	1				
1	Mónica M. Ramírez*				
2	Cecillia D. Wang* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION				
3	FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS PROJECT				
4	39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111				
5	Telephone: (415) 343-0778 Facsimile: (415) 395-0950 Email: mramirez@aclu.org				
6					
7	Attorneys for Plaintiffs (Additional Attorneys for Plaintiffs listed on next page)				
8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT				
9	DISTRICT COURT OF ARIZONA				
10	HECTOR LODEZ, LEODOL DO IDARRA.	Case No.			
11	HECTOR LOPEZ; LEOPOLDO IBARRA; ISMAEL IBARRA,	Case No.			
12	Plaintiffs	COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF			
13	v.	AND DECLARATORT RELIEF			
14	TOWN OF CAVE CREEK, ARIZONA;	42 U.S.C. § 1983 (FIRST AND			
15	VINCENT FRANCIA, Mayor and Town Council member of Cave Creek, in his	FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS)			
16	official capacity; GILBERT LOPEZ, Deputy Mayor and Town Council member of Cave				
17	Creek, in his official capacity,				
18	Defendants.				
19					
20					
21					
22					
23					
24					
25					
26					
27					
28					
	1 COMPLAINT				
	COIVIT LAINT				

1	Additional Attorneys:			
2	Daniel Pochoda (AZ Bar No. 021979) ACLU FOUNDATION OF ARIZONA			
	P.O. Box 17148 Phoenix, AZ 85011-0148			
4	Telephone: (602) 650-1854 Facsimile: (602) 650-1376			
5	Email: dpochoda@acluaz.org			
6	Kristina M. Campbell (AZ Bar No. 023139) Cynthia Valenzuela*			
7	MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND			
8				
9	634 S. Spring Street, 11th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90014 Telephone: (213) 629-2512, x136 Facsimile: (213) 629-0266			
10	Email: kcampbell@maldef.org			
11	*Application for admission <i>pro hac vice</i> forthcoming.			
12				
13				
14				
15				
16				
17				
18				
19				
20				
21				
22				
23				
24				
25				
26				
27				
28				
	2 COMPLAINT			
	CUMPLAIN I			

INTRODUCTION

- 1. This civil rights action challenges Section 72.17(C) of the Cave Creek Town Code (the "Ordinance"), a content-based restriction on free speech that violates the First Amendment rights of persons who wish to express their availability for work, to advertise their business, or to request charitable contributions in public areas in the Town of Cave Creek.
- 2. The Ordinance prohibits solicitation, or attempted solicitation, of employment, business or contributions from occupants of moving or parked vehicles, while the person soliciting, or attempting to solicit, stands on or adjacent to a street or highway, which includes sidewalks.
- 3. The Ordinance is a content-based regulation of free speech and therefore violates the First Amendment, which applies to the Town of Cave Creek through incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment, of the U.S. Constitution. Content-based regulations are subject to strict scrutiny and are presumptively unconstitutional. The Ordinance is content-based because it prohibits not the manner of solicitation but particular messages of solicitation.
- 4. The Ordinance violates the First Amendment under any legal test. Even if the Ordinance were considered a content-neutral regulation, it would still be unconstitutional because it is not narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and fails to leave open ample alternative channels of communication. Indeed, district courts in the Ninth Circuit have repeatedly struck down similar anti-solicitation ordinances that were enacted for the stated purpose of regulating traffic safety, on the ground that they were not narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose.
- 5. Plaintiffs are day laborers who in the past have successfully solicited temporary work in the Town of Cave Creek by peaceably standing in public areas and waiting for homeowners and other employers to pick them up and take them to job sites. Under the Ordinance, such solicitation is now prohibited. Plaintiffs would violate the

terms of the Ordinance if they, for example, wave their arms, carry a sign or distribute fliers, if what they are attempting to convey to occupants of vehicles, through any of these means, is their availability to work. The First Amendment does not tolerate these types of content-discriminatory restrictions on speech and expression.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 6. This Court has jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a), and 2201, as well as under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- 7. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is proper in this district because Plaintiffs reside in this district and the events giving rise to the claims occurred and are occurring in this district.

