEDESTRIAN FENCING TRYING TO SHAKE AND KNOCK IT DOWN. THE GROUP WAS KICKING, PUSHING AT THE FENCE. THIS GROUP CONSISTED OF APPROXIMATELY 10-15 PEOPLE.

PEPPERBALL WAS DEPLOYED AND THE GROUP QUICKLY DISPERSED INTO THE CROWD. I THEN OBSERVED A LONE WHITE MALE WEARING A BLIGHT BLUE TSHIRT RUN UP TO THE PEDESTRIAN FENCING AND WITH BOTH HANDS PULL AND SHAKE THE FENCING IN AN AGGRESSIVE MANNER. HE WAS YELLING AND GRIMACING IN AN ANGRY TONE WHILE TRYING TO KNOCK THE PEDESTRIAN FENCING DOWN. MORE PEPPERBALL WAS DEPLOYED IN HIS DIRECTION AND HE QUICKLY FLED THE AREA.

THE LINE OF OFFICERS WAS SPREAD OUT FROM 2ND STREET TO 3RD STREET MOVING NORTH FROM MONROE



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STREET IN ATTEMPTS TO PUSH THE CROWD FROM THE AREA AND THIN THE CROWD OUT. WHILE WALKING NORTH BOUND IN A SLOW PACE, WE HELD OUR POSITION. THE AIR UNIT CAME OVERHEARD WITH ITS SPOT LIGHT AND MADE ANNOUNCEMENT INTO THE CROWD ADVISING OF THE "UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY." I WAS ABLE TO HEAR THE COMMANDS WHILE WEARING A GAS MASK AND WEARING A POLICE EAR MIKE CONNECTED TO MY CONSTANTLY BUSY RADIO TRAFFIC ON THE POLICE RADIO CHANNEL DEDICATED TO THE PROTEST.

THE GROUP I WAS APART OF THAT WAS HOLDING THE LINE FACING EAST TOWARDS 3RD STREET LATER MERGED TOWARDS 3RD STREET AND VAN BUREN STREET WHERE THE CROWD THERE SOON THIN OUT. WE STAYED AT THIS POSITION UNTIL WE WERE DISMISSED BY LT. MOORE #6803.

DURING THIS TRU EVENT, I DID NOT DEPLOY ANY GAS AND/OR STUN BAG ROUNDS AND/OR BORE THUNDER.

FOLLOWING THE TRU DEPLOYMENT, I COLLECTED MY GEAR AND LATER SECURED FOR THE EVENING.

THIS COMPLETES MY REPORT AT THIS TIME.

Public Narrative

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Arrested Suspects	Additional Suspects	Unknown Suspects	Victims	Other Persons	Vehicles	Items	Evidence Count	Leota Court	Related Report #
<input type="checkbox"/> Arson Related Arson Code					Damage Value		<input type="checkbox"/> Bias Crime <input type="checkbox"/> Gang Involved <input type="checkbox"/> Domestic Violence		
Incident Details									
Squad 50X	Clearance Disposition CLEARED BY ADULT ARREST		Cleared by Exception				Exceptional Clearance Date		
Situation Found					Status CLOSED - CLEARED				
Location Given By Dispatcher E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST					Cargo Theft NO				
Incident Address									
Street Address E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST									
City PHOENIX		State ARIZONA		Zip 85004		Country Code UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA)			
Administrative Info									
Reporting Officer HOWELL, JEFFREY		Serial # 05823							

Narrative Information

GRENADIER SUPPLEMENT

OFFICER JEFFREY HOWELL #5823 - PEPPERBALL LAUNCHER SERIAL# 1873912
 ROUNDS DEPLOYED - APPROXIMATELY (1) SPEEDPOD
 IMPACT LOCATIONS - GROUND, FEET, KNEES, ANKLES, LEGS, TORSO, ARMS, AND HANDS
 DISTANCE - VARIED BETWEEN 15 FEET TO 60 FEET

ON 082217, I WAS ASSIGNED AS GRENADIER FOR THE POTUS VISIT WHICH WAS BEING HELD AT THE PHOENIX CONVENTION CENTER LOCATED AT 100 N. 3RD ST. I WAS PARTNERED WITH OFFICER LANE WHITE #6356. I WAS SUPERVISED BY SGT. BACHORSKI #7403 WHO WAS THE BRAVO TEAM LEADER. WE WERE ALL UNDER THE DIRECTION OF LIEUTENANT BENJAMIN MOORE #6803 WHO WAS THE FIELD FORCE COMMANDER FOR THIS EVENT.

AT APPROXIMATELY 1300 HOURS, THE GRENADIERS AND EXTRACTION TEAM MEMBERS WERE BRIEFED BY SGT. MCBRIDE ON INTELLIGENCE SURROUNDING THE VISIT AS WELL AS CURRENT TRENDS AND INCIDENTS OCCURRING AT THESE TYPES OF EVENTS WHICH INVOLVED CIVIL UNREST. AT THIS MEETING, I WAS GIVEN MY GRENADIER ASSIGNMENT. I WAS ASSIGNED AS A PEPPERBALL OPERATOR AND TEAMED UP WITH OFFICER LANE WHITE.

DURING THIS MEETING, SGT. MCBRIDE INFORMED THE TEAMS THAT A PUBLIC SAFETY BUFFER ZONE HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED ON MONROE STREET TO KEEP THE CROWDS SEPARATED AND ALLOW A "WORK ZONE" FOR THE OFFICERS. THE PERIMETER OF MONROE STREET WAS LINED WITH PEDESTRIAN FENCING AND ALSO LINED WITH BRIGHT YELLOW CRIME SCENE TAPE WHICH READ "POLICE LINE DO NOT CROSS".

MYSELF AND OFFICER WHITE HAD BEEN ASSIGNED TO ROTATING POSTS THROUGHOUT THE DAY ON THE SOUTHSIDE OF MONROE ST. BETWEEN 2ND AND 3RD STREET. THE MAJORITY OF THE CROWD WAS LOCATED ON THE NORTH SIDE OF MONROE ST. BETWEEN 2ND AND 3RD STREET. WE WERE TO LOOK FOR ANY TROUBLE AREAS AND TO ENSURE PUBLIC SAFETY. PRIOR TO THE CIVIL UNREST, MYSELF AND OFFICER WHITE WALKED INTO THE CONVENTION CENTER THROUGH THE NORTH DOORS BY 2ND ST. AND MONROE TO TAKE A BREAK. WE WERE ONLY ON BREAK FOR A SHORT TIME, WHEN LIEUTENANT MOORE REQUESTED MORE GRENADIERS TO RESPOND TO THE AREA OF 2ND ST. AND MONROE. AT THIS POINT, I PUT MY GEAR BACK ON AND RESPONDED OUT THE CONVENTION CENTER DOORS WHICH EXITED ONTO MONROE ST. JUST EAST OF 2ND ST.

AS I WALKED UP TO THE PEDESTRIAN FENCING, WHICH WAS LOCATED ON THE SOUTHSIDE OF MONROE ST., I COULD SEE AND HEAR THE CROWD ON THE NORTH SIDE OF MONROE ST. WAS BECOMING VERY LOUD AND AGITATED. THE CROWD STARTED TO PUSH THE PEDESTRIAN FENCING OVER IN ORDER TO GAIN ACCESS ONTO MONROE ST. AT THIS POINT, I BEGAN TO DEPLOY PEPPERBALLS TO THE GROUND DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF WHERE THE BREACH WAS OCCURRING. THESE DEPLOYMENT ORDERS WERE GIVEN PRIOR BY LT. MOORE THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WERE PROTESTERS ALLOWED TO BREACH THE "BUFFER ZONE". THE DEPLOYMENT OF



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PEPPERBALLS WERE USED TO STOP THE ACTIONS OF THE CROWD WHO WERE TRYING TO BREACH THE FENCING. A PORTION OF THE CROWD BEGAN TO RETREAT FROM THE FENCED AREA. HOWEVER, THERE WAS STILL A LARGE GROUPING OF "ANTIFA" TYPE PROTESTORS. MOST OF THESE SUBJECTS WERE DRESSED IN ALL BLACK AND HAD THEIR FACE'S COVERED TO CONCEAL THEIR IDENTITY. SEVERAL OF THE SUBJECTS WERE ALSO HOLDING UP BANNERS WHICH BLOCKED OUR VIEW OF WHAT WAS OCCURRING BEHIND THE BANNERS. THESE TYPES OF DRESS AND STRATEGIES IS COMMONLY REFERRED TO AS "BLACK BLOC".

AT THIS POINT, SOMEONE FROM THE CROWD ON THE NORTH SIDE OF MONROE ST. HAD THROWN SOME TYPE OF SMOKE GRENADE AT THE OFFICERS WHO WERE LOCATED JUST TO THE EAST OF MY LOCATION. SHORTLY AFTER THAT, I HEARD A COMMAND TO DON GAS MASKS. PRIOR TO THIS COMMAND, I COULD FEEL TH EFFECTS OF CS GAS ON MY FACE. I KNOW WE HAD NOT DEPLOYED CS GAS AT THIS POINT. I DEDUCED THAT THE SMOKE GRENADE THAT WAS THROWN BY SOMEONE IN THE CROWD WAS IN FACT CS. I IMMEDIATELY DONNED MY GAS MASK AND CONTINUED TO DEPLOY PEPPERBALLS IN ORDER TO THWART THE ADVANCEMENT OF PROTESTORS, PROTECT THROWN MUNITIONS, AND TO STOP THE AGITATORS WHO HAD BEGUN TO THROW FROZEN WATER BOTTLES AND ROCKS AT US. I COULD ONLY IDENTIFY THESE AGITATORS AS WEARING ALL BLACK. ON MORE THAN THREE OCCASIONS, I HAD TO MAKE SEVERAL EVASIVE MANEUVERS IN ORDER NOT TO GET HIT BY THE FLYING OBJECTS. I RESPONDED TO THESE ACTIONS BY DEPLOYING PEPPERBALLS AT THE TORSO AREAS OF THE AGITATORS BODIES.

AFTER THE INITIAL ATTACK FROM AND DISPERSING OF THE PROTESTORS, I MOVED TO THE AREA OF 2ND ST. AND MONROE JUST WEST. WHILE AT THIS LOCATION, A SKIRMISH LINE WAS SET UP ACROSS MONROE ST. FACING WESTBOUND BY LT. MARK SCHWEIKERT. I PROVIDED GRENADEIER SUPPORT FOR THE SKIRMISH LINE AS WE ADVANCED AND PUSHED THE PROTESTORS WEST TOWARDS 1ST STREET. AS WE REACHED 1ST ST. AND MONROE, LIEUTENANT SCHWEIKERT ADVISED THAT WE WOULD HOLD THE SKIRMISH LINE AT THIS LOCATION. SEVERAL MINUTES HAD PASSED, WHEN THE PROTESTORS ONCE AGAIN, BECAME VERY AGITATED. FIGHTS STARTED TO BREAK OUT AMONG THE PROTESTORS IN THE STREET AND INTERSECTION AS WELL AS THE BLOCKING OF VEHICULAR TRAFFIC MOVEMENT. LT. SCHWEIKERT GAVE THE ORDER TO CLEAR THE INTERSECTION. I DEPLOYED PEPPERBALLS TO THE ASPHALT IN AND AROUND THE INTERSECTION. THIS GROUND DEPLOYMENT OF PEPPERBALLS CAUSED THE CROWN TO STOP FIGHTING AND IMMEDIATELY DISPERSE FROM THE INTERSECTION. OUR SKIRMISH LINE THEN PRESSED FORWARD BY PUSHING THE PROTESTORS WEST ON MONROE ST. TOWARDS CENTRAL AVE.

AS WE WERE APPROACHING CENTRAL AND MONROE ST., WE OBSERVED SEVERAL MORE FIGHTS BREAKING OUT. WE ALSO OBSERVED A BLACK TRUCK SQUEAL ITS TIRES AS IT TURNED OFF OF MONROE ST. ONTO CENTRAL AVE. WHEN WE ARRIVED AT CENTRAL AND MONROE, WE OBSERVED AN UNMARKED POLICE VEHICLE WITH ITS EMERGENCY LIGHTS ACTIVATED IN THE MIDDLE OF CENTRAL AVE JUST NORTH OF MONROE ST. THIS POLICE VEHICLE HAD STOPPED THE BEFORE MENTIONED SMALL BLACK TRUCK. THE TRUCK HAD ATTEMPTED TO TURN AROUND IN THE MIDDLE OF CENTRAL AVE AND PROCEED THE WRONG WAY TOWARDS MONROE ST. I RAN OVER TO THIS LOCATION AND PROVIDED COVER WHILE OFFICERS TOOK THE DRIVER INTO CUSTODY. THE PROTESTOR CROWD WAS AGAIN BECOMING VERY AGITATED AND YELLING AT THE RESPONDING OFFICERS. ADDITIONAL FIGHTS BROKE OUT ON THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF CENTRAL AND MONROE. DURING THIS TIME, I DEPLOYED PEPPERBALLS IN A GROUND SATURATION METHOD IN ADDITION TO SOME MID-TORSO DIRECT IMPACTS. GRENADEIER OFFICER TURIANO HAD ALSO ARRIVED AT MY LOCATION TO ASSIST IN DISPERSING THE CROWD.

THIS CONCLUDES MY INVOLVEMENT IN THIS INCIDENT.

Public Narrative

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<input type="checkbox"/> Arson Related Arson Code					Damage Value		<input type="checkbox"/> Bias Crime <input type="checkbox"/> Gang Involved <input type="checkbox"/> Domestic Violence		
Incident Details									
Squad X04	Clearance Disposition CLEARED BY ADULT ARREST		Cleared by Exception			Exceptional Clearance Date			
Situation Found					Status CLOSED - CLEARED				
Location Given By Dispatcher E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST					Cargo Theft NO				
Incident Address									
Street Address E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST									
City PHOENIX		State ARIZONA		Zip 85004		Country Code UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA)			
Administrative Info									
Reporting Officer HERR, GEORGE		Serial # 07737							

Narrative Information

OFFICER(S) INVOLVED:
 OFFICER HERR #7737
 OFFICER STICCA #7765

ASSIGNMENT:
 GRENADIER

OFFICER HERR'S TRAINING/EXPERIENCE:

I HAVE BEEN A PHOENIX POLICE OFFICER FOR APPROXIMATELY 15 YEARS. DURING THIS TIME, I HAVE SERVED AS A PATROL OFFICER, EQUIPMENT OFFICER FOR THE SEARCH AND RECOVERY DIVE TEAM, AND AS A PLAIN CLOTHES DETECTIVE.

IN AUGUST OF 2016 I ATTENDED AND COMPLETED THE TACTICAL RESPONSE UNIT TRAINING. THIS TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION WAS ISSUED THROUGH THE PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT.

IN DECEMBER OF 2016 I ATTENDED AND COMPLETED LEVEL 2, GRENADIER TRAINING. THIS TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION WAS ISSUED THROUGH THE PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT.

IN DECEMBER OF 2016, I ATTENDED AND COMPLETED THE PEPPERBALL OPERATOR COURSE. THIS TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION WAS ISSUED THROUGH THE PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT.

IN JANUARY OF 2017 I ATTENDED AND COMPLETED THE PEPPERBALL INSTRUCTOR COURSE AND PEPPERBALL TECHNICIAN COURSE. THIS TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION WAS ISSUED THROUGH PEPPERBALL.



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***** MUNITIONS DEPLOYED *****

PEPPERBALL

PEPPERBALL LAUNCHER: SERIAL #230006117

MUNITIONS DEPLOYED: 3/4 OF A TUBE OF PEPPERBALL PAVA ROUNDS (APPROXIMATELY 75 ROUNDS)

IMPACT LOCATION(S):

FIRST:

AREA DENIAL TO THE SOUTH OF THE PEDESTRIAN FENCE ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE HERBERGER THEATER WHEN SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS ATTEMPTED TO BREACH THE WORK SPACE DESIGNATED FOR FIRST RESPONDERS.

SECOND:

IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE AREA DENIAL, PEPPERBALL WAS DEPLOYED AT THE LOWER LEGS OF THE VARIOUS INDIVIDUALS WHO FAILED TO LEAVE THE IMMEDIATE AREA - WHICH IMMEDIATELY STOPPED THEIR ACTIONS. AS WELL AS SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS WHO RECEIVED A DIRECT IMPACT ROUND(S) WHEN THEY WERE THROWING OBJECTS AT OFFICERS.