PARTIES

- 8. Plaintiff Hector H. Lopez is a longtime resident of Arizona and has lived in Cave Creek for approximately five years. He is currently employed part-time at the Good Shepherd Episcopal Church in Cave Creek. Prior to working at the Church, he successfully solicited employment in the Town by peaceably standing in public areas and soliciting work from occupants of vehicles. Mr. Lopez currently would like to make his availability for day work known through means prohibited by the Ordinance in order to supplement his income. However, because of the Ordinance, Mr. Lopez is prohibited from engaging in expressive activity indicating his availability to work on sidewalks or other public areas in Cave Creek. He fears that he could be cited or arrested for violating the Ordinance.
- 9. Plaintiff Leopoldo Ibarra is a longtime resident of Arizona and currently resides in Cave Creek. He solicited employment in Cave Creek before the Town passed the Ordinance by peaceably standing in public areas and making his availability to work known. Mr. L. Ibarra is currently unemployed and wishes to be able to make his availability for day work known through means prohibited by the Ordinance. However, because of the Ordinance, Mr. L. Ibarra is prohibited from engaging in expressive activity

indicating his availability to work on sidewalks or other public areas in Cave Creek. He fears that he could be cited or arrested for violating the Ordinance.

- 10. Plaintiff Ismael Ibarra is a longtime resident of Arizona and currently resides in Phoenix with his family. Mr. I. Ibarra occasionally solicited employment in Cave Creek until the Town passed the Ordinance. He is currently employed and wishes to have the opportunity to supplement his income by soliciting employment in Cave Creek through means prohibited by the Ordinance. However, because of the Ordinance, Mr. I. Ibarra will not engage in expressive activity indicating his availability to work on sidewalks or other public areas in Cave Creek. He fears that he could be cited or arrested for violating the Ordinance.
- 11. Defendant Town of Cave Creek ("the Town") is an unincorporated municipality located in Maricopa County. The Town adopts municipal ordinances through a seven-member Town Council and enforces these ordinances by contract with the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office.
- 12. Defendant Vincent Francia is the Town's Mayor and a member of the Town Council, which adopts laws and policies for the Town. Defendant Francia is responsible for the adoption and enforcement of the Ordinance. He is sued in his official capacity.
- 13. Defendant Gilbert Lopez is the Town's Deputy Mayor and assists Defendant Francia with executive duties, including law enforcement policy. Defendant G. Lopez is also a member of the Town Council, which adopts laws and policies for the Town. Defendant G. Lopez is responsible for the adoption and enforcement of the Ordinance. He is sued in his official capacity.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

14. On September 24, 2007, the Cave Creek Town Council adopted the Ordinance, which states: "No person shall stand on or adjacent to a street or highway and solicit, or attempt to solicit, employment, business or contributions from the occupant of

any vehicle." Town Code § 72.17(C). The Ordinance has been in effect since October 24, 2007.

- 15. A violation of the Ordinance constitutes a civil code infraction not to exceed \$250. See Town Code § 72.17(C) (referencing Town Code § 10.99). However, anyone who has been twice previously found to have violated any provision of the Ordinance within the preceding 24 months, shall, in addition to the civil code infraction, be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor and be punished by a fine not to exceed \$2,500, by imprisonment for a period not to exceed six months, by a term of probation not to exceed three years, or by any combination of such fine, imprisonment, and probation. Town Code § 10.99(D).
- 16. Defendants' public statements suggest that they pursued enactment of the Ordinance out of a desire to target a perceived problem with illegal immigration in Cave Creek.
- 17. At the June 18, 2007, Town Council meeting, Defendant Francia appointed Defendant G. Lopez and another councilman, Ernie Bunch, to address public concerns about an alleged rise in illegal immigration and day laborers in the Town by way of anti-loitering and anti-solicitation ordinances.
- 18. In a letter to the editor of the local *Sonoran News* in August 2007, Defendant G. Lopez acknowledged the Town's plan to respond to perceptions of illegal immigration by means of a law prohibiting day laborers from soliciting work in Cave Creek. Defendant G. Lopez's letter indicates that he presumed that day laborers are undocumented immigrants.
- 19. The Ordinance prohibits and regulates speech and other expressive activity in areas, such as public sidewalks, which are traditional public fora.
- 20. The Ordinance discriminates among types of speech and other expressive activity on the basis of content, as it prohibits solicitation of employment, business or

contributions, but does not prohibit solicitation on other topics or speech unrelated to solicitation, even if expressed in the same time, place and manner.