DEPLOYMENT DISTANCE:
APPROXIMATELY 10 - 15 YARDSDEPLOYMENT TIME:
APPROXIMATELY 2033 HOURS

LESS LETHAL SHOTGUN

LESS LETHAL SHOTGUN - ORANGE IN COLOR AND DESIGNATED FOR GRENADIERS
SERIAL #B888121MMUNITIONS DEPLOYED:
ONE BORE THUNDER ROUND
ONE STUN BAG ROUND

IMPACT LOCATION:

BORE THUNDER:

LAUNCHED INTO THE AIR ABOVE THE SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE ACTIVELY DISPLAYING AGGRESSION TOWARDS OFFICERS - TO INCLUDE THROWING A WOODEN FLAG POLE IN A SPEAR LIKE MANNER.

STUN BAG ROUND:

DEPLOYED AT AN UNKNOWN WHITE MALE (NO SHIRT WITH DARK PANTS) WHO WAS ACTIVELY THROWING WATER BOTTLES AT OFFICERS. IMPACTED UNKNOWN MALE IN THE UPPER TORSO.

DEPLOYMENT DISTANCE FOR BORE THUNDER:
APPROXIMATELY 20 - 30 YARDS

DEPLOYMENT TIME FOR BORE THUNDER:



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APPROXIMATELY 2035 TO 2040 HOURS

SUSPECT INFORMATION:

SEVERAL UNKNOWN INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE ACTIVELY BREACHING THE PEDESTRIAN FENCE WHICH WAS ESTABLISHING THE WORK SPACE FOR FIRST RESPONDERS. AS WELL AS SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE CONDUCTING VARIOUS ACTS OF ACTIVE AGGRESSION TOWARDS VARIOUS OFFICERS ? INCLUDING ONE, UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL, WHO THREW AN OBJECT WHICH STRUCK OFFICER STICCA.

NARRATIVE:

ON AUGUST 22, 2017 I WAS ASSIGNED TO THE FIELD FORCE ALPHA TEAM AS A GRENADIER FOR THE PRESIDENT TRUMP RALLY AT THE PHOENIX CONVENTION CENTER. I WAS PARTNERED WITH OFFICER STICCA #7765, WHO WAS ALSO ASSIGNED AS A GRENADIER. I WAS DESIGNATED TO OPERATE THE PEPPERBALL SYSTEM, WHILE OFFICER STICCA WAS DESIGNATED TO OPERATE THE 12 GAUGE SHOTGUN AS WELL AS SMOKE/GAS GRENADE DEPLOYMENT.

AT APPROXIMATELY 1300 HOURS, THE GRENADIER TEAM WAS BRIEFED BY SGT. MCBRIDE. DURING THE BRIEFING SGT. MCBRIDE INFORMED US OF THE DESIGNATED WORK SPACE FOR FIRST RESPONDERS, ALSO COMMONLY REFERRED TO AS THE SAFE ZONE, WHICH HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED ON MONROE STREET BETWEEN 2ND STREET AND APPROXIMATELY 4TH STREET. OUR OBJECTIVE FOR THIS EVENT WAS TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THE FIELD FORCE UNITS AND ASSIST IN MAINTAINING THE MONROE STREET BUFFER BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS. WE WERE TOLD NO-ONE WAS AUTHORIZED TO BE ON MONROE STREET OR AUTHORIZED TO BREACH THE PEDESTRIAN FENCING. AS GRENADIERS, IF A BREACH WAS TO OCCUR WE WERE TO ADDRESS THE BREACH WITH PEPPERBALL UNTIL A FIELD FORCE SQUAD ARRIVED OR THE INDIVIDUAL(S) RETURNED TO THE NORTH SIDE OF THE STREET.

AFTER THE BRIEFING WE MOVED OUR EQUIPMENT TO OUR STAGING LOCATION. OFFICER STICCA AND I WALKED OUTSIDE AND LOOKED AT THE ESTABLISHED SAFE ZONE. WE OBSERVED THE PEDESTRIAN FENCING SET UP ON THE NORTH AND SOUTH SIDE OF MONROE STREET FROM APPROXIMATELY 4TH STREET TO 2ND STREET AND HAD YELLOW POLICE TAPE ATTACHED TO IT. MONROE STREET WAS CLOSED TO THE GENERAL POPULATION. THE AREA DESIGNATED FOR THE INDIVIDUALS PROTESTING WAS THE NORTH SIDE OF MONROE STREET - WHICH WAS PRIMARILY THE HERBERGER THEATER. THE SOUTH SIDE OF MONROE WAS DESIGNATED AS AN INGRESS ROUTE FOR THE INDIVIDUALS ATTENDING THE RALLY.

AT APPROXIMATELY 1400 HOURS, OFFICER STICCA AND I BEGAN ROTATIONS WITH OTHER GRENADIERS ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE CONVENTION CENTER, BETWEEN 3RD STREET AND 2ND STREET. THROUGHOUT THE DAY THERE WERE SEVERAL OCCASIONS WHEN WATER BOTTLES WERE THROWN AT VARIOUS INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE WALKING ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE CONVENTION CENTER (SOUTH SIDE OF MONROE), WHICH WAS THE ROUTE TO ENTER THE CONVENTION CENTER FOR THE RALLY.

AS THE DAY WENT ON, THE INDIVIDUALS ON THE NORTH SIDE OF MONROE STREET BECAME MORE AGITATED. THIS RESULTED IN THERE BEING MORE OF A POLICE PRESENCE. ONE BY ONE, THERE WERE SQUADS ADDED TO CREATE MORE OF A BARRIER BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS. THE OFFICERS WERE LINED UP, FACING NORTH, IN TACTICAL RESPONSE UNIFORMS/GEAR FROM 2ND STREET TO 3RD STREET ON MONROE.

AS THE RALLY WAS COMING TO AN END, THE NORTH SIDE OF THE CONVENTION CENTER (SOUTH SIDE OF MONROE STREET) WAS CLOSED AND THE EGRESS ROUTE WAS SET INTO PLACE. THE EGRESS ROUTE KEPT THE INDIVIDUALS ATTENDING THE RALLY EXITING THE CONVENTION CENTER TO THE SOUTH, WHILE KEEPING THE INDIVIDUALS NOT ATTENDING THE RALLY ON THE NORTH SIDE OF MONROE.

AT APPROXIMATELY 1900 HOURS SGT. MCBRIDE ADVISED THERE WERE SEVERAL WATER BOTTLES WHICH HAD BEEN



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N THROWN FROM THE NORTH TO THE SOUTH. SHORTLY AFTER THAT, LT. MOORE REQUESTED ADDITIONAL FIELD FORCE UNITS TO RESPOND TO 2ND STREET AND MONROE AND ORDERED EVERYONE TO ENSURE THEY HAD THEIR HELMETS DONNED.

AT APPROXIMATELY 1927 HOURS, OFFICER STICCA AND I ESCORTED OFFICER THWING WHILE SHE WAS GIVING ANNOUNCEMENTS UTILIZING AN LRAD DEVICE. OFFICER THWING BEGAN THE ANNOUNCEMENTS AT 2ND STREET AND WE WALKED EAST ON MONROE STREET UNTIL WE REACHED THE END OF THE CROWD AT APPROXIMATELY 4TH STREET. OFFICER THWING REPEATEDLY INFORMED THE CROWD TO STOP THROWING OBJECTS AT OFFICERS AND OTHERS. AT APPROXIMATELY 1935 HOURS WE CONCLUDED THE ANNOUNCEMENTS AND RETURNED TO OUR ASSIGNED FIXED POSITIONS.

SHORTLY AFTER WE RETURNED TO OUR FIXED POSITIONS, LT. MOORE REQUESTED GRENADIER SUPPORT AT 2ND STREET AND MONROE. OFFICER STICCA AND I STAYED AT THE POSITION WE WERE CURRENTLY AT, APPROXIMATELY MID - BLOCK BETWEEN 2ND STREET AND 3RD STREET - WHILE OTHER GRENADIERS ASSISTED LT. MOORE.

AS THE CROWD BECAME MORE AGITATED, WE WERE ADVISED THERE WERE SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS THROWING WATER BOTTLES FROM THE MULTI-LEVEL PARKING GARAGE, LOCATED ON THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF 2ND STREET AND MONROE. LT. MOORE ADVISED THERE WAS A GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE PUTTING UP A LARGE BANNER ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE PEDESTRIAN FENCING.

AT APPROXIMATELY 2030 HOURS, OFFICER STICCA AND I WERE STILL AT OUR POST - MIDBLOCK BETWEEN 2ND AND 3RD STREET ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF MONROE, WHEN SGT. MCBRIDE TOLD ME TO COME WITH HIM. I FOLLOWED HIM ONTO MONROE STREET WHERE HE TOLD ME HE WAS BEING TOLD THERE WAS A GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE PLANNING ON BREACHING THE PEDESTRIAN FENCING ON THE NORTH SIDE. AS I LOOKED TO THE NORTH I OBSERVED A LARGE BANNER WHICH HAD BEEN ERECTED ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE PEDESTRIAN FENCE. WHILE STAYING ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF MONROE ? BUT STILL ON THE STREET, SGT. MCBRIDE MOVED TO THE EAST SIDE OF THE BANNER AND I MOVED TO THE WEST SIDE OF THE BANNER. I MOVED TO THE WEST, AND IN FRONT OF THE FIELD FORCE SQUAD, IN AN ATTEMPT TO GAIN MORE OF A VANTAGE POINT OF SEEING WHAT WAS TAKING PLACE AT OR AROUND THE BANNER. OFFICER STICCA WAS TO MY LEFT (WEST).

A FEW MOMENTS LATER A GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS ON THE NORTH SIDE OF MONROE STREET GRABBED THE PEDESTRIAN FENCING AND BEGAN TO SHAKE THE FENCING. THEY THEN BEGAN TO PICK THE FENCING UP AND SLAM IT ON THE GROUND AND BEGAN YELLING. THERE WERE SEVERAL WATER BOTTLES WHICH WERE THROWN FROM THE BACK OF THE GROUP AS WELL. AS THE PEDESTRIAN FENCING BEGAN TO BOW TOWARDS THE CENTER OF MONROE STREET, SGT. MCBRIDE AND I BEGAN TO FIRE PEPPERBALL MUNITIONS AT THE ASPHALT IN FRONT OF THE GROUP IN A TACTIC KNOWN AS "AREA DENIAL". SOME OF THE INDIVIDUALS STOPPED TRYING TO BREACH THE FENCE AND RAN TOWARDS THE BACK OF THE CROWD - HOWEVER THE MAJORITY OF THE INDIVIDUALS CONTINUED ATTEMPTING TO BREACH THE FENCING.

"AREA DENIAL" IS A TACTIC TAUGHT BY PEPPERBALL. THIS TACTIC CAN BE DESCRIBED AS DEPLOYING THE MUNITIONS AT THE FEET OF THE INDIVIDUAL(S) SO THE PAVA POWDER (THE ACTIVE INGREDIENT IN THE PEPPERBALL MUNITION) WILL ASSIST IN CHANGING THE BEHAVIOR OF THE INDIVIDUAL(S) WITHOUT A DIRECT IMPACT ON THE PERSON(S) BODY.

AS WE WERE IMPLEMENTING THE AREA DENIAL TECHNIQUE, INDIVIDUALS FROM THE BACK OF THE GROUP BEGAN TO THROW LIGHTED OBJECTS AT US. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS I OBSERVED OBJECTS WITH LIT WICKS BEING THROWN, FROM THE BACK OF THE CROWD, TOWARDS OFFICER STICCA AND MYSELF.

OFFICER STICCA TAPPED ME ON THE LEFT SHOULDER AND POINTED TO A WHITE MALE, WEARING A BLACK SHIRT WITH BLUE SHORTS AND WAS WEARING A GAS MASK, AND TOLD ME HE WAS THROWING OBJECTS AT US AND HE HAD BEEN STRUCK BY SOMETHING ON HIS HAND. I IMMEDIATELY TURNED TO MY LEFT AND FIRED 2-3 PEPPERBALL MUNITIONS (ROUNDS) AT THE UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL. THE INDIVIDUAL WAS DIRECTLY IMPACTED BY THE PEPPERBALL MUNITIONS AND RAN TOWARDS THE BACK OF THE CROWD.

I THEN OBSERVED A LARGE OBJECT, LATER IDENTIFIED AS A GAS GRENADE, BEING THROWN FROM THE BACK OF THE CROWD TOWARDS ME. THE MUNITIONS LANDED WITHIN A FEW FEET OF WHERE I WAS STANDING AND BEGAN TO



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DEPLOY A SMOKE. SEVERAL PEOPLE AROUND ME BEGAN TO COUGH AND SOMEONE BEGAN YELLING TO "MASK UP" BECAUSE THEY (THE INDIVIDUALS ON THE NORTH SIDE OF MONROE STREET) WERE THROWING GAS AT US. MY SKIN WHICH WAS EXPOSED BEGAN TO BURN. I RECOGNIZED THIS FEELING AS A GAS EXPOSURE FROM MY TRAINING. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THE TERM "MASK UP" IS HOW OUR FIELD FORCE ORDERS THE OFFICERS TO DON THEIR GAS MASKS.

AS THE FENCING BEGAN TO BOW EVEN MORE TOWARDS US, I BEGAN TO TARGET INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE PHYSICALLY GRABBING THE FENCING. THE MAJORITY OF THE INDIVIDUALS RELEASED THEIR GRIP ON THE FENCING AND MOVED TO THE BACK OF THE CROWD, AS A RESULT OF THE VARIOUS INDIVIDUALS BEING TARGETED WITH THE DIRECT IMPACT OF THE PEPPERBALL - WHICH IMMEDIATELY STOPPED THEIR ACTIONS.

THE CROWD CONTINUED TO THROW MORE OBJECTS AT OFFICERS, TO INCLUDE OFFICER STICCA AND MYSELF. AS LT. MOORE GAVE THE ORDER TO DEPLOY SMOKE, MY PEPPERBALL GUN WENT DOWN. I ATTEMPTED TO FIX THE LAUNCHER, HOWEVER I WAS UNABLE TO REGAIN AIR PRESSURE. I TURNED TO MY LEFT AND TOLD OFFICER STICCA MY LAUNCHER WAS DOWN AND ASKED FOR HIS SHOTGUN. HE GAVE ME HIS SHOTGUN AND HIS MUNITIONS FOR THE SHOTGUN. THERE WERE SEVERAL WATER BOTTLES THROWN AT US WHILE I WAS GETTING THE SHOTGUN AND MUNITIONS SITUATED ON MY PERSON. I HAD TO EITHER SIDE STEP OR DUCK MY HEAD TO AVOID BEING HIT BY SEVERAL OF THE WATER BOTTLES BEING THROWN.

WHILE WE WERE WAITING FOR THE SMOKE TO CLEAR UP SOME, A WOOD POLE WITH A FLAG WRAPPED AROUND ONE END OF IT WAS THROWN AS A SPEAR THROUGH THE SMOKE IN OUR DIRECTION. I LOADED A ROUND KNOWN AS "BORE THUNDER" INTO THE SHOT GUN AND FIRED IT INTO THE AIR TOWARDS THE NORTH - THE DIRECTION THE "SPEAR" WAS THROWN FROM. THE "BORE THUNDER" MUNITION CAN BE DESCRIBED AS A DIVERSIONARY DEVICE WITH FLASH AND OVERPRESSURE WHEN LAUNCHED FROM A 12 GAUGE SHOTGUN. AFTER THE BORE THUNDER ROUND WAS LAUNCHED THE NUMBER OF WATER BEING THROWN AT THE OFFICERS DECLINED AND THERE WERE NOT ANYMORE FLAG POLES THROWN AT US.

THROUGH THE SMOKE, I OBSERVED A LIGHT SKINNED MALE, WITH NO SHIRT AND DARK PANTS, STANDING DIRECTLY ACROSS FROM US IN THE COURTYARD OF THE HERBERGER THEATER. THE INDIVIDUAL HAD A WATER BOTTLE IN HIS HAND. I LOADED A SINGLE ROUND OF THE "SUPER SOCK" MUNITION, ALSO KNOWN AS A BEAN BAG ROUND, INTO MY SHOT GUN. AS THE INDIVIDUAL BEGAN TO THROW THE WATER BOTTLE I FIRED MY SHOTGUN, STRIKING THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE UPPER TORSO AREA AND CAUSING HIM TO FALL TO THE GROUND. ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL GRABBED HIM BY THE ARM AND THEY FLED TO THE EAST.

AT THIS TIME THE ORDER WAS GIVEN FOR US TO BREACH THE FENCE TO THE NORTH AND FORM A LINE ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE FENCE. WHILE THIS WAS TAKING PLACE THE CROWD SPLIT AND PART OF THE CROWD WENT TO THE 3RD STREET SIDE OF THE HERBERGER THEATER AND THE OTHER PART OF THE CROWD WENT TO THE 2ND STREET SIDE OF THE HERBERGER THEATER. OFFICER STICCA AND I WENT TO THE 3RD STREET SIDE WHERE WE SUPPORTED THE FIELD FORCE UNITS WHO HAD CREATED A SKIRMISH LINE. THE CROWD WHICH WAS ON THE 3RD STREET SIDE WAS VERY QUIET, DID NOT THROW ANY OBJECTS TOWARDS US OR ANYONE ELSE, AND DISPERSED WHEN THEY WERE TOLD TO DO SO.

DURING THIS TIME I WAS ABLE TO GET MY PEPPERBALL LAUNCHER/SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL, SO I GAVE OFFICER STICCA THE SHOTGUN BACK AS WELL AS THE MUNITIONS FOR THE SHOT GUN.

WE WERE EVENTUALLY REDEPLOYED ON 2ND STREET TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THE FIELD FORCE UNITS; HOWEVER I DID NOT DEPLOY ANY OTHER MUNITIONS.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE PHOENIX POLICE AIR UNIT WAS OVER THE CROWD AND WAS MAKING ANNOUNCEMENTS TO THE CROWD TO DISPERSE. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT AT NO TIME DID I DEPLOY ANY MUNITIONS BEHIND ANY SKIRMISH LINE OR TOWARDS ANY OFFICERS, NOR DID I DEPLOY ANY MUNITIONS WHICH WERE NOT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT.



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Public Narrative

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Arrested Suspects	Additional Suspects	Unknown Suspects	Victims	Other Persons	Vehicles	Items	Evidence Count	Leads Count	Related Report #	
<input type="checkbox"/> Arson Related		Arson Code		Damage Value		<input type="checkbox"/> Bias Crime		<input type="checkbox"/> Gang Involved		<input type="checkbox"/> Domestic Violence
Incident Details										
Squad X81		Clearance Disposition			Cleared by Exception			Exceptional Clearance Date		
Situation Found					Status					
Location Given By Dispatcher E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST					Cargo Theft NO					
Incident Address										
Street Address E MONROE ST & N 2ND ST										
City PHOENIX			State ARIZONA			Zip 85004		Country Code UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA)		
Administrative Info										
Reporting Officer WOOLGAR, RIKKI		Serial # 07510								

Narrative Information

*****GRENADIER DEPLOYMENT INFORMATION*****

40MM LAUNCHER: SERIAL# GS0524

ROUNDS DEPLOYED: 3 OC MUZZLE BLASTS

OC POWDER DIRECTED OVER CROWD

DEPLOYED FROM 5-10 YARDS

CS GAS

ROUNDS DEPLOYED: 3 CS CANISTERS

THROWN INTO CROWD FROM APPROXIMATELY 15 YARDS

TRAINING

LEVEL TWO GRENADIER TRAINING- DECEMBER 2016

PEPPERBALL OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE- DECEMBER 2016

ON 08222017 I WAS ASSIGNED AS A GRENADIER TO ASSIST WITH THE TRUMP VISIT AND RALLY. AS A GRENADIER WE WERE ASSIGNED TO THE CONVENTION CENTER TO ASSIST THE ALPHA FIELD FORCE WITH EVENT SECURITY. DUE TO THE LARGE NUMBER PEOPLE GATHERED NORTH OF MONROE BETWEEN 2ND STREET AND 3RD STREET MYSELF AND OTHER GRENADIERS STOOD JUST OUTSIDE THE NORTH SIDE OF THE CONVENTION CENTER FOR SECURITY. WE ROTATED THIS POSITION FOR SEVERAL HOURS LEAVING SEVERAL GRENADIERS BETWEEN THE PEOPLE JUST NORTH AND THE PEOPLE ATTENDING THE EVENT.

ONCE THE CONVENTION CENTER WAS FULL AND SECRET SERVICE STATED NO ONE ELSE WAS ALLOWED IN I ASSISTED SEVERAL OTHER GRENADIERS IN JUST BEING PRESENT AT 2ND STREET AND MONROE WHILE THE CROWD THAT WAS NOT LET IN DISPERSED.

MYSELF AND OFFICER MERENA #7117 STOOD BY FOR EXTRA SUPPORT IN AREA OF 2ND STREET AND MONROE DUE TO THE LARGE CROWD THAT WAS STILL SURROUNDING THE AREA. WE WALKED JUST EAST ON MONROE AS 2 BIG



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BLACK BANNERS WERE BEING SET UP JUST NORTH OF THE PED FENCING BETWEEN 2ND STREET AND 3RD STREET. I OBSERVED A LARGE GROUP GATHER BEHIND THE BANNERS APPEARED TO BE SETTING UP FOR SOMETHING. SEVERAL PEOPLE WERE REACHING IN AND OUT OF BACKPACKS BUT I COULD NOT SEE WHAT THEY WERE TAKING OUT OF THE BAGS. DURING THIS TIME WE WERE ADVISED OVER THE RADIO THAT A FIGHT AT BROKEN OUT AT 2ND STREET AND ADAMS. LT FREUDENTHAL WHO WAS OVER ON ADAMS REQUESTED SOME GRENADIERS RESPOND FOR SUPPORT. MYSELF AND OFFICER MERENA RAN OVER FROM MONROE TO ASSIST. WHEN WE ARRIVED THEY MOVED SEVERAL OFFICERS OVER TO SEPARATE THE GROUPS. DURING THIS TIME OVER THE RADIO WE HEARD THAT PEPPERBALL WAS BEING DEPLOYED ON MONROE. LT FREUDENTHAL ADVISED US THAT HE NO LONGER COULD SEE THE PROBLEM GROUP SO HE TOLD MYSELF AND OFFICER MERENA WE COULD GO BACK AND ASSIST ON MONROE.

AS I ARRIVED BACK ON MONROE JUST EAST OF 2ND STREET I OBSERVED THAT THE STREET WAS FULL OF SMOKE AND SAW SEVERAL ITEMS BEING THROWN AT THE LINE OF OFFICERS. I OBSERVED ONE MALE BY THE HERBERGER THEATER LIGHT WHAT APPEARED TO BE A SMALL FIRE CRACKER AND THROW IT AT OFFICERS WERE LINED IN THE STREET. I FIRED AN OC MUZZLE BLAST FROM MY 40MM LAUNCHER AT THE DIRECTION OF THE MALE WHO THREW THE FIRECRACKER. AT THE TIME LT MOORE ADVISED TO DEPLOY GAS SO I THREW 2 CS CANISTERS AT THE CROWD WHO WAS NOT DISPERSING. AT THIS TIME THE AIR UNIT HAD GIVEN SEVERAL COMMANDS TO DISPERSE. ONE OF THE CS CANISTERS I THREW WAS THROWN BACK IN MY LOCATION SO I WAS NOW STANDING IN A CLOUD OF GAS SO I HAD TO QUICKLY DON MY GAS MASK. DUE TO THE GAS BEING THROWN AT ME AND OTHER OFFICERS I FIRED 2 MORE OC MUZZLE BLASTS IN THE AREA WHERE THE CANISTER WAS THROWN BACK FROM.

LT MOORE DIRECTED OFFICERS TO MOVE UP AND DISPERSER THE CROWD OF THE THEATER PROPERTY. AS WE APPROACHED THE NORTH PED FENCING TO MOVE THE CROWD I THREW ANOTHER CS CANISTER JUST NORTH AND EAST WHERE MALES WERE STILL THROWING ITEMS IN OUR DIRECTION.

I STAYED WITH THE WEST SIDE OF THE LINE AND CLEARED THE WEST TO 2ND STREET. DURING THIS TIME THE AIR UNIT CONTINUED TO GIVE COMMANDS TO THE CROWD TO DISPERSER. THE CROWD WAS NOW STANDING IN 2ND STREET REFUSING TO LEAVE THE STREET. WE MOVED THE LINE NORTH PUSHING THE CROWD BACK NORTH OF VAN BUREN. WHILE ON VAN BUREN THE CROWD WAS STILL IN THE STREET CAUSING US TO HAVE TO REDIRECT TRAFFIC THAT WAS STUCK ON VAN BUREN. ONCE THE CROWD THINNED OUT WE PULLED BACK TO THE CONVENTION CENTER.

END OF REPORT

Public Narrative

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Ex. 23

8:35 PM


ACLU
Arizona



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Ex. 24

8:34 PM



HERBERGER THEATER CENTER

HERBERGER THEATER CENTER

ACLU Arizona

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Ex. 25

8:43 PM




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Ex. 26

ACLU
Arizona


HERBERGER
THEATER CENTER



8:43 PM

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
Ex. 27



8:44 PM

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Ex. 28



8:51 PM

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Ex. 29

*Motion for leave to file non-electronic exhibits to be filed

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Ex. 30



ACLU
Arizona

8:51 PM

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Ex. 31

ACLU
Arizona

8:51 PM



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Ex. 32

8:51 PM



KTVE
Arizona

ALL STAY
KILL
Trump

POLICE

LIFE

222

BERG

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Ex. 33



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Ex. 34



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*Motion for leave to file non-electronic exhibits to be filed

Ex. 35

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Ex. 36

*Motion for leave to file non-electronic exhibits to be filed

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Ex. 37



City of Phoenix

To: Jeri Williams
Police Chief

Date: August 28, 2017

From: Ed Zuercher
City Manager

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Ed Zuercher', written over a horizontal line.

Subject: EXTERNAL ASSESSMENT OF POLICE RESPONSE ON AUGUST 22

What all members of the Phoenix Police Department accomplished on August 22 was notable. In an emotional atmosphere, our police officers showed professionalism in ensuring the safety and First Amendment rights of the community. There were no serious injuries or property damage and only four related arrests. The teamwork among your officers and all other City departments was a credit to their preparation. There is, though, significant community dialogue about how the final hour of the day unfolded.

As a follow-up to the event and to ensure public confidence in our Police Department, I am engaging an outside firm through the City Attorney to assess the preparation and response by the Phoenix Police Department to the events of August 22 surrounding President Trump's campaign rally in downtown Phoenix. Thank you in advance for the full cooperation of your office and the entire department to give unfettered access to all information on the preparation and response.

It is important to note that the vast majority of participants on August 22 in both the campaign rally and the protests outside were peaceful, prepared and civil. As we all know, at the end of the evening, the Phoenix Police Department engaged in crowd control tactics that involved pepper balls and tear gas due to a very small number of participants who became unruly. As stated before, there were no serious injuries or property damage, which is a tribute to both the police officers and the huge numbers of participants who conducted themselves with civility.

With the high-profile nature of the events and community concerns and support expressed, it is important to use outside expertise to add a layer of objective review in this situation. At my direction, the City Attorney is prepared to engage OIR Group, Inc., an experienced firm specializing in independent reviews of critical incidents and police tactics in a variety of police community interactions, to provide the City with an assessment of police interaction with the crowds on August 22 outside the Phoenix Convention Center. An item will be added to the August 30 Council agenda to contract with this firm. This review will take at least 90 days to complete and will be made public.

The City of Phoenix and its Police Department have always been willing to self-assess and learn from experience. I know you began a regular after-action review right away, per normal Phoenix Police Department procedures, and that should continue. The external review will be in addition to your after-action process.

Let me be clear, this review does not diminish the professionalism of our Phoenix Police officers. In fact, it will serve to strengthen the Phoenix Police Department and to transparently educate the community about the complexities of policing in a large city.

c: Mayor and City Council
Milton Dohoney, Jr.
Julie Watters
Penny Parrella
Kweilin Waller

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Ex. 38



Decl. Panuco ISO Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

Ex. 39



Decl. Panuco ISO Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

*Motion for leave to file non-electronic exhibits to be filed

Ex. 40

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Ex. 41

CIVIL DISTURBANCE RESPONSE PLAN		Operations Order 9.3
PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT	Rev. 10/15	PAGE 1

THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS PLAN IS RESTRICTED TO EMPLOYEES OF THIS DEPARTMENT ONLY AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC

1. Civil disturbances, labor-management conflicts, public demonstrations, and other events involving large or disorderly crowds require an appropriate response by the Department.
 - A. The police role can range from mere presence to the use of offensive tactics, including the use of deadly force.
 - B. It is the Department's statutory responsibility to preserve the public peace, prevent crime, arrest offenders, and protect the rights of persons and property in the Phoenix community during civil disorder.
 - C. It is also the Department's responsible for protecting the demonstrator's right to assemble and exercise free speech as provided in the federal and state constitutions.
 - D. The Department will respond to incidents of civil disorder with mobile field forces (FF) and will make reasonable efforts to employ non-arrest methods of civil disorder management.
 - E. The Department will also take all necessary measures to quickly contain and restore order or to prevent an uncontrolled incident from escalating.
 - F. When a decision has been made to arrest violators the Department will incarcerate as many individuals as possible.
 - G. Only the amount of force necessary to affect an arrest or restore order will be used in accordance with Operations Order 1.5, Use of Force.

2. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

3. **DEFINITIONS**

A. Affected Area	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The area within which civil disorder is occurring
B. Anticipated Incident	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An event that is predicted to occur, which is likely to cause or be accompanied by civil disorder, and for which there is adequate time for the Department to prepare and respond: for example, controversial court decisions, planned demonstrations, sporting events, or celebrations
C. Blocking Position	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Positions manned by officers, generally on major thoroughfares for the purpose of preventing entry by innocent bystanders or persons who desire to join the disturbance
D. Catalyzing Event	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An event which prompts a segment of the community to action
E. Civil Disorder	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Random violence and destruction committed by a large group of people making a political statement or reacting to an emotional or catalyzing event

CIVIL DISTURBANCE RESPONSE PLAN		Operations Order 9.3
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3. **DEFINITIONS:** (Continued)

F. Emergency Operations Center (EOC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The command center from which the City's response to civil disorder will be managed The EOC will be responsible for making policy-type decisions.
G. Fixed Post	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A position that must be manned for security purposes by police or military personnel; e.g., police stations, city buildings, police communications
H. Hazard Zone	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The area defined by the Fire Department to be hostile and requiring police support
I. Mobile Field Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Is a unit of officers assembled to provide a rapid, organized, and disciplined response to civil disorder, crowd control, or other tactical situation, and is generally commanded by a lieutenant
J. Perimeter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A line, consisting of blocking positions, barriers, signs, etc., defining the civil disorder boundaries and the affected area which must be closed off to the public. All calls for service in the affected area will be dispatched through the Tactical Operations Center (TOC).
K. Spontaneous Event	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A civil disorder incident which is not anticipated and for which the department does not have adequate time to develop an action plan or otherwise prepare for the event
L. Regional Intelligence and Strategy Center (RISC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> RISC is headed by a division commander or designee. During civil disorder events, RISC will support tactical and strategic-level decisions. Policy decisions will be the responsibility of the EOC commander. RISC is a resource for all Public Safety Units to gather, analyze, and disseminate homeland defense intelligence data.
M. Widespread Event	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Encompasses a large area (several square miles) or several disturbances at different locations throughout the city

4. **COMMAND STRUCTURE**

A. Overall operations will be at the direction of a patrol division assistant chief, who will serve as the incident commander, and will:

- (1) Notify the Homeland Defense Bureau (HDB) commander after hours to open RISC which is located in the Communications Bureau.
- (2) Assign bureau commanders to serve as:
 - (a) Assistant incident commander
 - (b) Staging commander

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

B. During a spontaneous event, the highest-ranking officer on duty will function as the incident commander until relieved of such duty by the designated Patrol Division commander or designee.

C. RISC is responsible for supporting tactical and operational decisions and will be staffed as shown below, due to limited space only authorized individuals will be allowed access.