- 21. The Ordinance proscribes particular messages of solicitation, and not the manner of solicitation. A violation of the Ordinance depends solely on a person, for example, saying the "wrong" words (e.g., "I need work"), distributing the "wrong" leaflets (e.g., "Donate to the Red Cross"), or carrying the "wrong" signs (e.g., "Lemonade for Sale").
- 22. The Ordinance proscribes particular messages of solicitation, and not actions or conduct that the Town might legitimately regulate, such as disruption of vehicular or pedestrian traffic.
- 23. To enforce the Ordinance, a law enforcement officer must examine the content of the speech to determine whether it falls within the proscribed category of solicitation speech. The Town does not have a compelling governmental interest in regulating speech and expression in the content-based manner achieved by the Ordinance.
- 24. Even if the Ordinance were content-neutral, it would violate the First Amendment because it is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.
- 25. If Defendants were concerned about traffic safety or maintaining clear passage on sidewalks, they could have enforced existing state and local laws that were sufficient for those purposes. Instead of availing themselves of existing regulations on activities relating to traffic and safety, Defendants enacted the Ordinance as a restriction on speech that is not narrowly tailored to prevent traffic hazards or other valid governmental interests of the Town.
- 26. The Ordinance does not leave open ample alternative channels in which Plaintiffs and other day laborers can express their availability to work in public areas.
- 27. The Ordinance is overbroad and burdens substantially more speech than is necessary to further any governmental interest.

- 28. The Ordinance is vague and does not provide adequate notice of what it prohibits. It fails to define key terms that would indicate where solicitation speech may be permitted. The Ordinance does not define the terms "solicit, or attempt to solicit," nor are these terms explicitly defined in any other sections of the Town Code.
- 29. The Ordinance offers no guidance to persons such as Plaintiffs and other day laborers as to whether standing in the same vicinity as other day laborers, raising an arm to signal to a passing construction contractor in a pickup truck, or watching for a bus to stop on a sidewalk could be construed as an "attempt to solicit."
- 30. The Ordinance offers no guidance to law enforcement officers as to what is prohibited under the Ordinance, creating a serious risk of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement against those who are or may appear to be day laborers. Plaintiffs are dark-skinned Latino men, as are the majority of day laborers in Cave Creek, and fear that they will be targeted if they stand in public areas because of their appearance.
- 31. Plaintiffs and other day laborers have previously successfully obtained and currently wish to continue to obtain lawful employment performing services, such as gardening, moving and construction, by expressing their availability to work, while standing on a public sidewalk or other public way, to persons in vehicles on the street.
- 32. Plaintiffs and other day laborers fear expressing their availability for employment in the manner they have used in the past because the Ordinance subjects them to the danger of arrest and fines.
- 33. An actual case or controversy exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants regarding the constitutionality and legal enforceability of the Ordinance.
- 34. Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration of their rights with regard to the Ordinance.

CAUSE OF ACTION

(42 U.S.C. § 1983 – First and Fourteenth Amendments)

1	35. Plaintiffs re-allege paragraphs 1-34 of this Complaint as though fully s	se	
2	forth here.		
3	36. By leaving in place, enforcing, and/or threatening to enforce Section	or	
4	72.17(C) of the Cave Creek Town Code, Defendants deprive Plaintiffs and others	O	
5	rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteent		
6	Amendment, of the U.S. Constitution. Defendants commit these unconstitutional act		
7	under color or authority of law.		
8	37. Section 72.17(C) and all acts by Defendants to enforce its unconstitution	ıa	
9	restrictions on speech therefore should be enjoined.		
10	PRAYER FOR RELIEF		
11	WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that the Court:		
12	1. Declare Section 72.17(C) of the Cave Creek Town Code null and void	as	
13	unconstitutional because it violates the First Amendment, as incorporated by Fourteentl		
14	Amendment, of the U.S. Constitution.		
15	2. Pending a decision on the merits, enter a preliminary injunction that enjoi	ns	
16	Defendants from enforcing Section 72.17(C).		
17	3. Upon hearing the merits, enter a permanent injunction that enjoi	ns	
18	Defendants from enforcing Section 72.17(C) in perpetuity.		
19	4. Award Plaintiffs, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, reasonable attorney's fees, cos	sts	
20	and expenses of this litigation; and		
21			
22	//		
23			
24			
25			
26			
27			
28			
	9 COMPLAINT	_	

1	5. Awar	d such further and additional relief as is just and proper.
2	Dated: March 25, 2008	Respectfully submitted,
3 4		Mónica M. Ramírez* Cecillia D. Wang* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
5		FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS PROJECT
6		Daniel Pochoda ACLU FOUNDATION OF ARIZONA
7		Kristina M. Campbell
8		Kristina M. Campbell Cynthia Valenzuela* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND
10		
11		By: _/s/ Kristina M. Campbell
12		Attorneys for Plaintiffs
13		*Application for admission <i>pro hac vice</i> forthcoming.
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		
		10

COMPLAINT