- Assistant chief or designee - Incident commander
- Bureau commander or designee - Assistant Incident commander
- HDB sergeant - Support officer
- Property Management Bureau (PMB) sergeant - Logistics officer
- Fire Department representative - Fire liaison
- National Guard liaison officer
- Any other agency representative as deemed necessary

CIVIL DISTURBANCE RESPONSE PLAN		Operations Order 9.3
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- 4. D. FF commanders will keep the RISC advised of any unusual developments or concerns.
- E. If the Mayor or City Manager opens the EOC, the Department will send the necessary commanders to the EOC for staffing.
 - EOC commanders will maintain telephone contact with the RISC to ensure proper coordination of activities with other City departments.

5. **FIELD FORCE (FF) CONCEPT**

- A. The possibility of civil unrest exists in all major cities, reasonable caution indicates that an effective response plan must be maintained, and in a major event it is necessary to quickly reorganize the department in order to make an effective response possible.
- B. The possibilities of civil unrest leading to riot-type situations necessitates the formulation of a rapid deployment crowd control plan, known as the FF concept, the FF can be utilized to rapidly deploy officers to affected areas of civil disturbance.

(1) A FF can be deployed to address several critical issues during a civil unrest situation.

- (a) Restoration of law and order, preserving the peace, and protecting lives and property
- (b) Crowd dispersal through established line formation tactics
- (c) Evacuation and rescue of innocent citizens and injured victims from affected areas
- (d) Isolation of problem areas through perimeter security control measures to:
 - Prevent further spread of civil unrest to unaffected areas
 - Prevent innocent citizens from entering affected areas

(2) The FF concept is based on group rather than individual action and tactics rely upon solid teamwork with emphasis upon:

(a) Pre-planning	Having set plans of action to respond to spontaneous situations
(b) Preparation	Completing action plans for anticipated events
(c) Training	Ensuring trained personnel are equipped with the tactical skills and equipment to carry out FF objectives
(d) Discipline	Ensuring FF officers follow instructions and obey commands of their supervisors
(e) Leadership	Ensuring FF supervisors lead and guide subordinates in accomplishing tactical objectives while complying with department rules and regulations

6. **FIELD FORCE (FF) ORGANIZATION**

█ [REDACTED]

█ [REDACTED]

█ [REDACTED]

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6. B. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

C. FF Leader - The lieutenant has several key responsibilities; for example, to direct a specific FF, to coordinate activities with other police personnel, and to maintain communication with the TOC or command post, the leader's staff will consist of:

(1) Sergeant	• Executive officer and alternate commander
(2) Scribe	• Officer to maintain activity log and document chronological order of events and exceptional incidents
(3) Officer	• Alternate scribe or additional security officer

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

7. **FIELD FORCE (FF)EQUIPMENT**

A. It is critical that all FF units have the necessary equipment at their disposal to accomplish their planned tactical objectives.

B. FF personnel will consist of certified and TRU personnel.

- TRU is composed of the Downtown Operations Unit (DOU), precinct Neighborhood Enforcement Teams (NET), and Gangs.
- Non TRU trained personnel (on-duty) patrol units may be assigned on an as-needed basis.

C. FF Equipment Consists of:

[REDACTED]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • [REDACTED] by department-trained and certified grenadiers. * [REDACTED] • White shoe polish for marking vehicles (unit designators)
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7. C. FF Equipment Consists of: (Continued)

(1) FF Kits (Continued)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arrest kits with arrest forms (carried in FF wagon) • Additional handcuffs <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Standard steel handcuffs (from Police Supply) * Plastic band wrist cuffs and wire cutters for removal * Prisoner property bags * Mass arrest cards * Two Polaroid cameras and additional film
(2) FF Commander's Kit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hand-held bull horn public address system • Tape recorder and camcorder (if possible) to document crowd warnings and orders to disperse, declarations of unlawful assemblies, mass arrest procedures, etc. • Binoculars • White shoe polish • Legal writing tablets, area maps, aerial photographs (if possible) • [REDACTED] * [REDACTED] * [REDACTED]
(3) TRU Personnel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Full tactical response uniform • Military boots • Knee and elbow pads • TRU protective gloves • Riot helmet with face shield • P. R. 24 side-handle baton • Hand-held shields (if deemed tactically appropriate)
(4) Non-TRU Personnel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Riot helmet • Baton
(5) FF Vehicles	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fully marked police vehicles or prisoner transport wagons with Police Department decals, emergency overhead lights, and sirens

8. **MOBILIZATION**

A. The Police Chief, an assistant chief, or a duty commander can order a department-wide mobilization.

(1) Patrol Division (patrol function) will be organized into three shifts with the following hours:

- Shift A duty hours will be from 5 a.m. to 5 p.m.
- Shift B duty hours will be from 1 p.m. to 1 a.m.
- Shift C duty hours will be from 9 p.m. to 9 a.m.

(2) Bureau employees will be reorganized into two shifts.

- Shift 1 duty hours will be from 4 a.m. to 4 p.m.
- Shift 2 duty hours will be from 4 p.m. to 4 a.m.

B. Each bureau and precinct will be responsible for maintaining current mobilization rosters and for conducting periodic mobilization exercises.

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8. B. (1) Each precinct will divide its manpower into the three (3) shift configuration listed above to provide 24-hour coverage.
- (2) Each bureau will divide its manpower into a Shift 1 and Shift 2 configuration to provide 24-hour coverage.
- (3) The roster will indicate to which of the two shifts sworn or civilian personnel are assigned.
- (4) Copies of mobilization rosters will be forwarded to RISC.

C. A command officer will assign a supervisor to contact off-duty personnel and advise them of:

- Department being mobilized
- Time to report to work
- Where to report and location of assembly area
- Report in full uniform unless otherwise directed
- Special equipment needs
- Special instructions

D. Assembly Area - A large area designated as an assembly point: [REDACTED]

(1) The assembly area will be commanded by a precinct commander and staffed with:

- Lieutenant
- Motor sergeant
- Motor officers to provide traffic control and security

(2) A motor officer at the gate will direct officers where to park their cars.

- Crime scene tape or flags may be used to help direct officers.
- If practical, cars should be fueled prior to reporting to the assembly area.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(4) Each officer will be directed to the assembly area for an assignment.

- (a) A police supervisor will assign each officer to a specific FF assignment and complete the FF roster.
- (b) The supervisor will give all officers a tag indicating to which FF they have been assigned and will advise them where to report.
- (c) The appropriate number of shotgun-certified officers will be assigned to each FF.
- (d) Officers will not walk around the assembly area and will remain in their assigned area.
- (e) Once a FF is staffed, the roster will be given to a FF commander, who will brief the field force.
- (f) After briefing, FF personnel (with their equipment) will go to the appropriately marked patrol cars.

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8. D. (4) (g) [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

E. Minimum Staffing Alert - Upon designation of a minimum-staffing alert by the assistant chief, each precinct will immediately:

- (1) Assign [REDACTED] each squad area in the precinct.
 - (a) Officers trained in fire escort **will not** be assigned to minimum staffing units.
 - (b) These units will use call signs consisting of the squad designator with the suffix "M": for example, 41M, 42M, and 43M.
 - (c) The units will ensure their vehicles are fueled to capacity and necessary equipment is in the vehicle.
 - (d) When deployed, these units will be available for radio traffic; however, they will not leave their assigned precinct.
- (2) Designate [REDACTED] detail for station security.
 - (a) Until an actual incident occurs, this detail will be used to fuel and prepare all serviceable vehicles, inventory equipment, and otherwise facilitate the mobilization of precinct officers who are not part of minimum staffing.
 - (b) Upon notification of an actual incident, this detail will be responsible for immediately locking down and posting the facility.
 - This responsibility continues until relieved by a supervisor.
- (3) [REDACTED]
- (4) Assign the shift commander and a sergeant to work the street as one unit.
 - The shift commander will **immediately** notify RISC of any indication of a civil disturbance.
- (5) Assignment of TRU (FF Alpha and Bravo):
 - (a) If on duty, stage at the precinct and prepare for a TRU assignment, the TRU lieutenant will telephone RISC to report personnel status when their squads are ready for deployment.
 - (b) If off duty, the squads will be placed on TRU standby, the TRU lieutenant will telephone RISC when all officers have been notified of their standby status.

F. Incident Alert - Once an incident has occurred, the precinct will be notified [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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■ ■ [REDACTED]



10. **JOINT OPERATIONS WITH THE FIRE DEPARTMENT**

- A. The procedures outlined in this section are designed to provide support for the Fire Department during civil disorder situations.
- B. Department support will include staging area security, escort, fire scene security, and protection of Fire Department personnel, FFC has **primary** responsibility for this function.
- C. Fire Department Response
 - (1) Establish a joint fire/police command post and staging area with the Department.
 - (2) Designate one or more **hazard zones** during a civil disorder.
 - (a) Designating a hazard zone requires all fire stations in that area to be vacated and surrounding fire stations to go into lock-down mode.
 - (b) Hazard zones will involve a perimeter of one or more square miles.
 - (3) All responses by fire units into the hazard zone will be directed by fire command.
 - (4) All fire responses into the hazard zone will be escorted by Department personnel.
 - (5) Fire units are governed by strict guidelines with regard to the level of risk to which they will expose themselves.

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

- (6) The extent of danger to responding fire personnel should be determined and classified as:
 - (a) Not Clear to Enter - There is significant potential for risk to personnel who enter the area, such as the suspect is still in the area that might attack police or fire personnel.
 - (b) Clear to Enter - Describes a scene where it is, to all practical extent, not hazardous to enter the area, such as the suspect is gone or in custody.
 - The Fire Department alarm room will be advised of the classification.

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10. D. Department Response

- (1) FFC will be commanded by a police commander and will have primary responsibility for Fire Department escort and protection, until FFC is employed, this responsibility may be assumed by the first responding officers.

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

- (2) Fire Department Support

- (a) Scene Security - Officers may be called upon to secure an area before fire responds to the scene and will likely remain in place to protect fire personnel while they are deployed.

- (b) Escort - Officers will provide escorts for fire personnel and apparatus into and out of the hazard zones.

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

E. Communications

- (1) A police or fire frequency will be designated exclusively for Fire Department support.
- (2) Fire units have access to all police chase channels and most fire trucks have telephones that can be used by officers.
- (3) When deployed together, police and fire units will work on the same frequency.

F. [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

G. Assignments with Fire Units During Civil Disorder Situations

- (1) All assignments will be coordinated through the Department command officer assigned to Fire Department support.
- (2) Prior to deploying with a fire unit, the assigned officers will provide the command post with their names, call signs, location, and type of incident to which they are responding.
- (3) Officers will be required to regularly report their status (en route, on scene, Code 4, etc.) while on assignment to the Department command officer.

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10. G. (4) Upon completion of the assignment, officers will provide the command officer with a brief report on the results of their assignment and their availability for another assignment.

(5) These assignment reports and results will be maintained by the FFC command post, the FF commander will forward a daily report to the RISC incident commander or designee.

H. Medical Treatment for Prisoners and Police Officers

(1) Medical treatment provided under this section will be for minor injuries including, but not limited to, contusions, small lacerations or tear gas irritation.

(2) When it has been determined that a demonstration of major proportions is being planned or is in progress, liaison will be established with the Fire Department to arrange for necessary medical services.

(3) The Fire Department will coordinate the availability of paramedics, ambulances, hospital facilities and medical personnel.

(4) When an officer or prisoner is injured, appropriate reports and photographs of the injury will be made.

11. ANTICIPATED EVENT

A. Although many civil unrest situations occur in a volatile spontaneous fashion, there are also anticipated events that can lead to the same consequences.

B. When the Department receives information of an anticipated event, a commitment will be made for planning and preparation.

C. The Community Relations Bureau (CRB) Community Response Squad, with the assistance of DOU, will analyze the event to determine and identify potential problems, and determine what department resources will be utilized to cover the event.

D. Either the CRB or TSB commander (depending on the circumstances) will have ultimate responsibility for developing an action plan at least 14 days prior to the event, if time allows.

E. Identification of Event - In order to effectively plan for an event, the CRB Community Response Squad, with assistance from DOU, will analyze the event, some examples are:

- Parades
- Demonstrations, rallies, protests
- Sporting events and celebrations
- Rock concerts

█ [REDACTED]

█ [REDACTED]

█ [REDACTED]

█ [REDACTED]

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11. H. (4) Determine specific assignments for perimeter control and crowd control units.

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

- (6) Identify possible scenarios that could occur and make necessary tactical preparations.

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

- (8) Complete and submit an After Action Report of the event to the Patrol Division assistant chief within ten calendar days of the event.

- I. Anticipated Major Event Notifications - During the planning stages of an anticipated event, the CRB commander will be responsible for the appropriate notifications, as necessary, to all affected Department personnel, as follows:

- Executive staff
- Patrol Division assistant chief
- Affected precinct commanders
- Duty commander
- HDB commander
- TSB commander
- Traffic Bureau (TB) commanders and lieutenants
- VCB commander
- TRU FF Alpha commanders
- FF Bravo commanders
- Special Assignment Unit (SAU) lieutenant
- CRB lieutenant/sergeant
- Communications Bureau
- Fire Department
- Other agencies, (DPS, MCSO, etc.)

12. **SPONTANEOUS EVENTS OR INCIDENTS**

- A. Spontaneous civil disorder incidents can occur for any number of reasons, often times they are the result of an unpopular police action, sporting event outcome, or opposing sides of a political issue confronting one another.
- B. The challenge facing the Department during a spontaneous event is to quickly restore order, prevent the incident from escalating, prevent innocent citizens from entering the area, prevent injury to citizens, and isolate the incident.
- C. This section of policy will serve as a tool to guide commanders, supervisors, and officers regarding basic information to manage a spontaneous incident of civil disorder.
- D. It is further designed to serve as an action plan and checklist for responding commanders or supervisors and can be used if an anticipated event escalates; however, it is not designed to suppress the use of common sense and sound police tactics.

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12. G. (2) (b) RISC should be opened as soon as practical if it appears that the incident will be widespread or of long duration.

(3) Command Post Operating Tasks

- (a) Appoint a supervisor to oversee staging
- (b) Appoint a scribe
- (c) Open a telephone line to RISC
- (d) Operate using Emergency Deployment Plan principles and ensure that each function supervisor has adequate resources
- (e) Request that our public information officer (PIO)/supervisor report to the command post or media staging area.
- (f) Request any additional logistical needs through Communications or as outlined in section 19 of this order.
- (g) Notify the CRB Community Response Squad to respond to the command post
 - Community Response Squad detectives will attempt to identify key individuals or persons with influence over the involved individuals, and establish a liaison with them.

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

(3) [Phoenix City Code \(PCC\) 23-21.1](#), Police Line Regulation, allows for the establishment of police lines and is the Department's authority for closing certain areas in the event of an emergency.

(4) Entry into an affected area will be limited to law enforcement and emergency personnel.

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

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- K. Commanders must determine the appropriate control means to be employed, as indicated by the degree of violence and type of event, before taking enforcement action; commander/s should consider the following factors:
- Will action (or inaction) cause the situation to grow worse?
 - If only scattered individuals are violent, it is better to arrest those individuals rather than to disperse the entire crowd?
 - Consider available resources
 - Establish safe and clear escape routes for FF units
 - Determine the number of FF units available or on standby
 - Determine public address system capability
 - What will be accomplished by the dispersal and/or arrest tactics used?
- L. When time permits, commanders should consider likely scenarios that might develop and pre-think their response to them.
- Commanders should decide in advance what they are going to do if such events occur, and consider the resources required and the method of implementing an operation plan.
- M. Prepare a Written Plan of Operation - Commanders should prepare written orders even when spontaneous events occur.
- (1) In emergency situations the orders will be very brief but will encourage consideration of essential planning elements.

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12. M. (2) For consistency, the plan will cover the following five basic sections in a format to be followed at all levels of the operation:

- What is the situation?
- What is the mission?
- What means are necessary to restore order?
- What are the administrative, manpower, and equipment needs?
- Who is in command of subordinate sections?

N. Concluding the Event - When the situation has subsided, the RISC or on-scene commander will conclude the operation by following the procedures outlined in section 22 of this order, Termination of Civil Disorder Activities.

[REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

C. Mobilization

- (1) The property investigations lieutenant will be the initial contact for mobilization of detective units of the North and South Command stations and will also notify the Investigative Services Detail (ISD) sergeant.
- (2) The ISD sergeant will contact the detective squad sergeants, who will contact and mobilize their squad detectives.
- (3) Supervisors will direct detail detectives to respond to the designated location in uniform.

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

E. Staffing

- (1) PCB units of the North and South Command stations will provide the following staffing to the listed functions:
- (2) The assigned PCB lieutenant will oversee all prisoner processing.
- (3) Detective units will be assigned to 12-hour shifts and all N-days will be cancelled.

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13. E. (3) (a) Northern Command Station will become a Shift 1 squad and will be responsible for one (1) 12-hour shift.
- (b) Southern Command Station will become a Shift 2 squad and will be responsible for the other 12-hour shift.

■ [REDACTED]

- Each wagon will consist of two (2) officers.
- The severity of the circumstances will dictate the number of wagons required.

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

F. Field Transportation

- (1) Wagons will be supplied by the precincts to transport prisoners to the field detention area from the arrest area.
- (2) Each precinct will be required to transport a wagon to the Department command post where a wagon officer will pick it up.
- (3) Before wagon officers proceed to the arrest area, each wagon will be equipped with an arrest kit.

■ [REDACTED]

- (4) Wagon units will proceed to the arrest area and meet the arresting officer.
 - The arresting officer will complete a mass arrest card, filling in all applicable information.
 - The card will be given to the wagon officers.
- (5) The arresting officer and the arrestee will be photographed together by a wagon officer, using color Polaroid film.
 - (a) The arresting officer will not remove his helmet when photographed unless they are in a secure area.

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

- (6) The wagon officers will transport the arrestees to the field detention area for processing.
 - (a) The wagon officers will secure prisoners until they are processed.
 - (a) Prisoners will be booked or may be cited in lieu of detention (CLD) with the approval of the on-scene commander.

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13. G. Field Detention/Prisoner Processing

(1) Field Detention	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A field detention area will be established in a strategic location that will allow for orderly processing of prisoners prior to transporting them to the MCSO Jail. • This detention area should be situated in a safe and secure area away from the location of arrest. • A fenced-in area, [REDACTED] would be an ideal location. • The location will be selected by the assigned property crimes lieutenant after consultation with the RISC commander and the TRU lieutenant, (see Addendum E of this order). • The field detention area is a temporary holding area, after prisoners are processed they will be transported to the jail as expeditiously as possible. • Defense counsel will not be allowed access to the field detention area. • Opportunities to obtain or consult with a defense attorney will be provided after booking pursuant to MCSO procedures.
(2) Prisoner Processing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The sergeants assigned to the processing site will be responsible for obtaining: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • [REDACTED] • [REDACTED] • Officers will utilize the information from the mass arrest card and complete a Booking form template to facilitate any mass arrests (refer to the Field Based Reporting (FBR) User Manual for creating a mass arrest template). • A digital photograph will be attached to the Booking forms and the booking number will be provided to the arresting officer after booking. The arresting officer/s will complete a supplement at the conclusion of the event for each arrestee (refer to the FBR User Manual for importing booking information). • Prisoners will be placed on buses and transported to jail facilities for booking. One (1) bus will be used for adults and another for juveniles. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • [REDACTED] • [REDACTED] • [REDACTED] • [REDACTED]

H. Equipment

- (1) Buses for transporting prisoners to jail facilities will be provided by the Department of Corrections (DOC). These buses are secured by a cage and can accommodate up to 50 prisoners. DOC can supply up to three buses and will supply drivers for these buses.
- (2) Additional buses can be provided by Phoenix Transit and the detention unit of MCSO.

14. **SPECIAL UNIT RESPONSIBILITIES**

[REDACTED]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • [REDACTED] The SAU lieutenant will report directly to the TSB commander. * [REDACTED] * SAU will provide support for the field forces. * [REDACTED]
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14. **SPECIAL UNIT RESPONSIBILITIES:** (Continued)

[REDACTED]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
B. Air Support Unit (ASU)	<p>ASU will be directed by the Air Patrol Unit lieutenant.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The unit lieutenant will be located at the Deer Valley facility and will report directly to the TSB commander. • ASU will serve as an aerial observation platform for the scene commander. * Upon request, the unit lieutenant will deploy aircraft and personnel. * Under emergency conditions, ASU will discontinue normal operations. * Personnel will be assigned to 12-hour shifts for the duration of the emergency. • One helicopter will be reserved for FFC and fire operations.
C. Specialty Vehicle Detail (SVD)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The SVD will be placed on alert and will be available upon request. • Requests for specialty vehicles should be directed to the ASU commander
D. Canine (K-9) Teams	<p>K-9 teams will report to the K-9 sergeant, who will report directly to the ASU lieutenant.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requests for K-9 assistance should be directed to the AU lieutenant. • K-9 teams normally will not be utilized in conjunction with the FFs. • K-9 teams will be available in their normal capacity and will be utilized to answer routine calls for service • K-9 teams will also respond to barricades and requests for searches.
E. Homicide Unit	<p>The Homicide Unit will report directly to the Homicide Unit lieutenant.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The unit lieutenant will direct investigations from the field and will report directly to the VCB commander. • Homicide investigations will be conducted following normal procedures unless investigators are prevented from doing so due to exigent circumstances. • If detectives are unable to enter a homicide scene due to continuing hostilities, then responsibility for the initial investigation will be given to SAU. • At the direction of the SAU lieutenant, teams will be deployed to neutralize the threat; these teams will be required to provide cover while SAU personnel conduct a preliminary investigation. • An investigation conducted under these circumstances may only include the removal of the body, photographs of the scene, and removal of any obvious evidence. • SAU personnel will then retreat from the scene and transport the deceased to a nearby safe location. * SAU personnel will then meet with the assigned Homicide detective for the purpose of transferring the photographs and collected evidence. * An ambulance will be called to this location to transport the deceased to the medical examiner. • At the conclusion of the civil disorder, it will be the responsibility of the SAU lieutenant and the Homicide lieutenant to coordinate the investigations involving both units.

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14. **SPECIAL UNIT RESPONSIBILITIES:** (Continued)

F. Professional Standards Bureau (PSB)	<p>PSB will maintain responsibility for investigations of police-officer-involved shootings.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Under normal conditions, investigations conducted by PSB will be handled according to their current policy. • When exigent or hostile circumstances prevent a normal investigation of an officer-involved shooting, the investigation will be conducted in conjunction with the Homicide Unit, PSB, and SAU. • If the area is still hostile, SAU teams will be deployed to stabilize the area. SAU will photograph, videotape, gather evidence, and remove the deceased to a safe area. • The SAU commander will then coordinate the investigation with homicide and PSB investigators. Arrangements will be made for the deceased to be transported to the medical examiner, and any photographs or evidence will be transferred to the homicide investigator. • Shots fired by officers that do not strike or injure anyone will be reported to the on-scene supervisor. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * The supervisor will be responsible for completing a memorandum documenting the incident. * The supervisor will immediately report the incident to the RISC through the chain of command.
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15. **CALLS FOR SERVICE**

A. Processing calls for service will be determined by the size and extent of the incident.

- (1) All calls for service in the affected area will be dispatched through RISC to a FF unit, only priority one (1) and priority two (2) calls needing immediate attention will be dispatched.
- (2) Calls for service in the non-affected areas will be dispatched according to the Communications Bureau Civil Disorder Response Plan.
- (3) The decision to restrict calls based on the incident will be made by the Police Chief, an assistant chief, or the duty commander.

█ [REDACTED]

█ [REDACTED]

16. **COMMUNITY CONTACTS**

A. Contact Lists - Community Response Squad detectives are required to maintain current lists of community leaders, organizers of special interest groups, and demonstrators.

B. CRB Response

(1) Community Response Squad detectives will make contact with those persons who have authority over the demonstrators and will gather information and intelligence which, in turn, will be passed on to their bureau commander.

* (2) The Community Response Squad will maintain liaison and communication with the demonstration leaders before, during, and after the disorder.

(3) The CRB commander will collect all information and at that time make recommendations to the duty commander.

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16. C. Rumor Control Hot Line

- (1) The Public Affairs Bureau (PAB) will distribute a press release advising the general public of a telephone number for information or rumor control.
- (2) PAB will ensure the telephone is manned 24 hours a day during the disorder and for some time after.

17. **MUTUAL AID PROCEDURES**

- A. CRB will maintain procedures and documents for requesting assistance from other jurisdictions in their computer database.
- B. These procedures will include contact persons and telephone numbers for MCSO, DPS, and the Arizona National Guard, including the below listed documents.
 - (1) A draft declaration of emergency from the Mayor to the county requesting assistance.
 - (a) If the County's resources cannot meet the needs of the incident, the County may request assistance from the Governor by declaring a state of emergency.
 - (b) If the State's resources cannot meet the needs of the incident, the Governor may declare a state of emergency and activate the Arizona National Guard.
 - (2) A draft declaration of curfew for the Mayor to establish an emergency curfew ordinance.
 - (3) An agreement with the FAA to restrict air space above the disturbance area.

18. **LOGISTICAL SUPPORT** - Logistical support at the scene of a major incident will be provided by Property Management Bureau (PMB) Police Supply; they will be responsible for obtaining needed equipment or resources (water, ice, fencing, Port-A-Johns, tents, etc.).

A. Meals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Department will feed, at no cost to employees, personnel in operational assignments who are unable to leave their posts to eat during a civil disorder incident. • Meals will only be provided to those units that are mobilized and assigned to a fixed location, FF, perimeter post, or other assignment determined by the on-scene commander. • All other personnel will be responsible for making their own eating arrangements. • Police Supply will coordinate feeding police personnel with the Fire Department, which has made arrangements with the Salvation Army to provide meals during emergency situations. During extended civil disorder, meals will be provided by the Arizona National Guard through the use of field kitchens. • Meals for prisoners will be the responsibility of the facility where the prisoner is booked.
B. Ammunition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Training Bureau's Armory Detail will be responsible for maintaining an adequate supply of ammunition for use during a civil disorder. • Academy personnel will be responsible for arranging for the transportation of ammunition to locations where it is needed.
C. Chemical Agents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sufficient amounts of chemical agents will be maintained by DOU and SAU for emergency issue and use at a civil disorder.

19. **INDIVIDUAL UNIT RESPONSIBILITIES IN A CIVIL DISORDER**

A. Property Management Bureau (PMB)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supply a logistics supervisor to the command post. • Provide emergency supplies, as needed. • Coordinate and provide rest room facilities, water, coffee, meals, etc., as necessary. • Provide personnel and equipment at the field detention area to receive, process, and secure evidence collected and large articles of property belonging to arrested persons.
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19. **INDIVIDUAL UNIT RESPONSIBILITIES IN A CIVIL DISORDER:** (Continued)

B. Communications Bureau	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordinate and provide the necessary radio frequencies
C. Information Technology Bureau (ITB)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordinate the use of video equipment and operators
D. Training Bureau	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain an adequate supply of ammunition consistent with the current civil disorder threat level. Provide emergency and ammunition and transportation of ammunition to units in need. Identify agencies willing to loan chemical agents in an emergency. Develop projected use estimates.
E. Community Relations Bureau (CRB)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide plainclothes detectives from the Community Response Squad to make primary contacts with participant leaders, the squad will: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Supply background information on types of individuals involved, such as age groups, sex, or affiliations. * Estimate the number of persons involved or who may become involved. * Identify potential assembly areas for participants and any known plans, special hazards, intent, or targets of participants. Provide intelligence information. Monitor the participants' actions, movements, direction, and demeanor. Facilitate development of current threat level, project changes, and identify trends and events that portend civil disorder. Complete actions plans for anticipated events
F. Tactical Support Bureau (TSB)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide SAU tactical support. Provide air surveillance and video monitoring, as needed.
G. Traffic Bureau	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide motor officers for assistance with traffic control.
H. Property Crimes Bureau (PCB)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide officers to transport and process prisoners, as needed. Coordinate activities with the City Prosecutor, MCAO, and City Courts. Coordinate the use of detention facilities with MCSO and JCC. Provide security for command area, as needed.
I. Homeland Defense Bureau (HDB)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide explosive detection services. Coordinate intelligence with Federal and local agencies. Operate RISC.
J. Violent Crimes Bureau (VCB) and Family Investigations Bureau (FIB)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Three-layered response depending on magnitude of disturbance. Cancel days off and leaves; response teams will work 12-hour shifts (3 a.m. to 3 p.m. and 3 p.m. to 3 a.m.). Respond immediately to calls for service, when the Patrol Division is at minimum staffing, to take initial disposition on ALL reports normally investigated by that bureau. Investigate violent crimes resulting from actions taken by participants. Provide plans for investigative procedures to be utilized under hostile circumstances. Provide timely information regarding participants to the command center. The Gang Unit, if not needed for TRU/FF Alpha, augmented by the Vice Unit, should be prepared to deploy as a combined operational unit, such as Safe Streets Program. * These activities will be directed by the incident commander.
K. Laboratory Services Bureau (LSB)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide latent print examiners to assist in processing prisoners.
L. Crime Analysis and Research Unit (CARU)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide maps of affected areas and assist command, as needed.
M. Patrol Division	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain liaison with the Street Transportation Department. Provide additional vehicles as needed by command.

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19. INDIVIDUAL UNIT RESPONSIBILITIES IN A CIVIL DISORDER: (Continued)

N. Legal Unit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide field assistance, as needed. • Act as liaison with prosecutors and courts. • Respond to RISC when requested. • Incident Review Unit (IRU) will assist on police civil liability issues.
O. Media Relations Detail	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct regular briefings at press staging areas. • Prepare news releases in accordance with Operations Order 5.2, Media Relations, and coordinate with the scene commander. • Provide liaison with the public seeking information on the status of individual prisoners.
P. Drug Enforcement Bureau (DEB)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Narcotics Investigation Detail will be assigned to the Gang Unit in VCB. • Other DEB details will be deployed on a 24-hour schedule in an undercover capacity to provide intelligence from within or in close proximity to the disturbance area. • The Airport Narcotic Interdiction Programs will continue normal airport operations.

20. COMPLAINTS

- A. Citizen complaints of police misconduct during a civil disturbance will be recorded and investigated in accordance with existing procedures as soon as practicable after police operations concerning the demonstration are ended.
- B. If a complaint is such that it would subject the Department to severe public criticism or liability, or is serious enough to result in disciplinary action if substantiated, the on-scene commander will be notified of the nature of the complaint as soon as possible.
- C. Officers who observe misconduct by other police personnel will bring it to their supervisor's attention as soon as possible.

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22. TERMINATION OF CIVIL DISORDER ACTIVITIES

- A. Accountability of Equipment - Supervisors will be responsible for ensuring all equipment issued to their subordinates for use during the demonstration is returned or accounted for before they are relieved from duty.

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22. B. Recording of Time and Attendance

- (1) Each supervisor will keep a record of all personnel assigned to their unit.
- (2) This record will contain names, assignments, serial numbers, dates, times, and hours worked.
- (3) Upon termination of the detail, time records will be forwarded to the Fiscal Management Bureau (FMB).
- (4) Supervisors will notify their officers of the date and time of their next duty assignment.

C. After-Action Reports - After termination of the demonstration, the following will be done:

- (1) The TSB commander will conduct a critique with the supervisors involved.
- (2) The TSB commander will prepare an after-action report which will be submitted, along with a copy of the Command Post Log, to the affected/assigned Patrol Division assistant chief within five calendar days.
 - The after-action report will contain a complete and detailed report of problem areas encountered to include casualty information, highlights of significant events, unsatisfactory conditions, and any recommendations for improvement during future demonstrations.
- (3) The affected/assigned Patrol Division assistant chief will submit a final report to the Police Chief.

Decl. Panuco ISO Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

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1. **GENERAL INFORMATION**

- A. Sanctity of Life – The Department respects the dignity of all persons and recognizes the sanctity of human life, rights, and liberty.
- B. The policies of the Department are set forth as follows:
- Physical force
 - Non-deadly force
 - Deadly force
 - * Officers are trained to utilize deadly force only as a last resort when other measures are not practical under the existing circumstances.
 - Lethal weapons and equipment
- C. Sworn employees and affected civilian employees will be trained and instructed in these policies before employing any of the weapons, tactics, or techniques.
- D. Only Department-issued or approved weapons, equipment, and chemical agents will be authorized.

2. **DEFINITIONS**

A. Reasonable Belief	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When the facts and circumstances cause a reasonable and prudent law enforcement officer to act or think in a similar way under the circumstances
B. Non-Deadly Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is a tactic when properly applied has minimal or no risk of causing death
C. Deadly Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Any tactic or use of force that creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious physical injury, such as the use of a firearm
D. Serious Physical Injury	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A bodily injury that creates a reasonable risk of death, causes serious and permanent disfigurement, or results in long term loss or impairment of the functioning of any bodily member or organ
E. Excessive Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The application of an unreasonable amount of force in a given incident based on the totality of the circumstances
F. Types of Resistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Psychological Intimidation - Non-verbal cues indicating subject's unwillingness or threats through attitude, appearance, and physical readiness • Verbal Non-Compliance - Verbal responses indicating unwillingness or threats • Passive Resistance - Physical actions that do not prevent an officer's attempt to control • Defensive Resistance - Physical actions that attempt to prevent an officer's control, but does not involve attempts to harm the officer <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Based on this definition, solely running from officers does not constitute defensive resistance • Active Aggression - Physical actions of assault • Aggravated Active Aggression - Deadly force encounter
G. Response Options	<p><u>The option used is determined by the totality of the circumstances</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presence - Identification of authority • Verbal Direction - Commands of direction or arrest • Soft Empty Hand Control and Restraining Devices - Techniques that have a minimal chance of injury <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Restraining Devices - Handcuffs, Ripp restraint, ankle cuffs, shackles • Chemical Weapons - Oleoresin capsicum (OC), Chloroacetophenone (C/N) and 2-Chlorobenzaimalononitrile (C/S)

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2. **DEFINITIONS** (Continued)

G. Response Options (Continued)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Electronic Control Device (ECD): for example, Taser • Intermediate Control Techniques - Techniques that have a probability of injury <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Hard Empty Hand Control * Impact Weapons * Stunbag Shotgun * Canine (K9) Application • Carotid Control Technique • Deadly Force
H. Use of Force Restrictions	<p><u>Handcuffed/Restrained Persons</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employees will not use strikes, impact weapons, chemical weapons, ECDs, carotid control techniques, or deadly force unless such force is necessary to prevent imminent serious bodily injury or death, or unless such force is reasonable based on the totality of circumstances.

3. **GENERAL POLICY**

- A. It is the policy of the Department to use a reasonable amount of force to conduct lawful public safety activities.
- B. The response option employed will be reasonable and based on the totality of circumstances.
- (1) Employees involved in the use of force have the responsibility of providing the facts and circumstances they believe justified the use of force by completing the necessary reports, memorandums, etc.
- (2) Circumstances that may govern the reasonableness of using a particular force option include, but are not limited to:
- The severity of the crime
 - Whether the subject poses an immediate threat to the safety of officers or others
 - Whether the subject is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight
- (3) Elements of Force - Employees need to consider the following:
- Ability - Subject has the reasonable ability to carry out the act
 - Opportunity - Subject has the reasonable opportunity to carry out the act
 - Jeopardy - Subject creates jeopardy to the officer or others
 - Preclusion - Other alternatives have been reasonably considered based on the totality of the circumstances
- C. Escalation/De-Escalation of Force
- When use of force is needed, employees will assess each incident to determine, based on policy, training, and experience, which use of force option will de-escalate the situation and bring it under control.
- D. All sworn employees will intervene, if a reasonable opportunity exists, when they know or should know another employee is using unreasonable force.
- All sworn employees will immediately report excessive force verbally to a supervisor.
- E. Medical Treatment - Employees are responsible for requesting medical treatment for subjects against whom force was used.

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3. E. Medical Treatment (Continued)

- Any time there is an injury, or an alleged injury, as a result of force used by Department personnel, employees will:
 - * Examine any person claiming injury and render first aid, if necessary.
 - * Request paramedics to respond to the scene, if appropriate.
 - * Immediately notify a supervisor.

F. The techniques taught by the Department's proficiency skills instructors will be used when practical.

4. **RESPONSE OPTIONS**

A. Presence

- Presence is established through identification of authority.
 - * The presence of a K9 at a scene falls under this parameter.

B. Verbal Persuasion, Negotiation, or Command

- Includes instruction or direction from an officer in the form of verbal statements or commands.

C. Soft Empty Hand Techniques and Restraining Devices - These techniques have a minimal chance of injury.

(1) Control and restraint techniques include, but are not limited to:

- Wrist locks
- Joint locks
- Pressure points
- Handcuffing (metal, plastic, or soft restraint devices)
- Restraining devices such as Ripp restraints, ankle cuffs, and shackles (transport use only)

(2) Employees **will not** restrain subjects with their legs behind their back (hog-tying).

D. Chemical Agents - The use of authorized chemical agents is considered a non-deadly tactic.

<p>(1) Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Spray</p>	<p>May be used when reasonable and justified in the following situations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To prevent the possibility of injury to an officer or another person • To ward off threatening dogs or other animals • In tactical building entries, such as search warrants • To subdue a person who is: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Threatening or attempting physical harm to himself or another * Resisting an arrest * Rioting * Interfering with an arrest <p><u>Carrying Procedures</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Uniformed Employees</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * All uniformed employees will be trained in the use of OC spray. * Mandatory equipment which will be attached to the gunbelt and carried at all times while on duty. * It will be carried with the canister in an upright position.
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4. D. Chemical Agents (Continued)

<p>(1) Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Spray (Continued)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Sworn Plainclothes Employees</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * All plainclothes employees will be trained in the use of OC spray. * Sworn employees in plainclothes below the rank of commander will carry 3/4-ounce OC spray as readily available as their weapon. • Undercover Operations - Carrying OC spray is optional for sworn employees assigned to undercover operations. • Civilian Employees - Because civilian employees do not have arrest powers and the training necessary to restrain aggressive individuals, those civilians authorized to carry OC spray will utilize this as a defensive tool in an effort to gain time and distance from an attacking subject. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Civilian employees will not engage individuals who, by their verbal or non-verbal actions, are engaging in aggressive behavior that may result in a physical attack to the employee. <p><u>Directions for Use</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employees using the 1.6-ounce OC spray will direct a one-second burst into the face of the subject; effective range is normally 12-15 feet. • Employees using the 3/4-ounce spray will direct a one-second burst into the face of the subject; effective range is normally 10-12 feet. • Do not use within three (3) feet of a subject as soft tissue damage could occur. • The subject should be immediately handcuffed and moved to a well-ventilated area; medical help will be requested if a subject complains or displays any severe or abnormal reaction to the spray. • Employees will not unnecessarily display or handle any OC spray. • When the circumstances justifying the use of OC spray no longer exist, OC spray will immediately be discontinued. * Employees still may use reasonable force to maintain control and to protect themselves from danger. <p><u>Post-Use Care</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Warm water can be used to flush the eyes without rubbing. • If water is not available, the Fire Department will be called to the scene. • Subjects should recover within 45 minutes; however, the intense sensation of skin burning may persist for 30 to 90 minutes after exposure. • Salve or ointments should not be used on affected areas. • Subjects sprayed with OC will not be left unattended. • Paramedics will be called to the scene if a subject exposed to OC spray complains or displays any severe or abnormal reaction to the spray at any time. • Employees will continue to provide post-use care to the subject until the subject has recovered from the effect of the spray. • Employees will not lay subjects on their stomach. • Civilian employees will follow the proper directions for use as prescribed for sworn employees and will notify Communications that OC spray has been deployed. * The employee will make efforts to maintain a visual on the subject and direct sworn officers to the location for disposition and post-use care. * Once sworn employees arrive, post care procedures will be implemented.
<p>(2) Oleoresin Capsicum Spray Mark-9 Canister 18.34 ounce</p>	<p><u>Authorized Personnel</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supervisors • Officers and supervisors of the Special Assignments Unit (SAU), Major Offender Unit (MOU), Downtown Operations Unit (DOU), and Tactical Response Unit (TRU)

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4. D. Chemical Agents (Continued)

(2) Oleoresin Capsicum Spray Mark-9 Canister 18.34 ounce (Continued)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>K9 handler</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Supervisors may direct an officer to deploy the Mark 9 canister when reasonable to do so. <p><u>Directions for Use</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employees using the Mark-9 canister OC spray will direct a one-second burst into the face of the subjects from a minimum distance of 15 feet. • The effective range is normally 20-25 feet. • Employees using the Mark-9 canister OC spray in a riot control situation should direct the spray face level, from a minimum distance of 15 feet, into the crowd until the desired effect is achieved. • Employees will not unnecessarily display or handle any OC Spray Mark 9 canister 18.34 ounce. • Tactical chemical agents are considered non-lethal weapons. • Detailed training, deployment procedures, and tactical considerations are found in the appropriate bureau manuals.
(3) Tactical Chemical Agents	<p><u>Delivery Systems</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Isper Jet • 37mm Gas Delivery System <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Ferret rounds will not be directed at individuals due to the possibility of serious injury if the round strikes a person. * Ferret rounds will not be used against moving vehicles. <p><u>Authorization for Use</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The use of tactical chemical agents will be limited to those officers and supervisors specifically authorized and trained in their use. • SAU and DOU are responsible for tactical chemical agent training; grenadier 1 and 2 levels, and will maintain the roster of officers certified to deploy chemical agents. • SAU, DOU, and TRU supervisors may authorize use of tactical chemical agents.

E. Electronic Control Devices (ECD) - Use is considered a non-deadly tactic.

(1) Guidelines For Use	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ECDs, such as the Taser, use compressed nitrogen gas to propel probes and wires that conduct electrical energy which overrides a subject's central nervous system, attempting to temporarily stop the subject's actions. • ECDs may be used when it is objectively reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances, on subjects who are displaying active aggression, or who are placing an officer or a third party in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury, or to prevent a subject from harming him/herself. • The following circumstances should be considered prior to use: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Is the subject posing an imminent threat to the safety of officers, a third party, or him/herself? * What is the severity and violence level of the crime? * Does the subject have a history of violent behavior? * If an arrest team is not available, is it feasible to delay deployment to wait for one? • When the circumstances justifying the use of an ECD no longer exist, the ECD will immediately be discontinued. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Employees still may use reasonable force to maintain control and to protect themselves or others from danger when such force can be justified through the totality of the circumstances.
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4. E. Electronic Control Devices (ECD) (Continued)

(1) Guidelines For Use (Continued)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ECDs will not be used for any of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Coercion of any type <p style="margin-left: 40px;">EXCEPTION: A warning Arc combined with the proper verbal warning may be used as coercion in situations that would likely result in a justified deployment of the ECD.</p> * Against subjects solely for running from the officer * Against a subject who would be in danger of falling from a significant height * When subjects are near flammable liquids and gases * Intimidation by reckless display * Escorting or prodding individuals * Waking unconscious or intoxicated individuals * Individuals operating a motor vehicle * Individuals holding a firearm when their finger is on the trigger * Handcuffed prisoners resisting/refusing to enter a police vehicle, holding room, or hanging onto a railing or other item, etc. <p style="margin-left: 20px;">NOTE: The Department currently uses a nitrogen propellant OC spray; however, employees need to use caution in incidents involving other jurisdictions which might be using an alcohol based OC spray.</p> • Employees will avoid using ECDs against the following subjects, unless employees can articulate other reasonable force options have been tried or were unlikely to succeed: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Female subjects known to be pregnant or who are visibly pregnant * Elderly subjects * Young children * Handcuffed prisoners • The following should be considered prior to using the device on subjects in water: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Any significant amount of water may cause the subject to drown and will hinder other officers assisting in the apprehension of the subject. * Deep water reduces the target area. • Employees requested to provide ECD demonstrations to groups and organizations will first obtain permission from their bureau/precinct commander. • Employees shall not carelessly or recklessly display the ECD. <p><u>Tactical Considerations</u> - When deploying an ECD, employees:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will announce deployment to prevent contagious fire. • Will communicate with other employees upon arriving at the scene. • Will, when practical, have an arrest team available. • Will consider whether other options exist when dealing with mental health or excited delirium subjects. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * If an exigency exists for ECD use, the circumstances regarding the decision will be explained in the Incident Report (IR). • Will, when practical, give a verbal warning and consider the brief use of the warning Arc function to give the subject adequate opportunity to comply before force is applied. • Should, if inside nine (9) feet, deploy in two authorized locations on the body far enough away from each other to create neuromuscular incapacitation (NMI) and then use the Arc button to activate all deployed probes. • May, if outside of nine (9) feet, deploy the ECD for one 5-second cycle, evaluate the subject's response, and, when feasible, allow the arrest team to control the subject. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Subsequent deployment may be administered if control over the subject is not achieved. * If the ECD is ineffective or inoperable, consider another force option.
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4. E. Electronic Control Devices (ECD) (Continued)

(1) Guidelines For Use (Continued)	<p><u>Tactical Considerations</u> - When deploying an ECD, employees: (Continued)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will, if it is determined an extended cycle is necessary to control a combative suspect, explain the circumstances regarding the decision in the IR. • Should only apply the number of cycles reasonably necessary to safely approach and restrain a subject (a limit to the number of cycles that may be administered to a subject has not been determined). <p><u>Primary Target Areas for Probe Deployment</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Center mass of the subject's back <p><u>Secondary Target Areas for Probe Deployment</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If unable to fire at the subject's back, employees will fire at either side of the body attempting to aim below the diaphragm. • If unable to fire at the subject's back or sides of his/her body, employees should target the lower front torso just above the belt line allowing the bottom probe to strike the legs. • The groin area will not be intentionally targeted. <p><u>Target Areas for Drive Stun</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Muscle or nerve points on the front, back, side, legs and arms (radial nerve, brachial plexus tie-in, common peroneal, etc.) <p><u>Close Deploy and Redirect</u> - This technique may be used when proximity to the subject would not result in a probe spread large enough to achieve NMI.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Under exigent circumstances; for example, cartridge malfunction, employees may deploy probes at close range and then redirect a drive stun to an area of the body at a distance great enough to achieve NMI. • ECDs equipped with Rotational Pulse Drive technology incorporate Smart Cartridges which, when working properly, can be deployed in a semi-automatic mode; therefore employees may deploy in two (2) authorized locations on the body far enough away from each other to create NMI and then back away using the Arc button to activate all deployed probes. <p><u>Non-Target Areas</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Head, neck, female breast, and groin <p><u>Probe Deployment Ranges for Patrol</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maximum range 25 feet for Smart Cartridge • Preferred range nine (9) to 18 feet for 25 foot Smart Cartridge <p><u>Medical Treatment</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Paramedics will be requested for the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Probe penetrates the skin, or if the probes penetrate the clothing and the cycle is effective * If multiple drive stun applications are delivered • Prior to paramedic care, ECD operators should remove probes from the subject while wearing latex gloves. • Do not remove probes from the subject's eyes, face, throat, or groin. • Any medical complications will be reported to paramedics. • A supervisor will be notified and respond to the scene.
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4. E. Electronic Control Devices (ECD) (Continued)

<p>(1) Guidelines For Use (Continued)</p>	<p><u>Authorized Personnel</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Only employees who are trained and certified by Training Bureau staff are authorized to carry and deploy the ECD. • ECD operators will receive training and recertify annually. <p><u>Authorized Equipment</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employees will only carry one (1) authorized ECD device (Taser X2). • First responders who have been certified and issued an ECD will carry the device on their person and a minimum of two (2) cartridges at all times. • ECD holsters will be worn on the support side (opposite side of the primary handgun) in a “cross draw” orientation. * The Safariland 6005-10 in black with a single leg strap is the only optional authorized drop-leg ECD holster (employees wearing this option will wear the holster/platform and ECD attached to the duty belt and wearer’s leg in order to be in compliance with this policy). • Sworn employees assigned to specialty details will carry an ECD in accordance with approved procedures authorized by the respective bureau commander. • Employees working in a non-uniform capacity that have a Department-issued ECD will have the device available in the passenger compartment of their City vehicle. • Employees who have a Department-issued ECD and are working in an off-duty capacity will carry the device as if they were in an on duty status. • Exceptions may be made by the employee’s bureau/precinct commander. • Certified civilian detention officers will carry their ECD in accordance with this policy. <p><u>Use on Animals</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employees may deploy an authorized ECD to incapacitate dangerous animals posing an immediate threat to officers or the public. • Employees should consider containment of the animal and request assistance from the Maricopa County Animal Care & Control (MCACC). • Follow the reporting and impounding procedures as outlined in section 6.A.(3) of this order.
<p>(2) General Information</p>	<p><u>Storage and Tracking Data</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New ECDs will be entered into www.evidence.com prior to being placed into service. * The ECD serial number and the officer’s name and serial number to whom the device is assigned will be kept current for as long as the program is in use. • Each bureau/precinct will maintain a log which will contain the following information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * The serial numbers of the cartridges assigned to each officer * The reason a new cartridge was issued (training, defective, use of force incident, etc.) * IR number if the cartridge was fired during a use of force incident • Police Supply is responsible for ordering extra cartridges and Power Magazines and keeping an extra supply of ECDs to replace those which are inoperable or taken due to an investigation. • Each bureau/precinct will maintain extra duty cartridges and Power Magazines. • Upon transfer from a first responder assignment, officers will immediately turn in their ECD, holster, battery, and cartridges to administrative staff of the assignment they are leaving so the equipment can be returned to Police Supply. • Employees will inspect their ECD for damage, to insure all parts are present prior to the start of shift. • If the ECD is damaged or parts are found missing, it will be reported to a supervisor in accordance with Operations Order 3.13, Rules and Regulations. • Employees will conduct a functional test of their ECD, in accordance with established training at the beginning of each shift in order to test the operability of the ECD.

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4. E. Electronic Control Devices (ECD) (Continued)

(2) General Information (Continued)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The employee's supervisor will conduct an inspection of the ECD, ensure the device has been downloaded each month, and the results will be reflected in their supervisor notes. <p><u>Online Firmware Updates</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Taser, Intl. publishes firmware updates online via www.evidence.com. Tasers must be connected monthly to ensure the most current firmware is installed on the device. <p><u>Voluntary Exposures</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> It is not the practice of the Department to conduct voluntary exposures as a requirement for user or in-house instructor certification or during Department approved ECD demonstrations.
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F. Intermediate Control Techniques - Techniques that may result in injury.

(1) Hard Empty Hand Techniques	<p><u>These include but are not limited to:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Closed fist strikes Hammer fist strikes Palm-heel strikes Impact pushes Kicks Knee strikes Elbow strikes <p><u>Guidelines for Use</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Areas to avoid are the neck, back, sternum, kidneys, and groin. Hard empty hand techniques may be used when facing the active aggression level of resistance. When the circumstances justifying the use of hard empty hand techniques no longer exist, hard empty hand techniques will immediately be discontinued. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Employees still may use reasonable force to maintain control and to protect themselves from danger. Although these techniques may be used in some situations when facing passive resistance, employees will first attempt verbal persuasion and soft empty hand techniques when practical. Closed fist, palm-heel, and elbow strikes are the only techniques that may be used to strike the face and head, and then only when reasonable as a means to overcome a violent attack. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * A supervisor will be advised and respond to the scene to view and evaluate the subject. * Jail personnel will be advised.
(2) Impact Weapons	<p><u>Straight, Side-handle, or Expandable Baton</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Impact weapon strikes may be used when facing the active aggression level of resistance. Passive resistance or resistance, such as a subject's refusal to enter a police vehicle or holding room or to let go of a railing, is not sufficient in itself to justify the use of impact weapon strikes. When the use of the impact weapon is warranted, employees will attempt to strike large muscle group areas and nerve motor points where there is minimal chance of permanent injury. Employees will not purposely strike or jab suspects with an impact weapon on the head, neck, sternum, spine, lower abdomen, groin, or kidneys unless faced with a deadly force situation. When the circumstances justifying the use of impact weapons no longer exist, the use of impact weapons will immediately be discontinued. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Employees still may use reasonable force to maintain control and to protect themselves from danger.

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4. F. Intermediate Control Techniques (Continued)

(2) Impact Weapons (Continued)	<p><u>Authorization to Carry Impact Weapons</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employees may carry impact weapons at their discretion unless specifically required otherwise. • The impact weapon will meet the specifications listed in Operations Order 3.15, Uniform Policy. • Employees who elect to carry an impact weapon must satisfactorily complete the appropriate course taught by a Department impact weapons instructor.
(3) Flashlights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Flashlights are not designed as impact weapons; however, a flashlight may be used as an impact weapon if a baton is not readily available. • Employees will not purposely strike or jab subjects with a flashlight on the head, neck, sternum, spine, lower abdomen, groin, or kidneys unless faced with a deadly force situation.
(4) Canines (K9s)	<p><u>K9s are considered a non-deadly tactic when properly deployed.</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • K9s will not be used for control of crowds or in any circumstances where a strong potential exists for discrediting the Department. • K9s may be used to search for or apprehend felony subjects when public or officer safety is threatened sufficiently to justify this level of force. • K9s may be used to search for misdemeanor subjects; however, the animal will remain on lead unless officer safety is threatened. <p><u>Procedures for Deploying K9s</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Whenever time and circumstances permit, a verbal warning will be given to a subject before releasing the K9 to conduct a search. • An announcement identifying police authority and giving directions to the subject should be made in addition to stating the K9 will be released if the subject fails to comply. • Detailed procedures for K9 use are found in Operations Order 5.3, Specialized Investigations and Assistance, and the Tactical Support Bureau (TSB) manual.
(5) Stunbag Shotguns and 37mm Direct Impact Munitions (SAU)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stunbag shotguns and 37mm direct impact munitions may be used in situations where distance is necessary to maintain officer safety and the use of impact weapons is a reasonable use of force: for example, subduing a person who is threatening or attempting physical harm to himself or another. • Stunbag or 37mm direct impact munition rounds should not be fired through mediums, such as glass or chain link fences, because the bag might tear and lead shot might be released. • Employees should anticipate firing follow-up shots if the prior shot missed or was not effective. • The affected bureau/precinct/duty commander will be immediately notified of all incidents involving the use of a stunbag shotgun or 37mm direct impact munitions. • Optimal ranges for the stunbag shotgun are between five (5) feet and 20 yards. • If possible, officers should consider other force options at less than five (5) feet. • When the circumstances justifying the use of a stunbag shotgun no longer exist, the use of a stunbag shotgun will immediately be discontinued. <p>* Employees still may use reasonable force to maintain control and to protect themselves from danger.</p> <p><u>Primary Target Areas</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arms below the elbow • Lower abdomen • Buttocks • Legs <p><u>Secondary Target Areas</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arms above the elbow • Back, excluding spinal cord area from the base of the skull to the tailbone • Knees

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4. F. Intermediate Control Techniques (Continued)

(5) Stunbag Shotguns and 37mm Direct Impact Munitions (SAU) (Continued)	<u>Non-target Areas</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Head • Spine • Thorax • Neck <p>NOTE: Shots to non-target areas can result in fatal or serious injury.</p>
	<u>Additional Information</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For specific guidelines reference the stunbag shotgun, refer to Operations Order 4.25, Firearms Regulations. • For specific guidelines reference the 37mm direct impact munitions, refer to the TSB manual.

G. Carotid Control Technique

(1) Guidelines	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The carotid control technique is designed to reduce the flow of oxygenated blood to the brain. • If oxygenated blood flow to the brain is cut off for longer than four (4) to six (6) minutes, irreparable brain damage may occur. <p><u>When to Use the Carotid Control Technique</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The carotid control technique should only be used on subjects who are using active aggression, aggravated active aggression, or who are a threat to themselves or others. <p><u>Improper Applications of the Carotid Control Technique</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This technique will not be used to render a subject unconscious for the following situations: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Administrative reasons, such as obtaining fingerprints or photographs * If a subject demonstrates passive resistance, such as refusing to enter a police vehicle or holding room <p><u>Post-Use Care</u> - If a subject is rendered unconscious as a result of the application of this technique, employees will comply with the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Immediately handcuff the subject • Roll the subject onto their side and check for vital signs (recovery time will vary, but usually takes 20 to 30 seconds) • Paramedics will be immediately summoned to the scene in all cases. • If cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) is necessary, officers will immediately remove the handcuffs. <p><u>Notifications</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A supervisor will be notified immediately and respond to the scene. • Employees will advise receiving officers (including detention personnel who may assume custody of the subject) the subject was rendered unconscious by the use of the carotid control technique. • The use of the carotid control technique will also be reported on relevant reports, booking forms, referrals, etc. <p><u>Restrictions</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employees will not use the technique more than once on the same subject because of the possibility of progressive physical injury. • The subject will remain handcuffed or restrained, as necessary, to avoid subsequent applications of the carotid control technique.
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4. G. Carotid Control Technique (Continued)

(1) Guidelines (Continued)	<u>Restrictions</u> (Continued) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Subjects who have had the carotid control technique applied will not be restrained with their legs behind their back (hog-tying).
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H. Deadly Force

(1) Guidelines	<p><u>Employees may use deadly force under the following circumstances:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> When such force is reasonable to protect themselves or a third person from another's use, or threatened use, of deadly force. To prevent the escape of a subject whom the employee has probable cause to believe has committed an offense involving the infliction or threat of serious physical injury or death, and is likely to endanger human life or cause serious injury to another unless apprehended without delay. In situations where the employee must overcome an attack the employee reasonably believes would produce serious physical injury or death to the employee or another person. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> When the use of techniques taught by the Department's proficiency skills instructors is not practical under the circumstances, the employee may resort to any reasonable method to overcome the attack. When the circumstances justifying the use of deadly force no longer exist, deadly force will immediately be discontinued. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Employees still may use reasonable force to maintain control and to protect themselves from danger. Deadly force is utilized as a last resort when other measures are not practical under the existing circumstances. The intentional use of a police vehicle against a subject on foot will be considered a use of deadly force. Employees will not attempt to deliberately collide with other vehicles or use a police vehicle to force any vehicle off the roadway. <p><u>EXCEPTION:</u> Employees trained in the precision immobilization technique (PIT) maneuver and assigned to the Airport Bureau on Airport grounds or dignitary protection officers when needed as part of their duties.</p> <p><u>Use of Firearms</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In addition to the guidelines listed above, employees will discharge firearms in connection with police activities only, and in accordance with the following policies, whether on or off duty. Employees will not unnecessarily draw or display any firearm, or carelessly handle a firearm. Warning shots will not be fired. When the shooting of a subject appears imminent, employees will, if practical, issue a verbal warning. Firearms will not be used under circumstances in which a substantial and unjustifiable risk of injury or death to bystanders exists. Employees will not discharge a firearm from a moving vehicle. Firearms will only be used to kill an animal posing an immediate danger to the employee or the public when other means of protection are impractical.
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4. H. Deadly Force (Continued)

(1) Guidelines (Continued)	<p><u>Vehicles</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weapons will not be fired solely to disable a moving vehicle. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Weapons may be discharged at the driver or other occupant of a moving vehicle only when the employee has probable cause to believe the subject poses an immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to the employee or others, and the use of deadly force does not create a danger to the public that outweighs the benefits of its use. • Employees will not deliberately place themselves in the path of a moving vehicle or one capable of immediate movement. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * This is generally considered tactically unsound unless executed as part of a tactical plan intended to enhance safety. * This is not intended to prevent employees from moving in front of or around vehicles during the execution of routine traffic duties, such as directing traffic. • Employees are reminded of the serious risks involved when reaching in or leaning into a running vehicle occupied. • Exigent circumstances must exist before an employee may reach or lean into a running vehicle with the driver's seat occupied. • When it is safe to do so, placing a police vehicle directly in front and rear of the subject vehicle provides an extra margin of safety. <p><u>Notifications</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employees who discharge any firearm will make a verbal report to a supervisor as soon as possible and submit a written report as soon as practical. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * A command officer can make an exception to this requirement. • The employee's bureau/precinct commander or the duty commander will be advised of the weapon discharge incident. • Firearms training, lawful target practice, and lawful hunting are exempt from this paragraph.
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5. **RESPONSE OPTIONS TRAINING**

A. All sworn employees will receive annual training on use of force options and policy by Department authorized instructors, who are certified through Arizona Peace Officers Standards and Training Board (AzPOST).

B. Impact Weapons

(1) Basic Impact Weapons Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recruits will receive basic impact weapons training while in the academy. • Employees not previously certified in basic impact weapons usage may receive impact weapons training on duty or if they are unable to complete the training during their assigned shift, in an authorized off duty training program. • Overtime will be authorized for any impact weapons certification/re-certification training only when employees are unable to complete the training during their regular on duty shift.
(2) Impact Weapons Proficiency Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employees carrying impact weapons will successfully demonstrate proficiency in its use annually. • Department training records will reflect which impact weapon/s an officer has elected to carry and the date basic and proficiency training was completed.

C. Stunbag Shotguns and 37mm Direct Impact Munitions (SAU)

- All sworn employees below the rank of lieutenant will receive stunbag training upon assignment to patrol, and every year thereafter if assigned to patrol.
- See Operations Order 4.25, Firearms Regulations, and the TSB manual for more information.

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5. D. Chemical Agents

- All sworn employees below the rank of commander will receive annual training regarding use of OC spray.

E. Carotid Control Technique

- In order to use the carotid control technique, an employee must satisfactorily complete the basic training course for carotid control.
- Employees will only use the carotid control technique taught by Department defensive tactics instructors.
- Employees must pass a proficiency test administered by a Department certified defensive tactics instructor.
- Certified employees will receive this training while attending post academy.
- Employees not previously trained in the basic carotid control technique must receive carotid control technique training and will demonstrate proficiency prior to utilizing it.
- Employees who are authorized to use the carotid control technique will demonstrate proficiency in its use annually.
- No other type of neck restraint/hold is authorized.

F. Firearms - See Operations Order 4.25, Firearms Regulations.6. **REPORTING USE OF FORCE INCIDENTS** - Employees will document the use of each response option.A. Reporting Guidelines

(1) Officer Presence Verbal Persuasion Negotiation or Command Soft Empty Hand and Restraining Devices	<p>Document the following as required in IRs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Officer presence • Verbal persuasion, negotiation, or commands used • Soft empty hand and restraining devices <p><u>Reporting requirements when injury or alleged injury occurs:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A supervisor will be contacted as soon as possible. • An IR will be completed with the use of force details explained in the Narrative section to include how any injuries were sustained. • If no injury is visible, this will also be documented. • Supervisors will complete a Use of Force report.
(2) Chemical Agents	<p><u>Reporting requirements for all incidents involving the use of chemical agents:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A supervisor will be contacted as soon as possible. • An IR will be completed with the use of the chemical agent documented in the Narrative section. • Supervisors will complete a Use of Force report only upon complaint of injury.
(3) ECDs	<p><u>Reporting requirements for all incidents involving an ECD:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A supervisor will be contacted as soon as possible. • The ECD will be downloaded immediately prior to the completion of the Use of Force report. • Supervisors will complete an Event Information Log for ECDs, available online at www.evidence.com for those with appropriate access, which will be saved electronically and attached to the Use of Force report. • An IR will be completed with the use of force details explained in the Narrative section including the reason for the ECD deployment and target and impact areas.

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6. A. Reporting Guidelines (Continued)

(3) ECDs (Continued)	<p><u>Reporting requirements for all incidents involving an ECD</u> (Continued):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supervisors will complete a Use of Force report which will include the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Serial number of ECD used * Number of times deployed * Distance of the subject from the operator/s who deployed the ECD * Effectiveness and result of use <p><u>Impounding Procedures</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Place the probes backward in the spent cartridge and cover with a biohazard sticker. • Place the cartridge, probes, and some of the Anti-Felon Identifications (AFIDs) in a plastic container and then into a plastic evidence bag marked with biohazard stickers, and impound as evidence. • When completing the IR, list the package/item in the Evidence section ensuring the spent cartridge serial number is included. • If there is no evidentiary value to the cartridge and probes, the following procedures will be followed: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Place the probes backward in the spent cartridge and cover with a biohazard sticker. * Place the cartridge in the sharps/biohazard container in any precinct impound room.
(4) Intermediate Control Techniques	<p><u>Reporting requirements for all incidents involving intermediate control techniques:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A supervisor will be contacted as soon as possible. • An IR will be completed with the use of force details explained in the Narrative section. • Supervisors will complete a Use of Force report. • <u>K9s</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * All Department K9 injury incidents will be investigated and documented by a K9 Unit supervisor using the standard bite report format. * The K9 Unit supervisor will also complete the Use of Force report. • <u>Stunbag Shotguns and Sage SL-6 (SAU)</u> - The Use of Force report will include the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Reason for the shooting * Weapon/s used * Number of shots fired * Target and impact locations * Distance of the subject from the officer/s that fired * Effectiveness and result of use • If a subject sustains a serious injury from a stunbag shotgun or Sage SL-6 shooting incident, see section 7.B of this order for detailed procedures.
(5) Carotid Control Technique	<p><u>Reporting requirements for all incidents involving the carotid control technique:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A supervisor will be contacted as soon as possible. • An IR will be completed with the use of force code details explained in the Narrative section. • Supervisors will complete a Use of Force report.
(6) Deadly Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • See the section 7 of this order for investigation and documentation procedures.

B. Use of Force Report

- (1) Upon notification of a use of force incident, supervisors will conduct a fact finding investigation which will be documented in a Use of Force report if a Use of Force report is required as outlined above in section 6.A.

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6. B. (1) (a) Refer to the Field Based Reporting (FBR) User Manual for data entry procedures.
- (b) A Use of Force report will not be completed on prisoner injuries occurring prior to police arrival or by means other than by police employees.
 - Refer to Operations Order 7.1, Prisoners, for required documentation.
- (c) When possible, audio record witness statements which will be attached to the Use of Force report as an "Image."
- (d) Digital photographs will be taken of any injuries which will be processed/stored as outlined in Operations Order 8.1, Evidence, Impounding, and Property.
- (e) No additional paperwork is required unless unusual circumstances exist.
- (2) Supervisors will submit the initial Use of Force report within seven (7) days of notification of the incident.
- (3) Use of Force reports will be submitted up to commander approval within 30 days of initiation of the report.

7. **SHOOTINGS AND OTHER CRITICAL USE OF FORCE INCIDENTS**

A. Required Reports - Supervisors will complete the following reports:

- Shooting Investigation (if applicable; see section 7.E of this order)
- Use of Force Report

B. Investigation and Reporting Responsibilities

(1) Shootings and Other Use of Force Incidents Resulting in Death or Serious Injury	<p>All shootings and other use of force incidents resulting in death or serious injury involving employees of this Department will be investigated concurrently by the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Professional Standards Bureau (PSB) - Completes the Use of Force report • Involved employee's supervisor • Violent Crimes Bureau (VCB)/Homicide Unit • Incident Review Unit (IRU) <p>EXCEPTION: Incidents listed in the following sections will be investigated accordingly.</p>
(2) Non-Injury Accidental Discharges and Shootings Involving Animals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For non-injury accidental discharges not involving a police action and shootings involving animals, the employee's supervisor will investigate the incident and complete the Use of Force report.
(3) Accidental Discharge Involving Police Action	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If an accidental discharge occurs while the employee is performing a police function and a citizen or subject is in close proximity such as, attempting to arrest a subject, PSB will conduct the investigation and complete the Use of Force report.

C. Notifications - The highest ranking officer at the scene will notify the PSB commander, VCB commander, and IRU/Legal Unit lieutenant.

D. Handling of Involved Employee's Firearm

- (1) Employees involved in any incident in which their firearm was discharged will release the firearm to the officer or supervisor responsible for the investigation.

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7. D. (2) Employees will be issued another firearm by PSB investigators prior to going off shift or returning to duty.

E. Shooting Investigation

- (1) The written report will include the following pre-narrative information:

Investigating Supervisor	Name, serial number, duty assignment, work days and hours
Employee Involved	Name, serial number, duty assignment, work days and hours
Synopsis	
Reason for Shooting Occurred	Injured animal, accidental discharge, etc.
Employee's Prior Use of Force Incidents and Dispositions	Location, date and time
Weapon Used	Make, model, caliber, ownership and type of ammunition
Number of Shots Fired/ Impact Locations/ Backdrop Description	
Injuries or damage	Description of any animals involved and name, address, etc., of owner of damaged property/injured animals
Witnesses	
Photos/Latent Print Examiner	Name of the employee who took the photographs
IR Numbers of Other Related Investigations	
Details of Investigation	Narrative

- (2) As soon as possible (after the scene investigation has been completed), the PSB Investigations Unit lieutenant will be contacted to obtain a PSB shooting incident control number.

- If the incident occurs during non-business hours, the investigating supervisor will contact PSB at the beginning of the next business day to obtain the control number.
- The control number will be included in the subject portion of the memorandum in addition to any other title information.

- (3) All pertinent documents, including photographs, will be attached to the investigative report.
- (4) Evidence in the form of bulk items (guns, shell cases, etc.) will not be forwarded.
- (5) Supervisors will make no recommendations other than referring the matter to the Use of Force Review Board.

F. Routing of Administrative Use of Force Investigation

- (1) Incidents Investigated by PSB - The PSB Commander will forward a copy of the PSB report to the employee's assistant chief and Department Use of Force Board chairperson.
- (2) Incidents Investigated by the Employee's Supervisor - The completed Use of Force report and shooting investigation will be forwarded to the commander of the involved employee's bureau/precinct.

8. **TACTICAL REVIEW COMMITTEE**

A. Purpose

- (1) The Tactical Review Committee (TRC) and TRC sub-committee will review critical use of force incidents and identify any related training needs.

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8. A. (2) The TRC will not have the authority to make recommendations on whether or not a particular use of force involved in the incident reviewed complies with Department policy.
- (3) While the role of the committee is primarily restricted to the identification of training needs for individuals and the Department as a whole, the committee may make suggestions regarding amendments to policy.
- Use of force incidents generally evolve rapidly, compelling employees to make decisions with limited time and/or information; therefore, the TRC will take into consideration the totality of the circumstances involved in the incident and decide if the training need is sufficient to justify immediate intervention.
- B. TRC Committee Members
- (1) The TRC will report to the Police Chief or designee and will consist of the following personnel:
- Training Bureau commander (chair)
 - Department Legal advisor (or representative)
 - PSB commander or designee
 - SAU lieutenant
 - Arizona Law Enforcement Academy (ALEA) Basic Training lieutenant
 - Training Bureau Advanced Training/Proficiency Skills lieutenant
 - Phoenix Police Sergeants and Lieutenants Association (PPSLA) president (or representative)
 - Phoenix Law Enforcement Association (PLEA) president (or representative)
- C. TRC Sub-Committee Members
- (1) The TRC sub-committee, consisting of the following personnel, will attend each VCB debriefing following a critical use of force incident:
- Officers – Tactical Training Detail officer, SAU officer, and a patrol officer
 - Sergeants – Firearms Detail sergeant, SAU training sergeant, Tactical Training sergeant, and a patrol sergeant
 - Lieutenants – Advanced Training/Proficiency Skills lieutenant, SAU lieutenant, K9 Unit lieutenant, and a patrol lieutenant
- (1) Based on the information reviewed at the incident debriefing, the sub-committee will discuss the incident and determine the type of training opportunities that can be addressed.
- (a) This training will address the tactical decision-making and actions of the involved officers, as well as the management of the tactical scene by the responding supervisors.
- (b) The TRC sub-committee will make their recommendations to the TRC.
- (c) The TRC will make a final determination on any training needs.
- D. Post Use of Force Training
- (1) Upon review of the incident by the TRC, all involved employees (to include supervisors) will be required to attend mandatory training.
- At the discretion of the TRC sub-committee, personnel indirectly involved in the incident may also be required to attend training.

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8. D. (2) A Training Notification Form 80-593D, completed by the TRC, will specify the required training and who will be required to attend the training.
- The commander/administrator of the affected employee/s will ensure the training is completed without delay.
 - * With the exception of extenuating circumstances, the mandatory training shall be satisfactorily completed within 14 calendar days from the date notified.
- (3) Employees will complete the mandatory training before returning to their regular work assignment.
- (4) Once the training is completed, the Training Notification form will be signed by the employee and the Advance Training/Proficiency Skills lieutenant.
- The signed Training Notification form will be returned to the TRC.
- E. Training Bureau Responsibilities
- (1) The Training Bureau will be responsible for designing and delivering training based on the review and recommendations made by the TRC.
- (2) Training may include the use of scenario based instruction when appropriate.
- (a) The Training Bureau may develop instruction, based on the TRC review process, to be given at module training, produced as training videos, or created as a written directive for Department-wide dissemination.
- (b) Matters deemed to be of an urgent nature will be addressed as soon as possible and will not be set aside for the next module.
- (3) The training recommended by the TRC may be different for supervisors and other involved employees.
- (4) The Training Bureau will ensure employees involved in the training acknowledge they have received and are responsible for the information presented to them.
- F. Use of Force: Semi-Annual Report
- (1) The TRC chairperson will provide a semi-annual report of lethal force activity to the executive staff by memorandum.
- (2) The TRC semi-annual report will include the following:
- The number and type of lethal force incidents reviewed
 - Any training given in relation to each lethal force incident and how the training was distributed
 - Any trends identified in lethal force incidents and any policy revisions or improvements made as a result of the TRC review process
- (3) The TRC may review incidents of non-lethal force upon referral made by a commander or assistant chief.

NOTE: Normally, the TRC will not review non-lethal force incidents.

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9. **POST USE OF FORCE TRAUMA**

A. Purpose

- (1) The physical and emotional well being of Department employees is a primary concern following any use of force incident.
- (2) The following guidelines have been established to ensure the physical and emotional needs of Department personnel are addressed.

B. Definitions

(1) Critical Use of Force Incident	Any situation where an employee seriously injures or kills a person
(2) Persons Directly Involved	Employees who seriously injure a person or who are seriously injured and those who participate in the incident
(3) Post Use of Force Trauma	The emotional and physical effects that may occur to persons who have been involved physically or emotionally in a use of force incident

C. Assistance at the Scene of Any Use of Force Incident

- (1) Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) Team - A CISM team coordinator will be contacted to evaluate the incident and call out CISM team members as needed in all use of force incidents.
- (2) Command Personnel - Appropriate command personnel, at the discretion of the Police Chief, will initiate personal contact with the involved employee and family to provide Department support and assistance as soon as possible.

D. Post Use of Force Counseling

- (1) Employees Directly Involved in a Critical Use of Force Incident - All employees directly involved in a use of force incident resulting in death or serious injury will attend a psychological debriefing with the contracted psychologist listed in this order.
- (2) The psychological debriefing will be scheduled as soon as possible after the incident by the employees' immediate supervisors.
 - (a) Counseling is available on a 24-hour per day basis if needed.
 - (b) Five (5) follow-up sessions will be available at no expense to employees.
- (3) Employees will meet with the contracted psychologist a second time before being released to enforcement duties (this session will be completed 30 days following the critical incident).
- (4) Verification of the visits from the psychologist's office (not the contents of the sessions) will be included in the Return to Work Authorization Form 80-595D to be forwarded to the appropriate assistant chief for review and his/her signature.
- (5) Employees Not Directly Involved in a Use of Force Incident
 - (a) All employees who feel they are or may be negatively affected as a result of their involvement are strongly encouraged to take advantage of the counseling services available through the Employee Assistant Unit (EAU)
 - (b) This may include the employees' spouses or immediate family members.

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9. D. (6) Services Contracted to Provide Post Use of Force Counseling - The following service is contracted to provide post use of force counseling:

Jeni McCutcheon, Psy. D., M.S.C.P., ABPP
 4501 N 22nd Street, Suite 190
 Phoenix, Arizona 85016
 602-368-2526
 To schedule appointments: www.drjeni.org

- (7) Counseling Confidentiality Assurance - Employees who seek consultation or receive counseling through the Department contracted psychologist are assured maximum confidentiality.
- (a) No individual, group, organization, department, City employee, or City official shall have access to any information regarding an individual's participation in the program except as noted.
- (b) The only exception to the guarantee of confidentiality is an indication by the officer to the psychologist of any **immediate physical danger to self or others**.
- (c) In the event of such an occurrence, the Police Chief shall be notified or action taken to ensure protection of those concerned.

E. Post Use of Force Reassignment

- (1) Reassignment Guidelines

(1) Employees Who Seriously Injure or Kill a Person	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Any employee who seriously injures or kills a person and is able to work <u>will be</u> assigned at home for one (1) week following the incident. The employee will ensure availability to investigators. The employee may be assigned to a non-enforcement position for at least three (3) additional weeks pending administrative review. The Police Chief may return the employee to full duty prior to the Use of Force Review Board upon recommendation of the officer's assistant chief. The employee will attend an initial psychological debriefing as soon as possible and a second meeting 30 days following the critical incident.
(2) Any Other Employee Directly Involved in a Use of Force Incident	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Any other employee directly involved in a use of force incident resulting in death or serious injury to any person may be reassigned to a non-enforcement position pending administrative review of the incident. The Police Chief may return the employee to full duty prior to the Use of Force Review Board upon recommendation of the officer's assistant chief. The employee will attend a psychological debriefing.

- (2) Any employee involved in a use of force incident resulting in assignment at home will have **PX** time (Use of Force/Administrative Leave) entered in eChris by the Fiscal Management Bureau/Human Resource Unit supervisor.
- (3) All employees directly involved in a Class III discharge of a firearm will be referred to the Training Bureau firearms staff for an appointment prior to returning to enforcement duty from administrative leave.
- (a) The employee's bureau/precinct commander/administrator or designee will be responsible for contacting the Training Bureau firearms staff to schedule the appointment.
- (b) This appointment will provide employees with the opportunity to fire their duty weapon, and if necessary, qualify on a replacement weapon and discuss any weapons related questions they may have as a result of their shooting incident.

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9. E. (4) All employees involved in a critical use of force incident will have a Return to Work Authorization form completed by their commander/administrator prior to returning to their regular work assignment.
- (5) The administrative review process will be considered complete upon the findings of the Use of Force Review Board, if the incident is found within policy, or upon completion of the disciplinary review process, if the incident is found to be out of policy.

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Police-brutality protest ends with clash with Phoenix Police Department

Yihyun Jeong, The Republic | azcentral.com Published 2:04 p.m. MT Oct. 26, 2014 | Updated 2:01 p.m. MT Oct. 27, 2014



(Photo: The Republic)

A protest against police brutality Saturday night in downtown Phoenix ended with a clash with officers, the arrest of six protesters and the discharge of pepper-spray balls, officials said.

The march, which was organized by [Wave of Action PHX](https://www.facebook.com/wavemaydayphx/info) (<https://www.facebook.com/wavemaydayphx/info>), began around 8:30 p.m. with about 40 to 50 people gathered at Civic Space Park between Central and First avenues near Van Buren Street.

Though the march started peacefully, it almost immediately became a serious public nuisance and hazard when marchers entered the roadway and began obstructing traffic, Phoenix police spokesman Sgt. Jonathan

Howard said.

The marchers were warned repeatedly to stay out of the roadway, but the majority of them disregarded the orders and continued to block traffic in the area, Howard said. They created additional hazards as they crossed against traffic signals near First and Washington streets.

Footage (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mgZIGaWl8-E>) taken at the event shows marchers clad in all black shouting, "Hands up; shoot back!" as they marched into traffic toward CityScape. The footage shows officers dressed in tactical gear along the street and some on motorcycles telling protesters to get out of the street or they will be arrested.

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A member of the collective, Tommy Johnson, said officers did not give ample warning to the group and that they began to take snap decisions. Johnson said an officer on a motorcycle rode into the group, running over several members and breaking someone's foot.

There were no reported injuries or damages, Howard said.

Johnson said officers continued to follow smaller groups when the march dispersed, and made violent arrests on the sidewalks.

"The Phoenix Police Department supports and defends peoples' right to free speech and peaceful assembly," Howard said. "After multiple warnings and attempts to obey the law were disregarded, police were forced to make several arrests to ensure the safety and well being of all people in the downtown area."

Several arrests were made for obstructing a thoroughfare and failing to obey officers regarding traffic control, Howard said.

Several members of the group became violent toward the officers making arrests and began to throw flagpoles that they had been carrying at the officers, Howard said.

"Officers discharged pepper balls at these suspects to protect the officers, the suspects being arrested and others in the area," Howard said.

The assailants fled the scene and were not located, he said.

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*Motion for leave to file non-electronic exhibits to be filed

Ex. 44